ANA 767 lousy landing

[snydersnapshots]

Originally Posted by Evan

I think you can only take the 'human factors' excuse so far. We're talking about basic, concrete and clearly specified things here: weather conditions.

Any experienced pilot or mariner will tell you that there is NOTHING basic, concrete, or clearly specified about weather conditions. Weather can change drastically within minutes, both for the better and for the worse. Case in point: Delta 191 at DFW. A Learjet that preceded them on the approach reported little turbulence. A few minutes later when Delta came through, the microburst smacked them out of the sky like a fly under a flyswatter.

Originally Posted by Evan

When traffic ahead tells you that they experienced severe turbulence down to the runway and the field is reporting heavy crosswinds and windshear, to proceed means taking a certain calculated risk with other people's lives, and a risk where the calculation doesn't add up to "probably safe". It adds up to "best to hold or divert".

Not necessarily. First of all, turbulence intensity (see page 13 of this advisory circular for definitions) is often over-reported--thus light is often reported as moderate and moderate as severe. Not saying you should disregard the reports by any means, just that you need to be aware.

Secondly, the size of the airplane reporting the turbulence is a player as well: something that I would report as moderate (per the definitions listed) when I was flying a 14,000 lb Jetstream would probably be light in the 450,000 lb 767 I'm flying now.

Thirdly, we don't know what procedures the ANA crew was using. In conditions like that, Boeing recommends adding 1/2 the steady wind and all of the gust to the Vref speed (not to exceed 20 knots) and use that as your target. So if the winds were 250 at 28 gusting to 44 as mentioned in a previous post), we'd use half of 28, which is 14 PLUS the 16 knot gust (44-28. Since 14+16=30, and that exceeds the 20 knot max additive, we'd add 20 knots. Let's say his Vref speed was 145; 145+20 is 165. He should have flown the approach at 165 knots (in my example).

If they didn't use the wind additive, a hard landing is quite conceivable.

Originally Posted by Evan

If a crew is going to proceed into harm's way simply because they are too stressed or fatigued to divert, then we have a MUCH BIGGER problem up there.

Without a doubt...

Originally Posted by Evan

Over and over I see hull loss accidents resulting from stupid landings that obviously should never have been attempted. Ultimately, it is the Capt to decide to continue..

How many "stupid landings" were made that day in the same conditions that did NOT result in aircraft damage?

Originally Posted by Evan

As I've argued unsuccessfully in the past, this decision should be restricted by regulations regarding weather over the field, and the field should have the final say in approving or denying the approach.

So you're advocating that a controller (or worse, a bureaucrat), who is not even a pilot, can make the decision that it's safe or not safe for me to land my 757 or 767, or when it's safe or not safe for me to land a Cessna 172. How about taking into account the fact that I'm extremely current in a 757, but haven't been in a 172 in 20 years. You can't put a blanket rule out there to protect everybody in a situation like this. Make the rule loose enough so the large aircraft can operate and you'll lose smaller airplanes. Make it tight enough that everyone is protected and nobody will fly.

Originally Posted by Evan

We have sensible minima for visibility but apparently not for winds or the potential for windshear.

Demonstrated crosswind limitation for the 757/767:

Landing: Dry or Wet: 40
Standing water/Slush: 20
Snow, no melting: 35

Takeoff: Dry: 40
Wet: 25
Standing water/slush: 15
Snow, no melting: 20

These look pretty sensible to me, and they're in the limitations section of the manual. Sure, they're demonstrated and recommended crosswind components, but if I go out and bend an airplane in a wind that exceeds these guidelines, I'm going to be explaining why I was out there playing test pilot with a bunch of paying passengers on board.

I've landed the simulator in a 40 knot direct crosswind, and the airplane in 35 knot gusty crosswinds. Both are completely doable.

Originally Posted by Evan

The field should have been temporarily closed even before this incident. There's no reason why flying needs to be this dangerous.

Bottom line, you're never going to eliminate risk from life, by legislation or any other means. If these guys had gotten the airplane on the ground without bending the airplane, we never would have known about the wind conditions in the first place.

[snydersnapshots]

Originally Posted by 3WE

Thanks always for your insight- and the topic of how intelligent pilots (correction- I mean adult pilots) on-board radar, holes in storms, and ATC all work together to keep the US air transportation system moving (sometimes sluggishly, but NONE THE LESS moving) through stormy areas is well documented.

As is the "herd mentality" (and the genuine safety value of a pirep (official pirep, or just knowing the dude made it) from someone 3 minutes ahead).

I think Les Abend (or maybe his predicessor) wrote an article in Flying about landing at San Antonio when a tropical storm was just hitting...as I recall he encountered 'extreme' winds, but turbulence was not so bad- and let Otto do 'everything' on the approach with him watching.

But back to the drilled nose wheel and need for Verbal's plastic surgery team- if someone reports "severe turbulence" on short final- I guess I could argue from my arm chair that it might be a good idea to call off landings for 5 or 10 min...and then someone could go back and try it again- being ready for severe turbulence.

...of course, one counter argument- and one you even learn in private pilot school- is that winds settle significantly in the last 50 to 100 feet above ground....(except when they don't).

...and another thing- Flying Wild Alaska is back on- they certainly have lots of impressive footage of operating in strong, gusty crosswinds in smaller planes- it seems the wind is never too strong for them.

Very well said. Pilots are put on airplanes not only to add weight to the forward section of the airplane and thus counterbalance the weight of the tail, but to use their judgment and skill as well. Most of the time this arrangement works out very well. Sometimes it works out better than it should--cases in point: Al Haynes and his crew on the DC-10 in Sioux City, and Sully Sullenberger and his crew in the Hudson. Unfortunately, other times the arrangement doesn't work out so well and the pilots involved "screw the pooch" as Tom Wolfe so eloquently put it in THE RIGHT STUFF.

[3WE]

Originally Posted by snydersnapshots

...Delta 191 at DFW. A Learjet that preceded them on the approach reported little turbulence...

Actually, he reported that it was the worst turbulence he had ever experienced...

...except that report was to officials after 191 crashed, as opposed to a timely report or pirep.

I'm not sure how many folks are aware that it was a really small cell that 191 encountered- a classic afternoon airmass thundershower, with the majority of the DFW area staying dry that day with light haze, with a few scattered towering cumulus around.

...maybe that's not fair- it was a TEXAS thundershower- those things are different- they tend to be dry and small, but loaded with wind, lightning, often hail...

[Evan]

Originally Posted by snydersnapshots

Any experienced pilot or mariner will tell you that there is NOTHING basic, concrete, or clearly specified about weather conditions.

What I mean is that the weather is currently not favorable. The fact that it might improve in the next few minutes is no reason to proceed. It's a reason to hold for an update.

Secondly, the size of the airplane reporting the turbulence is a player as well: something that I would report as moderate (per the definitions listed) when I was flying a 14,000 lb Jetstream would probably be light in the 450,000 lb 767 I'm flying now.

Aircraft type is required for a PIREP. If this was just an advisory from traffic ahead, wouldn't you request that as well?

If they didn't use the wind additive, a hard landing is quite conceivable.

Indeed.

How many "stupid landings" were made that day in the same conditions that did NOT result in aircraft damage?

This is my point. I think there is an "any-landing-you-walk-away-from" mentality going on here. Given the performance margins of large jets, odds are you will get away with it. I just don't want a pilot flying me into that margin and playing the odds with my life. I've had a few landings that probably qualified as that, and yes, I wanted to ask the pilot what the hell he was thinking. I would MUCH RATHER be delayed or diverted than go through that again. Or end up in the ICU.

So you're advocating that a controller (or worse, a bureaucrat), who is not even a pilot, can make the decision that it's safe or not safe for me to land my 757 or 767, or when it's safe or not safe for me to land a Cessna 172.

No. This is what people keep assuming I'm saying. What I'm proposing is that a controller, following the guidelines set down by a bureaucrat (the FAA), can make the decision that it is not safe. He cannot make the decision that it is safe. Only the pilot can do that. So the pilot still has final say on proceeding, unless weather conditions are below an established safe condition.

Bottom line, you're never going to eliminate risk from life, by legislation or any other means. If these guys had gotten the airplane on the ground without bending the airplane, we never would have known about the wind conditions in the first place.

That doesn't mean you can't mitigate the risk with common sense. Just to give you a few examples, such guidelines would have prevented the brilliant executions shown below:

[Gabriel]

Evan, believe it or not, I agree that as there are minimum conditions for ceiling and visibility, there could also be for winds and storms (it would be a bit more complicated because they would be type-specific, but doable).

That said, be careful with the examples you give so you don't fall in the confirmation bias trap:

Are you sure you cannot find a bunch of examples of landing accidents were weather conditions were NOT a significant factor?

Are you sure that in some of the examples you give, it was not another type of problem or error the main cause of the accident (for example forgetting to arm the spoilers before touchdown and failing to manually extend them after touchdown), rather than (or at least concurrently with)the weather conditions?

[Gabriel]

Ok, I'm going to take a risk:

While weather conditions could have been a factor in this accident, the main factor was the pilot actively and intentionally pushing nose-down after the first left-gear bounced touch-down. His intention was to take the nose down immediately after touch-down and he didn't initially notice that he had bounced.

The FDR will tell. Whether we will know about it or not is another subject.

[Evan]

Originally Posted by Gabriel

Are you sure you cannot find a bunch of examples of landing accidents were weather conditions were NOT a significant factor?

Certainly. I'm only addressing the ones that were the result of attempting a landing in what I consider unreasonably risky weather conditions.

Are you sure that in some of the examples you give, it was not another type of problem or error the main cause of the accident (for example forgetting to arm the spoilers before touchdown and failing to manually extend them after touchdown), rather than (or at least concurrently with)the weather conditions?

Put it this way: Aviation safety is based on redundancy. So you must do everything possible to preserve that redundancy. In other words, you should never attempt to land in conditions that cannot tolerate a reverser failure or failure to deploy ground spoilers. You should also have some margin built in for a float that might put you further down the runway when you get the weight on wheels. Without these margins, sooner or later, you are going to overrun, because, as we know, these things happen. Weather is often a contributing factor even when it is not the primary cause. Yes, you can land in X weather conditions if nothing goes wrong, but things do go wrong.

The real problem with leaving these decisions to the pilot (instead of having hard minimums) is that pilots tend to become task-focused and it can impair their judgement.

Example: Southwest 1248: An east south easterly wind would normally favor landing into the wind on Runway 13 Center. The runway visual range was reported at 4,500 feet, below the landing minimums for the Instrument Landing System approach to Runway 13C. The only available runway with lower minimums was the opposite direction on 31C, with the aircraft's groundspeed consequentially boosted by the tailwind. Alternately, the crew could have held in the air, waiting for the weather to improve, or they could have diverted to another airport, such as Chicago O'Hare International, whose substantially longer runways were 10 minutes flying time away. Each of these options would have entailed considerable additional expense for Southwest, as well as missed connections and significant inconvenience for the flight's passengers. The National Transportation Safety Board identified the psychological pressure to complete their assigned task as one of the factors contributing to the crew's decision to land at Midway despite unfavorable conditions. Cockpit voice-recorder transcripts indicate the pilots had been concerned about the weather and, prior to landing, jokingly alluded to the movie Airplane!, saying "I picked a bad day to stop sniffin' glue." (do pilots just forget about the CVR...?)

The NTSB preliminary report has determined that the aircraft touched down in the touchdown zone of the runway with 4,500 feet of its 6,522-foot (1,988 m) length remaining; under the prevailing conditions of weather, wind, speed, and weight, the aircraft needed 5,300 feet of runway to stop safely.

[Evan]

Originally Posted by Gabriel

Ok, I'm going to take a risk:

While weather conditions could have been a factor in this accident, the main factor was the pilot actively and intentionally pushing nose-down after the first left-gear bounced touch-down. His intention was to take the nose down immediately after touch-down and he didn't initially notice that he had bounced.

The FDR will tell. Whether we will know about it or not is another subject.

Look at the video Gabriel, the right main touches down hard and the left is still airborne. That looks like crosswind to me...

[Gabriel]

Originally Posted by Evan

Look at the video Gabriel, the right main touches down hard and the left is still airborne. That looks like crosswind to me...

I didn't say that there was no crosswind (I did say by mistake left gear bounce, I meant right).

What I think is that while weather might have been a significant factor in the right landing gear relatively hard touchdown and subsequent bounce, the reason why the nose goes down (which is what ultimately caused the damage) is the pilot positively and intentionally applying nose-down elevator, which after a bounce (weather related or not) is a wrong technique.

[Gabriel]

Evan,

As I've said, I agree that limiting wind, windshear and storm conditions could be imposed.

And it is not true that "So you must do everything possible to preserve that redundancy" in the way you imply it.

For example, there are lots of landings where a spoilers failure to deploy would lead to an overrun. Spoilers are a REQUIRED equipment for landing and its availability is taken into account in the landing performance calculations (except if you know forehand that it is out of service).

That said, there are lots of landings where, if the runway was dry, a spoiler failure would not mean an overrun and a wet runway landing would. In those cases, by accepting wet runway landings, we are knowingly giving away a "redundancy" (or a safety margin), and it would be possible just to ban those landings. So we are not doing everything possible to preserve that redundancy.

The problem lies in a line: reasonable.
We accept reasonable risks. And while we know that the risks can never be totally eliminated, it is also true that we accept that some flight operations that are riskier than others. And we accept that we could avoid that additional risk by avoiding such riskier operations. But we don't and we don't want to. To a point: reasonable.

The problem is that what is reasonable to one is not reasonable for another one. So whoever defines the limits of reasonability and wherever he puts that limits, it will be an arbitrary decision. And yet, someone has to make that decision.

[Evan]

Originally Posted by Gabriel

The problem lies in a line: reasonable.

We accept reasonable risks.

The problem is that what is reasonable to one is not reasonable for another one. So whoever defines the limits of reasonability and wherever he puts that limits, it will be an arbitrary decision. And yet, someone has to make that decision.

I totally agree with that. But 'arbitrarily' does not mean 'capricious'. We did this for visibility minima. Someone made those decisions. I, for instance, do not think the weather conditions described in this incident were reasonable, but experts may differ with me on that. A hand-picked group of safety pilots, engineers, meteorologic and aeronautic experts not under the influence of the industry could arrive at reasonable limits. But those limits should not be a compromise that favors risk over safety. I think those limits would have prevented the examples I posted above.

[Gabriel]

I agree except in one point: There WILL be influence from the industry, whether direct, indirect or implicit, because commercial aviation is a business, and while everybody says "safety is out top priority", economic viability is vital for the industry to exist. It would be extremely easy to gather a bunch of "experts" and come with several recommendation on just "how to improve safety" without any other consideration. The problem is when you have to do a multidimensional evaluation, where safety is not the only factor.

And I don't understand the "those limits should not be a compromise that favors risk over safety" part. The limits can always be made more stringent, that is with more safety and less risk, so in a way any limit WILL favor some "reasonable" risks over some "very strict" safety. Or maybe I understand what you mean but I don't agree with the wording.

[3WE]

Originally Posted by Gabriel

Ok, I'm going to take a risk:...the main factor was the pilot actively and intentionally pushing nose-down after the first left-gear bounced touch-down...

Originally Posted by ITS immitating Yoda

A bold statement makes you, young Jedi, to seemingly contradict Snyder and 5NavV...

But, in defense of your statement-the winds- while strong- were not all that different from what 5NavV mentioned in Florida, nor all that different from any other crazy windy day when brave airmen keep the air transportation system moving!

So- we are arm-chair judging that he hiccuped and shoved the nose over when he shouldn't have- just like every student pilot did at least once in his training.

99.999999% of the time, the professional pilot keeps the nose up while he works through the nasty bounce, but the Mark IV, gluteal-input, carbon-based autopilot sometimes-rarely-messes up (just like Airbus FBW, computers and MD-80 trim jack screws mess up on extremely rare occasions).

Despite Evan's rants- were the winds that day really that extreme-especially compared to some of the goodies on youtubez?

[snydersnapshots]

Originally Posted by 3WE

So- we are arm-chair judging that he hiccuped and shoved the nose over when he shouldn't have- just like every student pilot did at least once in his training.

99.999999% of the time, the professional pilot keeps the nose up while he works through the nasty bounce, but the Mark IV, gluteal-input, carbon-based autopilot sometimes-rarely-messes up (just like Airbus FBW, computers and MD-80 trim jack screws mess up on extremely rare occasions).

3WE--You're the voice of reason here and I'm jumping on your bandwagon:

We're looking at it from the perspective of the pilot of a relatively small airplane--or perhaps I should say "short-coupled" airplane. I don't have any time in the 767-300, but I have a fair amount in the -400. The longer airplanes are more susceptible to tail-strikes. A bounced landing like that depicted in the video is one of the most common causes of a tail-strike. So, before we hammer on him for slamming the nose down (not that you were in this post, 3WE), let's try to get into his head and figure out what he was thinking. My guess is that he didn't realize how high he was and pushed the nose over slightly to reduce the possibility of a tail-strike. Pure speculation on my part, but a reasonable explanation. Best option after the first bounce? Cob the power and get out of there. On the other hand, we're sitting here in the comfort of our home (or in my case, hotel room) with a lot of time to ponder the situation, the conditions, and the outcome. Take the time between the first time the mains touch and the second time (about 3 seconds) and you'll see how long he had to do all the analysis we've been doing here over the last several days...

Originally Posted by 3WE

Despite Evan's rants- were the winds that day really that extreme-especially compared to some of the goodies on youtubez?

I would venture to say that the winds were probably right at the limits in this situation. That being said, it appeared he did fine with the crosswind (i.e. keeping the thing on the runway), he just had issues with bouncing the landing.

My problem with Evan's comments above regarding a blanket "go or no-go" policy regarding wind conditions are these:

Evan compares the wind limits with visibility limits on landing. Visibility is very cut-and-dried. You get to the bottom of the ILS approach and you either see it or you don't. It doesn't matter if I'm shooting an ILS into Seattle, or Anchorage, or Paris, or Frankfurt, or Kalispell, Montana. When I get to the decision altitude, usually 200 feet above the ground, I either see lights or I don't. If I can see the approach light system (assuming a CAT 1 approach--CAT II and III are different animals), I can continue down to 100' AGL. If I don't see the runway environment at that point, then I make a missed approach. It doesn't matter where the runway is or what the terrain around it is--it's just you, the lights, and the runway.

Evan tries to apply the same logic to wind limits. In prevous posts I pointed out that different airplanes and different pilots need different limits (or even the same pilot in different airplanes). I didn't get into the geographical factors surrounding airports. Would the limits at SEA, where there are relatively few obstructions to the wind, be the same as they are at Boeing Field, where a strong wind from the west flows over the Boeing flight test hangar and creates a substantial amount of turbulence right in the touchdown zone? How about at Houston, where a strong wind from the south creates turbulence as it flows over the trees on runway 27, but does not create turbulence on 26 right because of the relatively flat area south of that runway. You can't create blanket limitations for wind as you can for visibility...

[Fear_of_Flying]

Originally Posted by snydersnapshots

3WE--You're the voice of reason here and I'm jumping on your bandwagon:

We're looking at it from the perspective of the pilot of a relatively small airplane--or perhaps I should say "short-coupled" airplane. I don't have any time in the 767-300, but I have a fair amount in the -400. The longer airplanes are more susceptible to tail-strikes. A bounced landing like that depicted in the video is one of the most common causes of a tail-strike. So, before we hammer on him for slamming the nose down (not that you were in this post, 3WE), let's try to get into his head and figure out what he was thinking. My guess is that he didn't realize how high he was and pushed the nose over slightly to reduce the possibility of a tail-strike. Pure speculation on my part, but a reasonable explanation. Best option after the first bounce? Cob the power and get out of there. On the other hand, we're sitting here in the comfort of our home (or in my case, hotel room) with a lot of time to ponder the situation, the conditions, and the outcome. Take the time between the first time the mains touch and the second time (about 3 seconds) and you'll see how long he had to do all the analysis we've been doing here over the last several days...



I would venture to say that the winds were probably right at the limits in this situation. That being said, it appeared he did fine with the crosswind (i.e. keeping the thing on the runway), he just had issues with bouncing the landing.

My problem with Evan's comments above regarding a blanket "go or no-go" policy regarding wind conditions are these:

Evan compares the wind limits with visibility limits on landing. Visibility is very cut-and-dried. You get to the bottom of the ILS approach and you either see it or you don't. It doesn't matter if I'm shooting an ILS into Seattle, or Anchorage, or Paris, or Frankfurt, or Kalispell, Montana. When I get to the decision altitude, usually 200 feet above the ground, I either see lights or I don't. If I can see the approach light system (assuming a CAT 1 approach--CAT II and III are different animals), I can continue down to 100' AGL. If I don't see the runway environment at that point, then I make a missed approach. It doesn't matter where the runway is or what the terrain around it is--it's just you, the lights, and the runway.

Evan tries to apply the same logic to wind limits. In prevous posts I pointed out that different airplanes and different pilots need different limits (or even the same pilot in different airplanes). I didn't get into the geographical factors surrounding airports. Would the limits at SEA, where there are relatively few obstructions to the wind, be the same as they are at Boeing Field, where a strong wind from the west flows over the Boeing flight test hangar and creates a substantial amount of turbulence right in the touchdown zone? How about at Houston, where a strong wind from the south creates turbulence as it flows over the trees on runway 27, but does not create turbulence on 26 right because of the relatively flat area south of that runway. You can't create blanket limitations for wind as you can for visibility...

As always, thanks for the informative post. But 3WE the "voice of reason"? Ok, maybe this once, as long as he quits while he's ahead.

Texas obviously produces some good pilots, and some of them can even spell!

[Evan]

Originally Posted by snydersnapshots

My problem with Evan's comments above regarding a blanket "go or no-go" policy regarding wind conditions are these:

Evan compares the wind limits with visibility limits on landing. Visibility is very cut-and-dried. You get to the bottom of the ILS approach and you either see it or you don't. It doesn't matter if I'm shooting an ILS into Seattle, or Anchorage, or Paris, or Frankfurt, or Kalispell, Montana. When I get to the decision altitude, usually 200 feet above the ground, I either see lights or I don't. If I can see the approach light system (assuming a CAT 1 approach--CAT II and III are different animals), I can continue down to 100' AGL. If I don't see the runway environment at that point, then I make a missed approach. It doesn't matter where the runway is or what the terrain around it is--it's just you, the lights, and the runway.

Evan tries to apply the same logic to wind limits. In prevous posts I pointed out that different airplanes and different pilots need different limits (or even the same pilot in different airplanes). I didn't get into the geographical factors surrounding airports. Would the limits at SEA, where there are relatively few obstructions to the wind, be the same as they are at Boeing Field, where a strong wind from the west flows over the Boeing flight test hangar and creates a substantial amount of turbulence right in the touchdown zone? How about at Houston, where a strong wind from the south creates turbulence as it flows over the trees on runway 27, but does not create turbulence on 26 right because of the relatively flat area south of that runway. You can't create blanket limitations for wind as you can for visibility...

snydersnapshots, I understand your point, visibility is a much more obvious issue and easier to quantify, but I don't see why a slightly more complex set of rules for weather conditions is so far-fetched. Visibility minima is categorized by equipment type and type of approach. Weather minima could also be determined categorically, by aircraft category, crosswind component, reported turbulence, precipitation, proximity to CB's and windshear potential. I think all of this could be calculated by the tower using a practical algorithm.

Example: Crosswinds 25G40; Heavy Precip; CB 5mi from the field; PIREP of moderate to severe turbulence; Aircraft Category: 40-100,000kg = NOGO at MDA. Or something along those lines...

I'm not saying I know exactly how it should be structured. As I said, this has to be the work of multi-disciplined experts. But as an example I could see how the directive could be a clearance to proceed (at your discretion) to MDA. If you are experiencing turbulence beyond a given threshold (moderate-to-severe) at that point (even with the runway in sight), and field conditions haven't been upgraded, you would have to go-around and then either hold or divert.

I think one great benefit this would have is in giving task-oriented pilots permission to abort landings in conditions where they might be thinking "I picked a bad day to stop sniffing glue!", without feeling the pressure of the consequences. They would, in fact be adhering to the task, not shrinking from it. And a lot of recent hull-loss accidents would never have happened. Including this one!

[TeeVee]

i've been told that in the military, crosswind limits are LIMITS--go, no go RULES. while in civilian aviation, crosswind limitations are "recommendations." supposedly, Boeing says, "the 737-8 has a crosswind maximum of 30 knots." this does not mean that the 737-8 is physically, mechanically, or technologically incapable of landing in a 40 knot crosswind. it means that boeing is "recommending" that pilots not try to land in those conditions.

p.s. i have no clue what the real limits of the 737-8 are...

[Gabriel]

It's called "demonstrated max crosswind" and is what the manufacturer actually demonstrated during the test flights.

Sort of "we know it can handle 30 kts because we've been there and done that, beyond that, good luck"

[3WE]

Originally Posted by Fear_of_Flying

But 3WE the "voice of reason"?

You should try it sometime...

[3WE]

Originally Posted by TeeVee

i've been told that in the military, crosswind limits are LIMITS--go, no go RULES. while in civilian aviation, crosswind limitations are "recommendations." ...

I would bet a beer that all major US airlines have hard crosswind limit RULES.

However, they exist in the companies operations manuals and not the FAR's nor manufacturer's aircraft manuals.

Also, I'd suggest that no one, not even Gabriel, knows that the true crosswind limits are...Really that depends on the pilot, the airplane, the airport, and there's no such thing as a perfectly stable crosswind either.

There's also the Cessna 172 factor... that high wing can be laid way over without scraping anything....but when the wind get's so high that the ailerons and rudder can't handle it, you just about reach the point where you can turn straight into the wind and land sideways on a runway. (might need a little bit of the turnoff if the runway is narrow.) That means a Cessna 172 has no crosswind limits (except maybe the maximum cruising speed)