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  • As sloppy as it gets without crashing...

    Hermes A320 at Lyon on Apr 11th 2012, unstabilized approach, dual input, descended below safe height
    Aviation Herald - News, Incidents and Accidents in Aviation


    That these pilots are allowed to fly other people is absolutely frightening:

    Descending through 2460 feet MSL (950 feet AGL) at 230 KIAS in clean configuration the Ground Proximity Warning System GPWS activated "TERRAIN! TERRAIN! PULL UP! PULL UP!", the instructor took control of the aircraft without corresponding call out, disengaged the autopilots, placed the thrust levers in the CLIMB detent and pulled the nose up to 9.5 degrees nose up, however, the automation, due to clean configuration, did not detect the terrain avoidance manoeuver and continued flight director modes vertical speed and heading select.

    In the meantime the minimum safe altitude warning activated at the controllers console, the controller called the aircraft advising they were below minimum safe altitude and instructed the aircraft to climb to 2500 feet MSL, then to report when they were established on the glide.

    While attemtpting to level off at 2500 feet the instructor applied nose down inputs for 20 seconds, the airspeed began to rapidly increase and the aircraft began to descend again descending through 2150 feet MSL at 320 KIAS. The thrust levers were placed into the IDLE detent, the MSAW activated a second time at the controllers desk prompting the controller to transmit: "... check your altitude immediately, you are too low!".

    The captain under supervision applied nose up inputs while the instructor applied nose down inputs, for a minute aural and visual warnings of dual input activated. The instructor, continuing to talk to ATC, requested vectors for a missed approach, the controller cleared the aircraft to climb to 5000 feet.

  • #2
    As much as I play Devils advocate on well controlled approaches that do not meet the black and white stable criteria, it sounds like this started by being grossly FUBAR'd and thank God they gained some altitude because overall things stayed pretty bad.
    Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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    • #3
      Originally posted by 3WE View Post
      As much as I play Devils advocate on well controlled approaches that do not meet the black and white stable criteria, it sounds like this started by being grossly FUBAR'd and thank God they gained some altitude because overall things stayed pretty bad.
      It sounds like this started by:

      - the limited experience on type of both crew members;
      - the operator’s desire to quickly train a pilot with low experience on type as a Captain;

      and

      - Evan won't be caught dead on Hermes Airlines;

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      • #4
        I don't see how being low time on type is responsible for most of their missteps here. Every type has procedures that need to be followed. Proper transfer of control isn't specific to the A320, neither are stabilized approaches or dialing in the ILS frequency correctly. The dual input thing, sure it's unique to Airbus, but there are no situations in any airplane in which two people should be trying to fly the plane and manipulate the controls at the same time.

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        • #5
          Originally posted by Leftseat86 View Post
          I don't see how being low time on type is responsible for most of their missteps here. Every type has procedures that need to be followed. Proper transfer of control isn't specific to the A320, neither are stabilized approaches or dialing in the ILS frequency correctly. The dual input thing, sure it's unique to Airbus, but there are no situations in any airplane in which two people should be trying to fly the plane and manipulate the controls at the same time.
          Concur ~ I am concentrating on the 'low experience' aspect in general and low experience on type for an instructor pilot, the things that betray a poor safety culture, like weak procedural discipline, F- on CRM, non-standard comms, leaving the FD's in, FCU stoogery etcetera. I think company culture is where it starts.

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          • #6
            Originally posted by Evan View Post
            Concur ~ I am concentrating on the 'low experience' aspect in general and low experience on type for an instructor pilot, the things that betray a poor safety culture, like weak procedural discipline, F- on CRM, non-standard comms, leaving the FD's in, FCU stoogery etcetera. I think company culture is where it starts.
            I could see the low time captain being a little frazzled with the instructor watching him, but the instructor in the right seat is the one who drops the ball multiple times here. The guy in the left seat was trying to pull up away from terrain.

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            • #7
              Originally posted by Leftseat86 View Post
              I could see the low time captain being a little frazzled with the instructor watching him, but the instructor in the right seat is the one who drops the ball multiple times here.
              Indeed.

              It's one thing to let someone mess up a bit but to let the guy get THAT low and no flaps, gear, and still kind of dropping fast...

              That was one huge initial screw up, followed by a number of other eye rolling moderatly bad goofs.

              Violations of numerous fundamentals and type-specific procedures!
              Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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              • #8
                What we need is another world war to develop some combat hardened pilots with snappy reactions for later civil use careers !

                ....and that is said with tongue VERY firmly buried in cheek !
                If it 'ain't broken........ Don't try to mend it !

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                • #9
                  While attemtpting to level off at 2500 feet the instructor applied nose down inputs for 20 seconds, the airspeed began to rapidly increase and the aircraft began to descend again descending through 2150 feet MSL at 320 KIAS.
                  This is also the worst attempt to level off I've ever read about. Nose down inputs for 20 seconds just to level off from 9.5 degrees nose up? No wonder they plunged back downwards.

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                  • #10
                    Originally posted by Leftseat86 View Post
                    This is also the worst attempt to level off I've ever read about. Nose down inputs for 20 seconds just to level off from 9.5 degrees nose up? No wonder they plunged back downwards.
                    ...did I catch something subtle...

                    That MAYBE the dude was TOTALLY fixated on the flight director that was not updated and was still telling him to get back on a glideslope or something???...

                    so TOTALLY FIXATED that the ACTUAL ATTITUDE (and other important SA things like altitude) may not have been registering with him as well as they should have?

                    Basic, Fundamental Procedure:
                    1) Autopilot off
                    2) Make expedited healthy climb
                    3) Watch altimeter (and all your basic instruments like you always do)
                    4) Level off by going to a 'familiar, nose-basically-level' attitude.

                    Procedure Procedure.
                    1) Autopilot off
                    2) Go to nose up 9.5, Power levers TOGA
                    3) Input new altitude into FMS
                    4) Follow FD command bars

                    So focused on the procedure of nailing the FD commands that he forgets the basics of keeping the plane near an intended attitude?
                    Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                      ...did I catch something subtle...
                      What's subtle about it? The FD was left on in V/S mode with a -1200fpm target.

                      It seems to me most of these bad Airbus things happen when poorly trained pilots start messing with selected guidance. From what I can tell here, they captured the LOC short of the glideslope in APPROACH mode with the vertical mode still in V/S, expecting to get on ILS once the G/S was captured but descended below MSA before reaching it and somebody (the "captain"?) ended up hand flying to the FD pitch bar when trying to level off after the climb back above MSA. The FD was still trying to get back to 1200fpm, not level-off. So, no G/S, just LOC and V/S.

                      Just your basic selected mode mismanagement combined with slavish obedience to the FD. Brought on by abysmal training. That's what I'm seeing not so subtly here.

                      What I completely do not understand is why they did this:
                      The altitude capture activated, the aircraft still at 240 KIAS, the crew selected 400 feet instead of 3000 feet into the altitude window, which caused the autopilot to revert to vertical speed mode at 1200 fpm rate of descent.
                      If they had just let the managed guidance alone they would have been fine.

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                      • #12
                        "What's it telling me to do now?"
                        Be alert! America needs more lerts.

                        Eric Law

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                        • #13
                          Originally posted by Evan View Post
                          What's subtle about it?...
                          Just your basic procedurally-laden mind that has somehow again forgotten some of the most extremely basic, cowboy airmanship fundamentals of manage attitude.
                          Fixed.

                          ...and just a minor clarification: The subtle and ironic part is that perhaps among all of the major screw ups these guys were stringing together, there may have been some excellent flight-director-following skills in play. (The SA of blowing through 1000 ft AGL all slicked up and triggering the GPWS makes dutifully following the FD seem more subtle).

                          Originally posted by Eric
                          "What's it telling me to do now?"
                          Indeed.
                          Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            The altitude capture activated, the aircraft still at 240 KIAS, the crew selected 400 feet instead of 3000 feet into the altitude window, which caused the autopilot to revert to vertical speed mode at 1200 fpm rate of descent.
                            So, monitor and manage airspeed and attitude isn't part of the problem?
                            Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Originally posted by elaw View Post
                              "What's it telling me to do now?"
                              You instruct George to maintain a 1200fpm descent and that what it does. You take George out of the game so now it's just telling you to do what you told it to do. If you don't want it to tell you this, you have to do something about it. It's all coming from you. Airbus, Boeing or what have you.

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