Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Australia, Indonesia and Malaysia to trial new method of tracking planes

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • Australia, Indonesia and Malaysia to trial new method of tracking planes

    "It uses technology already installed on most long-haul jets."

    Doesn't that mean it can still be manually shut down?

    Three countries are to trial a new method of tracking planes, which could help avoid incidents like the disappearance of flight MH370.

  • #2
    Yes.

    Head of Airservices confirms that.

    Comment


    • #3
      Originally posted by MCM View Post
      Yes.

      Head of Airservices confirms that.
      So, with regard to MH370, this is meaningless. Perhaps politically they feel the need to present the public some sort of initiative, just for show. From what I can gather this proposed system simply reports the aircraft position more frequently than the ACARS handshake signal, although less frequently than ADS-B. In the interests of making lost airliners a thing of the past, maybe it would make more sense to speed up worldwide implementation of ADS-B. And in a murdercide scenario, everything can be isolated on the fuse panels. Why not add an emergency battery powered locator system that is fused in the rear passenger cabin and triggered by certain events such as low cabin pressure? As for malicious pilots who might shut the current systems down, that problem needs to be solved by better pilot screening, better ongoing vigilance and crew training for such an event.

      Comment


      • #4
        What it does do is gives a more accurate starting point for a search in all lost aircraft scenarios, particularly where the system is still working. None of them are claiming this is to prevent MH370, nor are they claiming it would have made the difference. They've specifically said it wouldn't.

        Its something that can be done relatively cheaply - the cost is worn by the airlines, but they don't have a choice in the matter. It will, potentially, improve search and rescue potential, and, as they've said, its a temporary measure until 'more comprehensive solutions are developed', which will obviously include aircraft manufacturers, and potentially very costly retrofit programs.

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by MCM View Post
          None of them are claiming this is to prevent MH370, nor are they claiming it would have made the difference. They've specifically said it wouldn't.
          In the CNN article they specifically said it would "not necessarily have" helped, but of course we don't actually know what happened to MH-370. Still, given the fact that this is being undertaken by the nations involved in the search, it seems like it may be something of a reassuring gesture to the public. MCM, If ADS-B is installed and functioning, wouldn't that already be the solution to non-malicious events? I don't really see a point to adding an additional system that can also be shut down in flight.

          Comment


          • #6
            ADS-B is not necessarily available throughout this area to all aircraft.

            My understanding (although I could be mistaken) is that this is just a change to the contract time for ADS-C.

            When there is a contract established under ADS-C, it contains an automatic reporting interval, which varies. This is just that once per interval, the aircraft sends its message. The time can be every few minutes, or much longer, depending on requirements of the airspace.

            I believe they are just turning down the maximum time to 15 minutes to receive more frequent data. Only cost will be to the airlines' satcom bills.

            Comment


            • #7
              Originally posted by Evan View Post
              MCM, If ADS-B is installed and functioning, wouldn't that already be the solution to non-malicious events? I don't really see a point to adding an additional system that can also be shut down in flight.
              First of all, the only country that I know is working to implement ADS-B on a mandatory basis is the USA. They have been working on this for years and the goal is to have a partial implementation by 2020 (ADS-B out mandatory in certain airspaces). And it's taking a LOT of money and effort.

              While I can see it's the future, I think that expecting that it will be implemented on a worldwide basis in any reasonable timeframe is naive.

              Additionally, ADS-B requires ground stations too. Just like with secondary radar, there will be a "transponder" interrogating (in the ground or another aircraft) and the target plane's transponder responding to that interrogation. The difference with current systems is that the response message will include much more data than the pressure altitude and transponder code sent in mode-C. Most notably, it will include GPS-based coordinates. So you don't need the "radar" part anymore to tell the airplane's position. A simple antenna with a transponder makes for a ground station that is much much cheaper to deploy, operate and maintain than a radar. So the idea is to use ADS-B to replace radar and also use it to provide the same radar-like information of other traffic to airplanes equipped with ADS-B in gear (which will not be mandatory for all airplanes in the required airspace).

              But, while the "interrogating station" can of course be a stellite, I've heard of no plans to implement it massively anywhere.

              (By the way, a simple version of the ADS-B in is what flight tracking sites use. They rely on a network of voluntary users that install a very cheap antenna, PC interface and software to receive ADS-B out data from airplanes and upload it to the internet, but this equipment doesn't interrogate the planes but "listen" to the planes' response to the interrogation made by other planes or ground stations)

              --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
              --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

              Comment


              • #8
                Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                First of all, the only country that I know is working to implement ADS-B on a mandatory basis is the USA. They have been working on this for years and the goal is to have a partial implementation by 2020 (ADS-B out mandatory in certain airspaces). And it's taking a LOT of money and effort.

                While I can see it's the future, I think that expecting that it will be implemented on a worldwide basis in any reasonable timeframe is naive.

                Additionally, ADS-B requires ground stations too. Just like with secondary radar, there will be a "transponder" interrogating (in the ground or another aircraft) and the target plane's transponder responding to that interrogation. The difference with current systems is that the response message will include much more data than the pressure altitude and transponder code sent in mode-C. Most notably, it will include GPS-based coordinates. So you don't need the "radar" part anymore to tell the airplane's position. A simple antenna with a transponder makes for a ground station that is much much cheaper to deploy, operate and maintain than a radar. So the idea is to use ADS-B to replace radar and also use it to provide the same radar-like information of other traffic to airplanes equipped with ADS-B in gear (which will not be mandatory for all airplanes in the required airspace).

                But, while the "interrogating station" can of course be a stellite, I've heard of no plans to implement it massively anywhere.

                (By the way, a simple version of the ADS-B in is what flight tracking sites use. They rely on a network of voluntary users that install a very cheap antenna, PC interface and software to receive ADS-B out data from airplanes and upload it to the internet, but this equipment doesn't interrogate the planes but "listen" to the planes' response to the interrogation made by other planes or ground stations)
                I think Australia has currently mandated ADS-B above FL300.

                Still, even if this is an ADS-C interval measure as MCM suggests, it seems to me that any event that occurs suddenly within a very short period of time (AF447, QZ8501) may only see the search area moderately reduced over ACARS alone. The preferred situational reporting is still VOX. What are the scenarios that inhibit VOX? 1) an event too sudden for comms or incapacitating; 2) a comm failure; 3) malicious intent. In the first case, since any failure event will likely result in ACARS reporting unless it is spontaneous destruction, I don't see a major advantage there. In the second case, I can't envision a failure scenario that will inhibit comms, transponders and ACARS (which is one reason MH-370 is widely considered to be malicious). In the third case, this does nothing to address the issue.

                I was hoping, a year removed from the event, that the industry would have come up with something to deal with the third scenario. Sometimes any measure is a step forward. Sometimes any measure takes the pressure off finding better ones.

                Comment


                • #9
                  Originally posted by Evan View Post
                  I think Australia has currently mandated ADS-B above FL300.
                  Yes. After posting my previous comment, I've found that several countries or regions are mandating ADS-B to different extents and in different time frames.



                  Still, even if this is an ADS-C interval measure as MCM suggests, it seems to me that any event that occurs suddenly within a very short period of time (AF447, QZ8501) may only see the search area moderately reduced over ACARS alone.
                  In fact, from the same article linked above, it seems that ADS-C IS position reporting service over ACARS, and that ACARS alone does not report position unless this service is contracted.

                  ADS-Addressed (ADS-A), also known as ADS-Contract (ADS-C), is based on a negotiated one-to-one peer relationship between an aircraft providing ADS information and a ground facility requiring receipt of ADS messages. For example, ADS-A reports are employed in the Future Air Navigation System (FANS) using the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) as the communication protocol. During flight over areas without radar coverage (e.g., oceanic and polar), reports are periodically sent by an aircraft to the controlling air traffic region.[19]

                  The transmission delay caused by protocol or satellites is significant enough that significant aircraft separations are required. The cost of using the satellite channel leads to less frequent updates. Another drawback is that no other aircraft can benefit from the transmitted information as ACARS information is not re-broadcast from ground facilities to other aircraft.

                  --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                  --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post

                    In fact, from the same article linked above, it seems that ADS-C IS position reporting service over ACARS, and that ACARS alone does not report position unless this service is contracted.
                    Aha.

                    MH-370 was tracked in hindsight using pings from the Inmarsat system that serve to keep the satlink connection alive but are independent of ACARS status or interval settings. Even if all comms, datalinks and transponders are shut down in the cockpit they will continue to ping the satellite as long as the aircraft has electrical power. Making those pings more frequent—say, every 5 mins—seems like a possible step in the right direction. Still, they are not absolute position reports and could not be available in real time to controllers. We need something new here:

                    "There is satellite technology that can mitigate situations like we have seen – that satellite technology is available today – but the industry and the regulatory bodies as a whole have to get together and standardise, certify and use the technology in a more efficient way and in a quicker way," said [Inmarsat COO] Pinto. "Companies like Inmarsat have been investing, but the industry as a whole has not been keeping pace with what is available in terms of technology."

                    Even so, if a pilot decided to turn off the terminal that transmits position information on SwiftBroadband [the newer version of the older Classic Aero system installed on MH-370], he could still do that. There is an argument, therefore, to make it mandatory for aircraft to transmit their position at all times, and build this technology into the plane so that it cannot be switched off.

                    "If regulators wished to ensure that all aircraft identified themselves, as ships at sea are required to do over a certain tonnage, then you could do that via satellite," said Chris McLaughlin, senior vice president of external affairs at Inmarsat. "When you hear the story of flight MH370, you come very quickly to the conclusion that the aero industry needs to follow the maritime lead, and it needs to specify that all aircraft have to have a separate ringfenced position transmission system."

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Still, even if this is an ADS-C interval measure as MCM suggests, it seems to me that any event that occurs suddenly within a very short period of time (AF447, QZ8501) may only see the search area moderately reduced over ACARS alone. The preferred situational reporting is still VOX. What are the scenarios that inhibit VOX? 1) an event too sudden for comms or incapacitating; 2) a comm failure; 3) malicious intent. In the first case, since any failure event will likely result in ACARS reporting unless it is spontaneous destruction, I don't see a major advantage there. In the second case, I can't envision a failure scenario that will inhibit comms, transponders and ACARS (which is one reason MH-370 is widely considered to be malicious). In the third case, this does nothing to address the issue.
                      Why is voice the preferred option? It depends on the scenario.

                      VHF voice is the preferred communication option. It is clear, easy to use, and quick. Problem? There is limited VHF coverage, particularly over water. Other problem? In an event, we know that crew often don't have time, or remember, to communicate.

                      CPDLC, and ADS-C, are brilliant in locations outside VHF coverage. HF comms are a pain in the backside. Sometimes they're clear - sometimes you have basically no comms. CPDLC allows normal, and emergency, communications to be done by data, with accurate information including location sent at the press of a button. ADS-C also sends position information at regular intervals, as well as 'event' messaging (such as deviating off the assigned track, leaving the assigned flight level) to alert ATC of deviation. It can also be set to increase reporting intervals in some non-normal situations.

                      ADS-B is the next step in 'radar like' coverage, but has the same limitations of coverage as VHF.

                      I'm not sure why you say this won't help at all... it may not solve this particular scenario, but its a reasonable step that is viable in a short time frame. It also may help in other search cases where having 15 minute data, instead of 30, makes a difference. The real 'solutions' to this 'problem' are expensive, and will take considerable time to implement.

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Originally posted by MCM View Post
                        I'm not sure why you say this won't help at all... it may not solve this particular scenario, but its a reasonable step that is viable in a short time frame. It also may help in other search cases where having 15 minute data, instead of 30, makes a difference. The real 'solutions' to this 'problem' are expensive, and will take considerable time to implement.
                        I guess my main concern is that these halfway measures might take the pressure off developing (and paying for) better solutions. I agree with Chris McLaughlin that a 'ringfenced' solution is in order. Is anyone taking that seriously?

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Chris McLaughlin also works for the company that will receive significant financial benefits from any mandatory satellite tracking system, particularly one that has continuous position reporting.

                          I agree that the current system needs investigating, but we also need to weigh cost vs benefit. How many aircraft have disappeared entirely, compared to the enormous costs that could be incurred by a knee-jerk system.

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Yes, agreed. Costs would have to be kept in line and justified against the benefits. GIven the rapid escalation of cheap off-the-shelf technology these days, I think it might be feasible though. In fact, if, as you say, a service provider (or providers) stands to benefit by charging for the service, the cost of hardware and refit might be offset by them, sort of like getting an iPhone for $1 with a service agreement. And there would be public subsidies as well.

                            So yes, a cost/benefit analysis must make this sensible, but that shouldn't stop us from developing viable technology in the first place. My intuition tells me that this is a social contract issue—that the issue of missing aircraft is a political one and that the industry and their governments could otherwise tolerate a few rare incidents as acceptable losses. Therefore they must only show good faith and make gestures towards a solution for the political problem to dissipate. I think that is why this is being discussed in nations involved in the MH-370 search area. Again, I suspect a bandaid measure will assuage the political problem enough that further, more effective and costlier solutions will not be politically necessary. And then nothing will be done until the next occurrence starts the cycle once again.

                            And still, I've read nothing about airlines strengthening defenses against mental illness (and I also categorize religious fanaticism as mental illness). I'm more concerned about keeping malice out of the cockpit than tracking maliciously piloted planes.

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Originally posted by Evan View Post
                              (and I also categorize religious fanaticism as mental illness)
                              so you probably think that we should round up all the religious fanatics, including those going around loping off heads and place them in mental institutions until such time as they swear allegiance to country over god?

                              Comment

                              Working...
                              X