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TransAsia airplane crashes in Taipei (ATR 72)

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  • Originally posted by Evan View Post
    Pierre-Cédric Bonin, PF, right seat:


    4S ground training on 15 January 2009

    E33 training on 2 February 2009

    C34 base flight check on 3 February 2009

    Stall: A320 type rating: FFS session n°4: “piloting in degraded law (effect of buffeting) in alternate law”

    A320 type rating: FFS session n°7: “Preventive recognition and countermeasures to approach to stall. DEMONSTRATION STALL WARNING”.

    Yet didn't understand the concept of AoA???
    How is that possible?
    4S, E33, C34, FFS, n-deg-7, n-deg-4, Lets' Demonstrate a Warning?

    Is the answer in all those acronyms and strange words?

    All that cryptic code language, but nothing about "be careful about pulling up hard and remember, an airplane can be stalled at any airspeed and attitude".
    Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

    Comment


    • Originally posted by 3WE View Post
      Hey, this comment that 10 degrees nose up is a "generally healthy attitude" are valid.

      Gabriel- have you EVER done a practice stall where the objective was to demonstrate that a plane can be stalled at a normal healthy attitude and airspeed?

      Ever?
      Nope. That's why at the SMRFS del Sur we've implemented the "maneuvering at-the-onset-of-the-stall-warning" lesson.

      For me as a student, it was power-on and power-off, both wings level and slight bank to either side.

      Power on used a middle power typical of a downwind leg.
      Power off were two types: with the nose already pointing quite high and holding it there as the speed went down, or holding the altitude which required increase the pitch to some 15 degrees before it would stall.

      Turning stalls were with 15° of bank. Not what I would call an accelerated stall.

      Also, while AoA was certainly mentioned and perhaps even explained, there was much more focus in airspeed.

      One of the best stall lessons I had was when I was getting the endorsement for the C-152 (having done all my PPL in the Tomahawk).

      We went for a power off stall, so I killed the power and started to apply back pressure. I was used to sudden nose and wing drops of the Tomahawk, however I found myself with the yoke all the way back to the stops and the nose just slightly above the horizon (and with the stall warning sounding in the "second tone"). I told to the instructor "this plane won't stall". His answer was "Uh, no? You are with the nose slightly high, with 40 kts and doing 2000 fpm down, Additionally, you are pulling fully back and the nose doesn't go up. What is this if not a full stall?"

      As I've said before, I blame the primary flight training. I know that mine was not good (with some exceptions like the one above). I've learned how to fly a plane, but I've learned much more of what is really happening behind the curtains by studying and then trying it out in the plane by myself. But while I tried spiral dives, phugoids, zero G, controlling the plane without the yoke (trim, gas and rudder) and approach to stalls (to the very first beep of the stall warning) by myself, I never dared to attempt full stalls by myself. I was afraid to enter an unintentional spin and, while I knew the procedure to recover by hart (the one in the approved POH for the PA-38-112 "Tomahawk II"), I had never practiced it and was afraid to get either frozen or confused by the picture of the Earth spinning in the windshield and be unable to appy the procedure at all or to correctly interpret which way I had to recover (left or right).

      --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
      --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

      Comment


      • Originally posted by Evan View Post
        Or they couldn't think clearly enough to put it together... due to...
        Not knowing the high altitude UAS, AP off, high altitude stalls, high altitude manual flight, and upset recovery procedures?

        Bonin didn't pull up enough to make the stall warning sound and establish a 1.5G, 12.5° nose-up, 7500 fpm climb because of that.

        The other guy (don't remember the name right now) didn't fail to take over or clearly instruct "lower the nose NOW! You are at 35000ft with 12° nose up and 7500 fpm for God sake!" because of that.

        If they were so confused from second zero, before they had time to asses the situation, as to do what they did and fail to stablize the flight path (or to not destabilize it), then I don't believe that they were in a mental state compatible to assesing the situation correctly and apply the correct porcedure EVEN if they knew it.

        Nope. I don't buy it.

        Now, it may well be that having a lot of practice and theoretical study on those procedures would have given them a better sensibility to get how a plane flies and understand what the plane was telling them. Airmanship.

        Airmanship is a PREREQUISITE to procedures. This pilots showed no airmanship whatsoever, be it because they didn't have any (I don't think so), because they didn't have enough, or they lost it in the mental state.

        --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
        --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

        Comment


        • Gabriel, would you agree that they failed to have sufficient awareness? In a scenario where they did they would have been aware of the weather along that route (storms were said to be common in that area during that season and I believe it was in the briefings), if that was the case they would have been mentally prepared:

          Hmmmm, I am going to be flying into an area of convective activity and ....

          I also wonder about the wisdom of the Captain and his choice of time to take a nap .. were his junior officers aware of the weather and did he remind them of it?
          Live, from a grassy knoll somewhere near you.

          Comment


          • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
            Airmanship is a PREREQUISITE
            Concur.

            and

            ...Let's train people well so they don't botch a problem at V1 and crash planes.

            ...Let's train people well so they don't botch navigation and do CFIT.

            ...Let's train people well so they don't fail at CRM and fly a perfectly good plane into a swamp.

            ...Let's train people well so they'll recognize that speed rise under a thundertorm might be followed by a downdraft and speed loss and that they should go to full power.

            ...Let's train people well so they won't kill the good engine.

            ...Let's build rudder controllers that are incredibly safe.

            ...Let's build fuel tanks that won't explode randomly.

            And, I look forward to Evan's screening procedure that will discern the pilot who can nail a hand-flown, engine-out, CAT I approach to 200 & 1/2, in a thunderstorm, recite the FAR's and memory checklists nearly-perfectly, demonstrate excellent CRM, and would never incorrectly pull up relentlessly versus a pilot who can nail a hand flown, engine-out, CAT I approach to 200 & 1/2, recite the FAR's and Memory checklists nearly-perfectly, demonstrate excellent CRM, but might, for some incomprehensible reason, pull up relentlessly.
            Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

            Comment


            • Toss in ..... and while there is smoke coming from a panel overhead ....

              from "Fate is the Hunter" .. his instructor lights matches under his nose approach
              Live, from a grassy knoll somewhere near you.

              Comment


              • Originally posted by guamainiac View Post
                ...would have been mentally prepared...
                This is a crazy thought...everyone jokes about Airbus FBW and HAL and "What's it doing now" and Blue Screens of Death on computers.

                It's also a fact that we see a lot of blue screens and other electronic failures in our lives. Pilots actually see a fair number of failures on a daily basis (often a failure of an electronic sensor, no less). And, it's a fact that Airbus lets you know that this isn't a Cessna nor a Boeing- the computers taking care of the classic aerodynamics, you just supply turn, and climb/descend inputs.

                Could it be...that some pilots do harbor a very slight fear that the computer might just go crazy and render them out of control?

                We do want our pilots somewhat mentally primed for stuff to go wrong, correct (as Grammaniac alluded to)

                This is a crazy theory, and based on anti-Airbus bias, but I wonder if the crew didn't become petrified thinking, "oh, no, the computer really HAS gone crazy on us" and were indeed operating in an illogical panic mode.

                It's kind of a far out theory, but not that much crazier than wondering if Bonin pulled up in order to give them a safe, controlled, stall-protected speed.
                Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                Comment


                • Originally posted by guamainiac View Post
                  Gabriel, would you agree that they failed to have sufficient awareness? In a scenario where they did they would have been aware of the weather along that route (storms were said to be common in that area during that season and I believe it was in the briefings), if that was the case they would have been mentally prepared:

                  Hmmmm, I am going to be flying into an area of convective activity and ....
                  No, I would not agree.
                  They knew about the weather. They discussed it when the captain was leaving to rest. They deviated to avoid the worst part. They informed the cabin crew about it and indicated them to seat down. They identified the smell of ozone. They reduced the airspeed for turbulence penetration.

                  Awareness after the AP and AT disconnected, well, evidently they lacked it altogether at one point, as to actively stall the plane and fail to identify the stall.

                  Now, they had enough situational awareness one second before the AP disconnected. They knew that the plane was flying straight and level. Minutes before they had discussed that they would not climb to FL370 as planned because the weather was ISA+ XXX and the plane lacked the performance, son they would stay at FL350.

                  Now, the AP and AT quit, and half a second later the PF, against what they had previously discussed, starts to pull up like the hell. Either this pilot had no idea about how to fly a plane or his brain stopped working the second the AP and AT quit. They were already straight and level and all they needed was to remain straight and level, which required virtually no input (although following the proper UAS procedure would have been even much much better).

                  I also wonder about the wisdom of the Captain and his choice of time to take a nap .. were his junior officers aware of the weather and did he remind them of it?
                  It's easy to say so in hindsight. The captain had to rest to be legally available later in the flight. There wa no compelling reason to stay in the cockpit, and his two junior FOs were not so junior, especially the one not Bonin (don't remember the name).

                  --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                  --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                    This is a crazy thought...everyone jokes about Airbus FBW and HAL and "What's it doing now" and Blue Screens of Death on computers.

                    It's also a fact that we see a lot of blue screens and other electronic failures in our lives. Pilots actually see a fair number of failures on a daily basis (often a failure of an electronic sensor, no less). And, it's a fact that Airbus lets you know that this isn't a Cessna nor a Boeing- the computers taking care of the classic aerodynamics, you just supply turn, and climb/descend inputs.

                    Could it be...that some pilots do harbor a very slight fear that the computer might just go crazy and render them out of control?

                    We do want our pilots somewhat mentally primed for stuff to go wrong, correct (as Grammaniac alluded to)

                    This is a crazy theory, and based on anti-Airbus bias, but I wonder if the crew didn't become petrified thinking, "oh, no, the computer really HAS gone crazy on us" and were indeed operating in an illogical panic mode.

                    It's kind of a far out theory, but not that much crazier than wondering if Bonin pulled up in order to give them a safe, controlled, stall-protected speed.
                    If computes in airbus go crazy (let's say in case of lightning discharge or radiation exposure) whatever the pilot actions are they don't matter since the computers are between the pilot and flight controls. Some experienced maintenance engineers who maintained airbus once told me that it is not uncommon after lightning discharge via fuselage to had to replace some 9-10 of totally 19 computers on a320...On a classic metallic airplane it's as simple as a less than 8mm trace on a skin. So far too many things are bothering me. Generally you are not flying an airplane but some kind of drone or a plane with permanently connected autopilot and ridiculous man-machine interface...That kind of automation probably is created by people who never liked flying for people who are lazy to fly. It is shame for aviation. And will lead to lack of real pilots. But what is worse will lead to the most stupid accidents because you never now well computer based automation. Even if you are one of the programmers yourself. The pilot never has controls of such airplane. I know well that some advanced dynamically unstable wings and control surfaces have to be automatically controlled but the classic airbus design does not require such automation. Maybe the airbus creators decided to build a plane that could be flown by monkeys, but in fact this would lead to many problems.

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by georgel View Post
                      Some experienced maintenance engineers who maintained airbus once told me that it is not uncommon after lightning discharge via fuselage to had to replace some 9-10 of totally 19 computers on a320...On a classic metallic airplane it's as simple as a less than 8mm trace on a skin. After a decade of flying good old MD82 I am now passing an airbus transition and so far too many things are bothering me.
                      Dear oh dear...see, this is the problem with the internet: there are people who will take the above post seriously. This how Airbus (and other) mythology gets perpetuated.

                      Comment


                      • Why? Or maybe airbus is like religion to you? It is shame that because of this "industrie" much more proven and reliable aircraft are forced to get out of service by means of regulations...Because some people have to sell their fashionable religion, and sell it well...

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by georgel View Post
                          Why? Or maybe airbus is like religion to you? It is shame that because of this "industrie" much more proven and reliable aircraft are forced to get out of service by means of regulations...Because some people have to sell their fashionable religion, and sell it well...
                          A330 (like the one Air France crashed)
                          Introduction: 17 January 1994
                          Number built: 1,159
                          Fatal accidents in commercial service: 2 (Air France 447 and Afriqiyah Airways Flight 771, both due to gross incompetence of the flight crew that managed to crash two perfectly working planes).

                          --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                          --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by georgel View Post
                            Why? Or maybe airbus is like religion to you? It is shame that because of this "industrie" much more proven and reliable aircraft are forced to get out of service by means of regulations...Because some people have to sell their fashionable religion, and sell it well...
                            I'm sorry, what?

                            Comment


                            • Gabe, thanks those are things I have forgotten over time.

                              Is this the appropriate thread for all of this AF debacle. One of you high timers should just start the "AF continued" or some other name as appropriate.
                              Live, from a grassy knoll somewhere near you.

                              Comment


                              • So much rubbish, it's hard to imagine that this was once a legitimate thread about gross pilot error and training difficiencies.

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