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TransAsia airplane crashes in Taipei (ATR 72)

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  • Originally posted by Evan View Post
    I was hoping at least you could understand the reasons why the undustry has deemed it necessary to create these pre-rehearsed CRM-oriented routines, following the findings and recommendations of investigative reports and collaborating with safety pilots, engineers and human factor experts.
    I do.

    All that's needed now is a way to get pilots to recognize their own human limitations and embrace these things as the best way to stay AGL...
    I do.

    If they had failed to disconnected the AP or AT and that had caused some problem, if they had failed to disconnect the FD and they had followed its commands and that had caused some problem, if they had left the TL at CL hence keeping it in thrust lock and that had caused some problem, if they had stabilized the plane at other than 5° and CL and that had caused some problem, ... then I would agree with you.

    --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
    --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

    Comment


    • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
      What I'm saying, again, is that that knowing perfectly well the procedure that you didn't identify yet as the one to follow will not help you if your initial reaction is, using somebody's else words, pull up relentlessly.
      Now this is the crux of the matter. Where does that reaction come from? I say it comes from an absence of anything else instilled in the mind through memorized procedural training. It is a random reaction based on simple instincts like 'climb out of danger'. It is a wildly unconsidered reaction that seems to make sense in a moment of sheer mental confusion.

      Now look at a boxer. See how he instinctively keeps his gloves high when he's on the ropes under a blistering attack and sheer mental confusion. That is learned behavior, the result of endless sparring during training. A street brawler might swing wildly and get caught by a blow to the head. Boxing trainers know the value of aggressive training, they know that at some point the fighter will reliably use the right reaction if you train them with determination. This has been shown to work where improvisation fails. Defensive training is what AF447 lacked. But maybe you need to read that report again.

      Comment


      • i'm onna solve this once and for all so that we all dont keep trying to talk evan out of what he thinks he knows.

        WHAT HE REALLY WANTS IS A COMPUTER. just read the short scenario he posted... blah blah blah? check. blah blah blah check. all automatic with zero thought processes.

        Comment


        • Originally posted by TeeVee View Post
          i'm onna solve this once and for all so that we all dont keep trying to talk evan out of what he thinks he knows.

          WHAT HE REALLY WANTS IS A COMPUTER. just read the short scenario he posted... blah blah blah? check. blah blah blah check. all automatic with zero thought processes.
          Indeed. His comments continue to betray him.

          Since this circular argument has gone around about 30 times, your comment will probably prompt a response saying, "No, I never said the pilot shouldn't know fundamentals because that's what's in the procedures." Or something like that. Maybe even with some shouting, bold and angry-red-coloured fonts.

          It's currently 14.02.2015, 13:45Z. And I bet we have this sort of repsonse by 14.02.2015, 15:30Z.
          Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

          Comment


          • Has anyone here read Ernest K. Gann's ... "Fate is the Hunter" ..?

            Perhaps what many pilots lack now is a fundamental survival tool called fear.

            They rely on automation and systems to do the job and keep them safe and since they may have such intellect as to rely on memorizing and spitting back raw data, they have an illusion of mastery.

            The spirit of the book is essentially never become complacent or comfortable because all of the "numbers", time and circumstnce are conspiring against you.
            Live, from a grassy knoll somewhere near you.

            Comment


            • Originally posted by Evan View Post
              But no procedures were performed and no CRM was present because Air France failed to train them for this scenario.
              I think I can agree with this. AF failed to train them for stall recognition and they (all three of them) most probably had no idea what's happening to their aircraft. Do they have a procedure for an unrecognisable state of aircraft?
              Their CRM was actually consistent with the situation. The plane was descending fast and increasing pitch didn't help, who could understand this. Also, the attitude was nowhere the stall range. On the other hand, everyone knows Airbus doesn't stall and even the (false) stall warning silenced when they pulled up.

              Comment


              • Originally posted by kris View Post
                I think I can agree with this. AF failed to train them for stall recognition and they (all three of them) most probably had no idea what's happening to their aircraft. Do they have a procedure for an unrecognisable state of aircraft?
                Their CRM was actually consistent with the situation. The plane was descending fast and increasing pitch didn't help, who could understand this. Also, the attitude was nowhere the stall range. On the other hand, everyone knows Airbus doesn't stall and even the (false) stall warning silenced when they pulled up.
                There is no smiliy, but I'll take this post as a joke.

                Either that, or your way of thinking can perfectly explain how accidents like AF can happen.

                --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                Comment


                • Originally posted by guamainiac View Post
                  ...they may have such intellect as to rely on memorizing and spitting back raw data, they have an illusion of mastery...
                  BEAUTIFUL! This is the point I keep trying to make...there is a certain tension (and it's amplified with some people and some training situations) where large quantities of specific memorization is detrimental to remembering big, IMPORTANT fundamental things.

                  I'm certain those AF pilots could embarrass the hell out of Gabriel and I in a contest of how to program a flight plan into an FMS and on how much fuel an A330 will need for a trip, and how to interpret an arrival and departure chart, and how the hydraulics and generators work and allowable brake temperatures and RVR limitations and a hundred other things.

                  But somehow, "be careful with relentless pull ups" and "what a stall might look like" got lost somewhere along the way.

                  Edit: The words "certain tension" in no way mean, "don't study, practice and follow procedures". Neither do they mean "Airline training generally sucks and is in need of overhaul". But with some people and some situations and some training programs we sometimes (rare instances, in fact) see a breakdown.
                  Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                  Comment


                  • Thanks! I wonder who here has read "Fate is the Hunter" ..? It's not fiction.

                    Darned good winter read that you may just not be able to put down and it full of training scenarios.
                    Live, from a grassy knoll somewhere near you.

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                      There is no smiliy, but I'll take this post as a joke.

                      Either that, or your way of thinking can perfectly explain how accidents like AF can happen.
                      I think it really was like that. I don't think they understood the concept of angle of attack, a stall was a function of speed and/or attitude for them.

                      *** SV : "Stall, stall" + cricket continuously
                      *** The copilot sidestick is positioned: - nose-up to two-thirds of the stop position
                      Above all try to touch the lateral controls as little as possible eh
                      But we've got the engines what's happening (...)?
                      What's happening? I don't know I don't know what's happening
                      I have the impression that we have some crazy speed no what do you think?
                      What do you think about it what do you think what do we need to do?
                      There I don't know there it's going down
                      The wings to flat horizon the standby horizon
                      (...) it's impossible
                      What is... how come we're continuing to go right down now?
                      *** The pitch attitude is 14°.
                      Watch out you're pitching up there
                      I'm pitching up?
                      Well we need to we are at four thousand feet
                      Go on pull
                      Let's go pull up pull up pull up
                      (Ten) degrees pitch attitude

                      Comment


                      • Do you think that if they observed the radar, perhaps the look down function, that they would realize that they were flying into some very severe weather? Sounds like complacent basic situational awareness failure.
                        Live, from a grassy knoll somewhere near you.

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by kris View Post
                          I think it really was like that. I don't think they understood the concept of angle of attack, a stall was a function of speed and/or attitude for them.
                          Pierre-Cédric Bonin, PF, right seat:

                          6,547 flying hours, 4,479 on type:

                          Private Pilot’s License issued in 2000

                          ATPL theory in 2000

                          Professional pilot’s license issued in 2001

                          Multi-engine instrument type rating issued in 2001

                          Glider pilot’s license issued in 2001

                          Following his selection by Air France, pilot training course at the Amaury de la Grange flying school in Merville from October 2003

                          A320 type rating issued in 2004 (within Air France). End of line training and pilot in command for first time in September 2004

                          ATPL License issued on 3 August 2007

                          Additional A340 type rating issued in February 2008 (with Air France). End of LOFT and pilot in command for first time in June 2008

                          Additional A330 type rating and line training in December 2008

                          2008/2009 ECP instruction season:

                          4S ground training on 15 January 2009

                          E33 training on 2 February 2009

                          C34 base flight check on 3 February 2009

                          Stall: A320 type rating: FFS session n°4: “piloting in degraded law (effect of buffeting) in alternate law”

                          A320 type rating: FFS session n°7: “Preventive recognition and countermeasures to approach to stall. DEMONSTRATION STALL WARNING”.

                          Yet didn't understand the concept of AoA???
                          How is that possible?

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by Evan View Post
                            Yet didn't understand the concept of AoA???
                            How is that possible?
                            That's the big question.

                            They were at 10° nose up (as consistently shown in 3 attitude indicators).
                            The were going down 10Kfpm (as consistently shown in 3 altimeters and 2 vertical speed indicators).
                            The lateral handling was severely impaired by loss of roll damp and roll authority.
                            The aural stall warning was sounding uninterruptedly for one minute and a half (IIRC).
                            They were pulling up relentlessly.
                            The plane would not raise the nose any higher by pulling back.
                            They did not react as either if they knew they were at a stall, or if they knew how to react to that.

                            So no. Factually, they did not understand the concept of AoA. At least during the accident sequence.

                            --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                            --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                            Comment


                            • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                              So no. Factually, they did not understand the concept of AoA. At least during the accident sequence.
                              Or they couldn't think clearly enough to put it together... due to...

                              Comment


                              • Hey, this comment that 10 degrees nose up is a "generally healthy attitude" are valid.

                                Gabriel- have you EVER done a practice stall where the objective was to demonstrate that a plane can be stalled at a normal healthy attitude and airspeed?

                                Ever?

                                Remember the 'puppy-mill-recurrent-redundant' airliner stall training- PROMPTLY GO TO A HIGH PERFORMANCE CLIMB ATTITUDE WITH YOUR POWERFUL ENGINES RECOVERING YOUR SPEED FOR YOU.

                                I have to say that every bit of stall training I received was "if you pull up too much on climb out", "if you pull up too much on final", "if you pull up too much in a steep turn", "if you botch the stall recovery and pull up too much as you level off". And of course, be sure to maintain airspeed was part of the training.

                                Yeah, it's sad, but I do find it believable that three adults with a bazillion alarms going off and their "X-Box-type vanilla plane" is what'sitdoingnow with a vengence...they might be slow to recognize that a stall is happening.

                                And let's not forget that the PNF did not have a big ass yoke shoved back into his belly.

                                Bonin's error was compounded...the relentless pull up remains incomprehensible...but since he didn't tell anyone else (until a couple minutes later) what he was doing (and he was only giving a little slight pull on his atari game controller anyway)...

                                The captain comes in- they see 10 degrees nose up...that's a good healthy place to be...

                                ...in the heat of the moment, I can see the tunnel vision that "attitude is OK, we are not stalling" (again, when did you ever do a stall to show that a plane can be stalled at a 'healthy' attitude and airspeed).

                                I wish the wallowing wings were a better hint, I wish the stall warning was a better hint, I wish the AOA indicator was a better hint (was there one?), I wish Bonin was a better hint, I wish the attitude and altitude during the initial agressive climb was a better hint...

                                (and of course, I wish someone would have thought to leave the power and general attitude alone)

                                ...but there were a bunch of alarms, including the stall warning going off and on at not-so-intuitive times.

                                "A plane can be stalled at any airspeed and attitude" yeah, it's important, but it's mostly something we just say...has anyone here ever done a practice stall where the objective was to show a healthy attitude and airspeed still can mean stall?

                                Ever?
                                Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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