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How to crash a 737 using your solid stick and rudder skills

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  • #76
    I think something that's being overlooked to an extent here is that in many cases, and this one in particular, what's being called "basic airmanship" *is* a procedure.

    Take the following:
    Code:
    If the aircraft appears to be stalled:
    1. Increase power on all engines to the greatest possible extent
    2. Move the yoke or stick forward to lower the nose
    3. Using the yoke/stick and pedals, neutralize the rudder and ailerons
    4. If control motion in steps 2 and 3 seems ineffective, check trim settings
    I'd call that "basic airmanship" but it kinda looks like a procedure doesn't it?

    And while it may not be in the QRH (although I suspect it *is* in writing somewhere in the manuals), it's something I can guarantee the pilots of AF447 and all the others were trained on many times, and demonstrated during testing.
    Be alert! America needs more lerts.

    Eric Law

    Comment


    • #77
      Originally posted by elaw View Post
      I think something that's being overlooked to an extent here is that in many cases, and this one in particular, what's being called "basic airmanship" *is* a procedure.

      Take the following:
      Code:
      If the aircraft appears to be stalled:
      1. Increase power on all engines to the greatest possible extent
      2. Move the yoke or stick forward to lower the nose
      3. Using the yoke/stick and pedals, neutralize the rudder and ailerons
      4. If control motion in steps 2 and 3 seems ineffective, check trim settings
      I'd call that "basic airmanship" but it kinda looks like a procedure doesn't it?

      And while it may not be in the QRH (although I suspect it *is* in writing somewhere in the manuals), it's something I can guarantee the pilots of AF447 and all the others were trained on many times, and demonstrated during testing.
      That might be a procedure that is part of basic airmanship on certain aircraft. It is NOT the current procedure on aircraft with underslung engines. Item #2 should be item #1 and increase power must be done 'smoothly' and 'carefully'.

      A number of crashes have occured because pilots did not understand this.

      And this proves my point spectacularly because there are still many pilots who believe the procedures they learned on a tractor propulsion aircraft like the 172 apply to the underslung thrust propulsion aircraft like the 737 as 'basic airmanship'. They don't, because of factors that one must have an understanding of physics to recognize. Since many pilots don't have this knowledge and it would be unrealistic to expect them* to have it, we have procedures that are much simpler to understand, practice and perform by memory.

      If that doesn't illustrate my point, I give up.

      *all of them, across the world.

      Comment


      • #78
        Originally posted by Evan View Post
        A number of crashes have occured because pilots did not understand this.
        Show me ONE accident where they crashed because of applying 1, 2, 3 and 4 instead of 2, 1, 3 and 4.

        And I am saying that even when I think that the first reaction must be 2. IF and only IF ground or obstacle clearance is of immediate concern, then 1 should immediately followed and not so smoothly or carefully, but be prepared for 4.

        --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
        --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

        Comment


        • #79
          Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
          Show me ONE accident where they crashed because of applying 1, 2, 3 and 4 instead of 2, 1, 3 and 4.
          Sorry, stalls not crashes. I can't recall if any of those stalls resulted in crashes but the procedure is for approach to stall, stall avoidance at stickshaker, and some of these developed into full stall because of the power over pitch priority. Underslung thrust jammed to the firewall (or double-click on the TO/GA button) has been known to override elevator long enough to prompt the industry to change the procedure around. As you know:

          Originally posted by Gabriel
          Tell that to a couple of 737 pilots that couldn't arrest the nose-up pitching and subsequent increase in AoA and further loss of speed even after applying forward yoke to the stops. The engines were inadvertently idled in an ILS approach witht the AP adding nose-up trim to track the glide slope until the stick shaker activated, point at which the pilots TOGAe'd it and disconnected the AP. The plane kept pitching up despite the full forward yoke, fully stalled and fell. During the fall the nose went down and the plane gained enough airspeed to increase the effectiveness of the elevators to the point where the pitch could be controlled. It was a really close call.
          Maybe they were using their basic 172 airmanship? If that had happened at low altitude, that would be the ONE accident you are asking me for.

          The point of course (which is of course always missed in the details here) is that basic procedures are NOT universal and can VARY by TYPE.

          Comment


          • #80
            Originally posted by Evan View Post
            Sorry, stalls not crashes. I can't recall if any of those stalls resulted in crashes but the procedure is for approach to stall, stall avoidance at stickshaker, and some of these developed into full stall because of the power over pitch priority. Underslung thrust jammed to the firewall (or double-click on the TO/GA button) has been known to override elevator long enough to prompt the industry to change the procedure around.
            I've said "and 4".

            --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
            --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

            Comment


            • #81
              Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
              I've said "and 4".
              Ok, #4, here is an interesting example. On the A320, there is no yoke and no pitch trim thumb switch. You don't ever trim the A320 in flight. So A320 pilots, even if they were raised on Cessnas and Tomahawks, lose their vestigial instinct for manual pitch trim.

              Suddenly, for some unforeseen chain of circumstances, they find themselves in alternate law in a fully developed stall. The stabilizer trim, which has moved to the nose-up stop, is now frozen there and the manual pitch trim wheel must be used along with stick inputs to retain elevator authority. Does that come from a yoke-driven airmanship instinct. I doubt it. It comes from procedure. Learned and rehearsed procedure.

              Comment


              • #82
                Originally posted by Evan View Post
                Ok, #4, here is an interesting example. On the A320, there is no yoke and no pitch trim thumb switch. You don't ever trim the A320 in flight. So A320 pilots, even if they were raised on Cessnas and Tomahawks, lose their vestigial instinct for manual pitch trim.

                Suddenly, for some unforeseen chain of circumstances, they find themselves in alternate law in a fully developed stall. The stabilizer trim, which has moved to the nose-up stop, is now frozen there and the manual pitch trim wheel must be used along with stick inputs to retain elevator authority. Does that come from a yoke-driven airmanship instinct. I doubt it. It comes from procedure. Learned and rehearsed procedure.
                Indeed- Evan can cite a hypothetical instance where a procedure saves the day.

                Pretty much everyone else on this forum can cite multiple, actual incidents and body counts where basic fundamentals were grossly violated.
                Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                Comment


                • #83
                  Originally posted by Evan View Post
                  Ok, #4, here is an interesting example. On the A320, there is no yoke and no pitch trim thumb switch. You don't ever trim the A320 in flight. So A320 pilots, even if they were raised on Cessnas and Tomahawks, lose their vestigial instinct for manual pitch trim.

                  Suddenly, for some unforeseen chain of circumstances, they find themselves in alternate law in a fully developed stall. The stabilizer trim, which has moved to the nose-up stop, is now frozen there and the manual pitch trim wheel must be used along with stick inputs to retain elevator authority. Does that come from a yoke-driven airmanship instinct. I doubt it. It comes from procedure. Learned and rehearsed procedure.
                  When did that happen?
                  So, basically, what you are saying that they have to do #4 after all. So 1/2/3/4 works or doesn't?

                  --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                  --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                  Comment


                  • #84
                    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                    When did that happen?
                    XL Airways / Air New Zealand A320 near Perpignan on Nov 27th 2008:
                    Under the combined effect of pitch up due to the engine acceleration, the pitch up due to increasing air speed and the horizontal stabilizer still at the mechanical nose up stop, even full side stick down input was insufficient to prevent the nose from pitching up. The XL pilots did not understand what was happening, the lack of reaction to the nose down inputs did not draw the attention of the crew to the stabilizer trim. The crew did not notice that the automatic stabilizer trim was no longer working. No attempt was made to adjust the trim manually or to reduce engine thrust.
                    http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2008/d-la...la081127ea.pdf.

                    So, basically, what you are saying that they have to do #4 after all. So 1/2/3/4 works or doesn't?
                    What I'm saying is that doing what you always do to fly the plane is not enough. You have to know the unusual attitude procedures because of technical factors that are not plainly obvious to your practiced stick and rudder skills. An A320 pilot is not accustomed to using pitch trim in flight. Why would they do so instinctively if they were not trained on upset procedures? Also, notice that #1 contributed to the problem.

                    What I'm saying is know your aircraft. Know the procedures for your aircraft. If you don't know the reversion law requirements of the A320 you are not fit to fly it.

                    Originally posted by 3WE
                    Indeed- Evan can cite an actual instance where a lack of procedure didn't save the day.
                    I'm getting tired of fixing all your posts...

                    Comment


                    • #85
                      Originally posted by Evan View Post
                      So A320 pilots, even if they were raised on Cessnas and Tomahawks, lose their vestigial instinct for manual pitch trim.
                      Oh, it's "instinct" now?

                      IHMO "instinct" is something a person (or any other animal) is born with - a result of genetics. And per that definition, IMHO nobody is born with an "instinct" on how to fly an airplane. Some may be predisposed to learn faster than others, but everyone who successfully flies an airplane has learned to do so after birth... or is just damn lucky.

                      The point I was trying to make that you seem to have missed is that what we're calling "airmanship" here is also a procedure. It's not necessarily the same procedure in all circumstances on all airplanes, but it's a procedure that through learning and experience a pilot knows can be used to accomplish a certain task. Most of us don't follow a written "procedure" for entering our home, but we know from experience that we need to insert the key into the lock, rotate it, then press or turn a latch in order to get the door to open. And miraculously, most of us are able to accomplish that task successfully over and over again without having to refer to a document that we carry with us.

                      I view what we're calling "basic airmanship" the same way. The 1, 2, 3, 4 steps I outlined earlier might in fact be 2, 1, 3, 4 for a particular aircraft, or if you're in a glider might actually just be 2, 3, 4. But they still represent a "procedure", albeit an easily memorized and practiced one that is similar or identical on many different aircraft.

                      Let me put a different spin on this... I'm curious what you folks think.

                      I think what we're really talking about here when we argue "procedure" vs. "basic airmanship" (in them context of the current discussion - not universally) is where responsibility is placed. "Basic airmanship" basically means that the pilot's skills and judgement are relied upon, whereas "procedure" basically means the pilot becomes a managed element whose primary responsibility is to follow instructions written by someone else in a different location at a different time.

                      I think the crux of the issue is in any given situation, which of those options will ensure the best outcome? Sometimes the answer is very clear - with a good pilot (or pilots) in a situation never anticipated beforehand, relying on the pilots can give your best outcome - UA232 is a good example. In other circumstances, the opposite is true - in the case of AF90, if procedures had been followed properly you would not have had an aircraft in the river and and a bunch of people dead.

                      The question is, can you say that trusting the pilot(s) skills/training/reactions vs. procedure is always or never better... I say no. For any given situation the answer will probably be clear, but I don't think the same answer is correct for all circumstances.
                      Be alert! America needs more lerts.

                      Eric Law

                      Comment


                      • #86
                        Ok...

                        I will make at least a weak attempt at a cease fire because yeah, no one is going to budge further.

                        Evan is adding lots of qualifications indicating he's trying to think like us and indeed, he's close.

                        Procedure is important, but he maintains a certain addiction to procedure and disdain for folks filing operational thoughts it in their "fundamental" imperfect-brain-cells instead of their "checklist" imperfect-brain-cells.

                        I just don't think he'll ever be able to say, "Aviate, Navigate, Communicate" without saying the words, "because that's what the memory checklist in the QRH says to do and that you absolutely must always do that for the 737-236A but not the 737-200." (Italics are a final effort to point out the specific vs. broad general issue).
                        Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                        Comment


                        • #87
                          Originally posted by elaw View Post
                          ...For any given situation the answer will probably be clear, but I don't think the same answer is correct for all circumstances.
                          Indeed and concur...

                          It is woven, complex and not always the same.
                          Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                          Comment


                          • #88
                            Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                            Procedure is important, but he maintains a certain addiction to procedure and disdain for folks filing operational thoughts it in their "fundamental" imperfect-brain-cells instead of their "checklist" imperfect-brain-cells.

                            I just don't think he'll ever be able to say, "Aviate, Navigate, Communicate" without saying the words, "because that's what the memory checklist in the QRH says to do and that you absolutely must always do that for the 737-236A but not the 737-200." (Italics are a final effort to point out the specific vs. broad general issue).
                            3WE, for the last time, a memorized procedure is not a written checklist. It is basic airmanship converted to actionable steps in a predetermined sequence + any things specific to the aircraft type that also must be addressed. It is a sequence pre-determined by aerospace engineers, industry experts and veteran stick-and-rudder pilots. They exist to minimize the human factors that otherwise lead to errors like AF447 and AirAsia QZ-8501. They do not contradict basic airmanship, they add CRM into it. They take advantage of the fact that you are not a single pilot in a Cessna but rather part of a flight crew. The 'R' in CRM is for 'resource'.

                            Your idea that 'addiction' to procedure means distracting the PF from the task of flying to look up some checklist is false and ridiculous. Your idea that QRH procedures are complex and confusing is also false. The only downside to adherance to procedure is if the circumstances contradict the procedure. Therefore it is always the first step for the PIC to quickly determine "is there a clear danger contradicting the procedure?" (An example would be major structural damage after decompression where the rate of descent must be more gradual*.) If the answer is no, then the procedure is the safest course of action. Why? Because it satisfies both the need for airmanship and the need for situational awareness and CRM.

                            I'm no longer trying to convince you. You enjoy your general aviation improv airmanship. I am only concerned with commercial pilots who might think like you.

                            *Although I believe this is addressed in most versions of the memory procedure.

                            Comment


                            • #89
                              I'm more concerned with reports that your airline pilots often went to flight schools where they were taught that they key to acing the approach to stall in an ERJ-45 was to follow the memory checklist to go to full power and pull up to max climb attitude while the memory checklist for the ERJ-55 was to go to max power and pull up to maximum climb and the CRJ-700 and the CRJ-900...

                              All according to procedure, to heck with manage AOA.
                              Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                              Comment


                              • #90
                                You guys are pretty funny bantering this all back and forth.

                                Actually as Evan has said, "A memorized procedure is not a written checklist. It is basic airmanship converted to actionable steps in a predetermined sequence + any things specific to the aircraft type that also must be addressed. It is a sequence pre-determined by aerospace engineers, industry experts and veteran stick-and-rudder pilots. They exist to minimize the human factors that otherwise lead to errors like AF447 and AirAsia QZ-8501. They do not contradict basic airmanship, they add CRM into it. They take advantage of the fact that you are not a single pilot in a Cessna but rather part of a flight crew. The 'R' in CRM is for 'resource'".

                                This pretty well sums it up in the REAL life airline world. But then again I have never flown any Airbus aircraft and have no idea how all the wiz bang magic shit works!

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