How to crash a 737 using your solid stick and rudder skills

[Evan]

This pretty well sums it up in the REAL life airline world.

Thank you sir, I'm glad to hear that.

[Evan]

I'm more concerned with reports that your airline pilots often went to flight schools where they were taught that they key to acing the approach to stall in an ERJ-45 was to follow the memory checklist to go to full power and pull up to max climb attitude while the memory checklist for the ERJ-55 was to go to max power and pull up to maximum climb and the CRJ-700 and the CRJ-900...

Odd... that the procedure for stall on a stick-pusher equipped aircraft would be to pull to full climb attitude... might want to fact check that...

My SkyWest procedure says:

Autopilot = Disengage, if required
Pitch Attitude = Lower nose to reduce angle of attack
Thrust Levers = Advance to Max Power
Roll Attitude = Wings Level
Flight Spoiler lever = Retract

I realize some older CRJ stall procedures are more full-thrust-and-maintain 8°-10° pitch-oriented, probably because you don't have the pronounced pitch-coupling on fuselage cans and you have a stick pusher to boot. But anyway specifying 8-10° pitch in at typical stall warning does not mean "pull to full climb attitude". But this is also why we have recurrent training and MOM's, so procedures can always be modified and improved. Generally, the procedures must always mirror the latest airmanship wisdom of the day.

[3WE]

Yes, Bobby (and Evan), I know that ATP flying is "procedure-out-the-wazoo with good CRM".

I believe that Bobby and ATL and Lefty and V-Nav and Snyder and G-manic and yes, even ITS-cigar-in-mouth, TP-shredding-cowboy are procedure Ninjas and would ride with them any time.

The question is if it was detrimental when these 737 pilots were "untrained" from their 10-hour, Cessna 150 procedure to go around with strict control of attitude and airpseed on a FUBAR'd approach and if it was detrimental when the Air France pilots were "untrained" from their 10-hour, Cessna 150 procedure to not pull up relentlessly except when executing the memory checklist from the POH on how to DELIBERATELY stall the plane for practice purposes. When was Hui Theiu Lo "untrained" from the 10-hour Cessna 150 procedure to glance at that upper-left instrument area to see if speed is on target and maybe keep a hand on the power control when on short final.

Yes, I just won't give up that a basic-oriented action (or a basic-oriented thought) might have helped the passengers more that what they DID do, and am at a loss at why they did what they did...why they forgot what is both procedural AND totally crazy-basic.

And Evan, 1) As you are aware, Gabriel's numerous rants on various aviation fora got THE BASIC UNIVERSAL STALL procedure rewritten to manage AOA FIRST. (Or perhaps, more correctly he got the the various QRH's for 737-200's, 236A's, DC-9's, 757, 767, Airbus, C/ERJ's (and more) modified to AOA first.)

But, the question is if there's still some pilots around from second rate and third world flight schools (perhaps not West Jet) who were trained predominately on how to pass tests to the exclusion of the basics behind procedures.

[3WE]

Odd... that the procedure for stall on a stick-pusher equipped aircraft would be to pull to full climb attitude... might want to fact check that...

It's actually a good, fundamental procedure that if you are very low and get into an incipient stall situation, that you critically manage speed and AOA and climb to the best of the planes ability (within reason).

That fundamental concept that "Altitude is your friend". Get away from the tree that the Russians moved over, Call off your unstabilized approach, go around, do it again...Actually the crash in this thread should have done this...power up, climb to the best of the planes ability.

I have indeed (as has Gabriel) heard of pilots being taught this at commercial flight schools (and I was taught it by my instructor whom I respect).

It's just best to do with with a bit of fundamental knowledge that if you DO get a stall warning, or a wing falls or you are losing altitude while nose up, or you are pulling up really hard, you might need to ease up a bit, maybe glance at the AOA.

I believe that you may find something very similar to this in various QRH...I dunno, the specifics may vary slightly

...and I'm sure Bobby knows them for his plane as I know the specifics for a 172M...(need to double check the target speed for the 172P and remember not to go looking for carb heat).

[Evan]

3WE, find the AF447 report (there's a link on wikipedia at the bottom of the page), maybe the final report, I can't remember. It describes in detail the training that Air France provided to them. As I recall, they were given good fundamental training but were not trained on memory procedure, hand flying at cruise level and obviously never heard of CRM. I might be wrong, I'm going from.... memory.

But this is why I think the relentless pull up was more about human factors than lack of fundamental training.

[3WE]

...they...were not trained on memory procedure, hand flying at cruise level and obviously never heard of CRM...

1) Carefully look at my snip- there was no intention to change the context.

2) I'm declaring a cease fire, for the moment, try to laugh with me.

3) HAND FLYING AT CRUSE AND DECENT CRM IS AN EXPELETIVE-VERB-PRESENT-TENSE BASIC, FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT.

Ok, the chuckle is over, the temporary cease fire is still on, but I'm at DEFCON 4:

I will say that human factors affects CRM every bit as much as it affects your basic memory...and I don't object to a mindless muscle memory to do a crisp, small shove over if there's a stall warning.

And...

I got one for you to think about...in the Colgan crash, the PNF co-pilot calls out "flaps 15" and raises the flaps to 15 degrees, further lowering the stall speed.

I've heard people say how fundamentally wrong that was. I don't think about it much because Gabriel's always yelling about how the pilot pulled up so relentlessly.

I have two questions for you:

1) Why do you think she did it.

2) Did she do right or wrong?

[Gabriel]

1) Why do you think she did it.

We were in an approach, not he has put full power and he is climbing like hell. We are in go-around mode. Flaps 15. Later she offers "Gear up?"

2) Did she do right or wrong?

Everything but "I have control" was wrong at that point. And she didn't have the balls to do it.

[Evan]

I got one for you to think about...in the Colgan crash, the PNF co-pilot calls out "flaps 15" and raises the flaps to 15 degrees, further lowering the stall speed.

I've heard people say how fundamentally wrong that was. I don't think about it much because Gabriel's always yelling about how the pilot pulled up so relentlessly.

I have two questions for you:

1) Why do you think she did it.

2) Did she do right or wrong?

I don't know where you're getting your information. Renslow the Cpt called out for flaps 15 (from 5) just prior to the stall. That is standard flap scheduling for the approach under 160kts around 4-5 miles out. Because the flaps have to be deployed in steps and the stall warning happens during flap transit, they never go beyond the 10° detent. During the stall she cleans it up, which is go-around procedure but not before reaching acceleration altitude. You could argue that this was an error on her part but 10° of flaps hardly matters when the pilot has already stalled the plane and continues to pull up against the stick pusher.

But yes, she did it wrong. I think she just lacked experience and stall recovery training.

Also, he never calls out "stall - full power" or whatever the procedure call out is, so as I think Gabriel is suggesting, she might have thought in the confusion he was doing a missed approach. (although stickshaker and roll excursions and all the "uughs" should have told her otherwise). Nevertheless, CRM means you make the call out.