Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Germanwings A320 on BCN-DUS flight crash near Nice, France

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
    You would need to modify the lock system to allow ground override.
    Then you need some protocol for the ground operator to validate the request.
    Then you add the risk of a rogue ground operator arranging with a rogue passenger to unlock the door at X time.

    All this can be solved.
    No, it can't. This isn't chess, you don't have time. Actually, when the rogue pilot starts his action, it's over.
    Now, the second person always present can be a deterrent. Perhaps the pilot will not start when not alone. Not a complete fix, of course - the complete fix requires removing pilots from the cockpit.

    Comment


    • "Good morning, this is Capitan Franklin speaking. Welcome aboard our flight 123 from Chicago to Los Angeles. I am at the Company's Remote Flight Control Facility in Orlando, Florida and I will be in charge of YOUR flight today. Weather in the route is good and YOUR flight time will be four hours. YOUR flght has a ten minutes delay because I had a malfunctioning in my keypad here but the TI support has already changed it and the ground crew is ready to push-back YOUR plane"

      Two hours after the takeoff, passangers experience a turbulence-like situation.

      "this is Capitan again. YOU just had experinced a turbulence. This was not Weather-related. It happened because I had a slight malfunction in my Windows system here below. The IT support had to reinitiate my computer here and I am ready to provide YOU a smooth flight as YOU expect. Sorry about that".

      No. No way the average public will keep the same level of trust in the industry.

      Comment


      • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
        All this can be solved.
        By having an FA in the cockpit, in the jumpseat, ready to open the door upon pilot request.

        The problem with code-based solutions is that, even if overridden, they still take 30 secs to open the door. A rogue pilot can get into a fatal attitude and/or airspeed in that span of time or do immense damage to the controls. The second pilot must be able to re-enter the cockpit instantly. The FA must be trained to recall the capt and open the door at the first sign of trouble (such as any departure from flight level or automated flight at cruise).

        I think that would mostly eliminate the pilot threat. But then it introduced the FA threat. So the pilots should also have unique codes that lack the 30-sec delay.

        - FA (or reserve/deadheading/check pilot) in the jumpseat while pilot is away.
        - Priority pilot emergency codes that cannot be overriden and work instantly
        - standard door code for the cabin crew.
        - no deadbolt (so auto-locks must have back-up battery and be fault-tolerant)
        - OR a deadbolt with a key provision on the outside. Pilot leaving the flight deck must wear this key which is otherwise stowed on the flight deck. First emergency code lock must be opened, then deadbolt key.
        - Use of emergency code squawks situation to ATC.

        A complex and expensive modification that must be paid for by the public.

        Comment


        • Originally posted by Evan View Post
          A complex and expensive modification that must be paid for by the public.
          you mean the same public that wants to fly safely? why would they want to pay for a system designed to protect them form being killed????

          Comment


          • "Ladies and gentlemen. Welcome aboard this flight to New York JFK. We will be cruising at 36,000 feet and expect a flight time of 6 hours. I have exciting news for you. This flight is the first commercial flight to be wholly controlled from the ground with no pilots on the flight deck. The levels of technology used are so advanced that even this message is computer generated and synthesised. We would like to advise you that our systems have been extensively tested and there is absolutely nothing that can go wrong....go wrong....go wrong....go wrong....go wrong....go wrong."
            If it 'ain't broken........ Don't try to mend it !

            Comment


            • One thing is for sure. If I have to chose between the risk of a possibly suicidal pilot and the risk of a pilot-less plane that might be hit by lightning, I'll chose pilots any day... Once planes have less than two flight crew aboard, my air travel days are over...

              Comment


              • Or, if it's anything like the NYC subway..

                "Good merncjf ladisj and genrkeer, thss is sss pilozz spedxzz z bz zbz ssbz zbsb z zz bssbdbsbz z zsbz zzz sbxb zzbz zsbddbx zz zz dbbdbdz z z sbd bzzz sdxz zz ddbdbxzbz xzbzbzb z zbzbz bzz bzbz zbz zbzz z zzz bzbzzb"

                All this talk of automated, pilotless planes is nonsense. Far into the future, we will still need a human crew capable of reacting to unexpected and unpredictable failures. Remote piloting offers no advantages other than the flight crew itself is no longer at risk, and that is actually a detriment to passenger safety. What can and probably should happen is that the systems will take on more defense against pilot error and manual flight will be further restricted to emergency situations and non-revenue flight training. All landings will be Cat IIIc autoland. Pilots will be more focused on system administration, the way astronauts are now. Well, Airbus started us down that road and since then there is no end to all the hang-wringing over computer-enforced envelope protections... it's a long stubborn road ahead.

                Comment


                • You know where this is a leading to Gabriel...
                  Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                  Comment


                  • Time line on final moments from the CVR:

                    The audio from the plane's cockpit voice recorder has not been released, but the German newspaper Bild published what it claims is a summary of the transcript from the recording.

                    CNN translated Bild's report -- which the newspaper says is based on the 1.5 hours of audio that was on the cockpit voice recorder -- but cannot independently verify the information.

                    Before takeoff, Sondenheimer tells co-pilot Andreas Lubitz that he didn't manage to go to the bathroom in Barcelona, Spain, according to Bild. Lubitz tells him he can go any time.

                    Lubitz is believed to have locked the pilot of Flight 9525 out of the cockpit before putting the plane on a rapid descent into the mountains, French authorities have said.

                    The flight took off 20 minutes late. After reaching cruising altitude, Sondenheimer asked Lubitz to prepare the landing.

                    Once that's finished, Lubitz tells the captain he "can go any time."

                    There is the sound of a seat being pushed backward after which the captain says, "You can take over."

                    At 10:29 a.m., air traffic radar detects that the plane is starting to descend.

                    Three minutes later, air traffic controllers try to contact the plane and receive no answer -- shortly after an alarm goes off in the cockpit, warning of the "sink rate," Bild reported.

                    Next comes the banging.

                    Sondenheimer begs Lubitz to let him in. Passengers then begin to scream, according to the transcript obtained by Bild.

                    Another three minutes pass. A loud metallic bang is heard at 7,000 meters (almost 23,000 feet).

                    A minute and half later and 2,000 meters (about 6,5000 feet) lower to the ground, an alarm says "Terrain -- pull up!"

                    "Open the damn door!" the pilot says.

                    It's 10:38, and the plane is at 4,000 meters (about 13,000). Lubitz's breathing can still be heard on the voice recorder, according to Bild's report.

                    Two minutes later, investigators think they hear the plane's right wing scrape a mountaintop.

                    Screams can be heard one final time.

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by Observer View Post
                      "Good morning, this is Capitan Franklin speaking. Welcome aboard our flight 123 from Chicago to Los Angeles. I am at the Company's Remote Flight Control Facility in Orlando, Florida and I will be in charge of several flights at the same time including YOUR flight today.
                      Fixed!

                      --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                      --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                      Comment


                      • Two minutes later, investigators think they hear the plane's right wing scrape a mountaintop.
                        Ahh, Bild...

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by Arrow View Post
                          For the airlines, that has the added appeal of being dead (so to speak) cheap because a F/A can be platooned for the short span of time a relief break requires one of the flight deck crew to be out of position. Of course the next thing to happen will be a suicidal flight deck crew member who overpowers the F/A platooned as seat warmer. What then?

                          Arrow
                          They would not be able to lock the door on their own. So the overde code would open the door.

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by Observer View Post
                            "Good morning, this is Capitan Franklin speaking. Welcome aboard our flight 123 from Chicago to Los Angeles. I am at the Company's Remote Flight Control Facility in Orlando, Florida and I will be in charge of YOUR flight today. Weather in the route is good and YOUR flight time will be four hours. YOUR flght has a ten minutes delay because I had a malfunctioning in my keypad here but the TI support has already changed it and the ground crew is ready to push-back YOUR plane"
                            You left out the part where they ask the pax to please push the flight attendant call button if they happen to see any thunderstorms, because there's no radar coverage over the ocean...
                            Be alert! America needs more lerts.

                            Eric Law

                            Comment


                            • Originally posted by Observer View Post
                              "Good morning, this is Capitan "Franklin" speaking. Welcome aboard our flight 123 from Chicago to Los Angeles. I am at the Company's Remote Flight Control Facility in MUMBAI, INDIA and I will be in charge of SEVERAL DOZEN FLIGHTS SIMULTANEOUSLY today. .
                              Corrected.

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by Evan View Post
                                By having an FA in the cockpit, in the jumpseat, ready to open the door upon pilot request.
                                Absolutely, but it doesn't have to be either one or the other. We can have both, so if the FA is overpowered there is still hope.

                                The problem with code-based solutions is that, even if overridden, they still take 30 secs to open the door.
                                No. Once the non-overridable code is entered, there is no point to give the pilot in the cockpit the 30 seconds delay so he can override.

                                Or you mean the time the process to enter the code takes?

                                A rogue pilot can get into a fatal attitude and/or airspeed in that span of time or do immense damage to the controls. The second pilot must be able to re-enter the cockpit instantly. The FA must be trained to recall the capt and open the door at the first sign of trouble (such as any departure from flight level or automated flight at cruise).
                                There is no perfect solution. The time it takes for the pilot outside to just get to the cockpit door can be already too much. How much it takes to switch off two ADRs, roll inverted and pull full up (which is down)? The airplane will be destroyed in seconds and, in the mean time, the G forces will make it impossible to walk to the cockpit door.

                                I think that would mostly eliminate the pilot threat. But then it introduced the FA threat. So the pilots should also have unique codes that lack the 30-sec delay.

                                - FA (or reserve/deadheading/check pilot) in the jumpseat while pilot is away.
                                - Priority pilot emergency codes that cannot be overriden and work instantly
                                - standard door code for the cabin crew.
                                I think we need 2 secret codes (one flight crew and one cabin crew).
                                It already happened that one pilot lawfully locked the other one outside the cockpit to protect the flight from such pilot.

                                - no deadbolt (so auto-locks must have back-up battery and be fault-tolerant)
                                - OR a deadbolt with a key provision on the outside. Pilot leaving the flight deck must wear this key which is otherwise stowed on the flight deck. First emergency code lock must be opened, then deadbolt key.
                                - Use of emergency code squawks situation to ATC.

                                A complex and expensive modification that must be paid for by the public.
                                I mostly agree with all that, and I think that most of the steps can be taken without any expensive (in aviation terms) modification.

                                I could temporarily live without the key option and without the battery and fault tolerant solution. If pilots, one in a million times, get locked inside they can stay in, and if they really need to go out for reasons more important that the toilet, they have emergency exits both towards the cabin and towards the outside of the plane. And the chance that a pilot tirs to do a criminal action and just then the lock system fail is close to zero (just connect the lock system to the main buses and provide no means to power it off: no switch and the CB out of reach).

                                --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                                --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                                Comment

                                Working...
                                X