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  • Air Shuttle Tail Strike

    Wow, what is NOT involved in this?

    Traditional airmanship of watch the airspeed on short final (just like Hui Theiu Lo, but no autothrottles involved).

    Unstabilized approaches and bad CRM. (for Evan.)

    But they WERE trained in CRM (oh the tension of training vs. performance for my interest- AND should they have been TRAINED to watch the airspeed? (Like you are supposed to be trained in your very first hours of flight training)

    A stall. (for Gabriel)

    A cover up. (for Northwester (didn't last very long nor go very high up. so probably not of tin-foil-hat levels)).

    Missed reports by maintenance, walk-around...(Swiss cheese for all).

    An excellent landing.

    And even the taboo subject of diversity in the cockpit could be brought up by insensitive persons...I say no more.


    Originally posted by Wikipedia
    On October 16, 2001, an EMB 145 was on final approach to Roanoke, Virginia. The captain had briefed a "no go-around" for a night visual approach to a "Special Airport." The approach was not stabilized, and the airspeed decreased to the point of a stall. The airplane struck the runway in a nose high pitch attitude, the aft fuselage struck the runway first then settled on the landing gear. The first officer made initial callouts of slow airspeed and then stopped when the captain failed to respond to her callouts. After landing, the airplane was taxied to the gate where a post flight inspection limited to the main landing gear did not find the damage to the tail section. The incident was not reported by either pilots to the Company and the airplane was allowed to be flown by the next crew the following morning on its scheduled service back to Charlotte, NC where a post flight inspection revealed the tail strike. When interviewed, the captain first denied having been involve in a hard landing and speculated that the tail strike must have been the result of an over rotation on takeoff from the morning crew. When faced with the CVR and FDR data, she eventually admitted to the incident. She reported that she briefed "no go-around" because no takeoffs were authorized on the runway at night or in IMC conditions; however, the first officer knew this was incorrect, but did not challenge the captain. Both pilots had received CRM training, which included crewmember assertiveness, methods of fostering crew input, and situational awareness, and training on special use airports; however it was not followed by either pilot. The captain said the first officer was passive and quiet. The first officer reported the captain was defensive and did not take criticism very well. It is remarkable that the damage to the tail section was not discovered during the preflight visual inspection performed by the morning flight or ground crews. The aircraft had an MELed APU and needed the engines to be started with the assistance of an external air cart. The connection for the air cart is located at the aft bottom fuselage section where the damages were visible. The access panel was in fact bent. Yet the ground crew did not notify the flight deck crew. When the walk around visual inspection was performed by the morning crew's first officer, it was performed during the hours of darkness with the help of a flashlight. The air cart was already connected and forced the first officer to walk around the cart and away from the aircraft, missing the tail strike damages.[16] Both crews were terminated from employment however the first officer of the accident flight and the captain of the morning flight were eventually reinstated with help of their union (ALPA). The accident captain was able to recover her certificates and privileges but was not reinstated. The first officer from the morning crew died from illness prior to being reinstated.
    Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

  • #2
    You missed one 3WE - Airline creating a negative safety culture.

    If the airline is the type that sacks all 4 (including the Captain of the next flight, who would have had very limited ability to know anything about it), no wonder they didn't want to report the hard landing!

    Comment


    • #3
      Originally posted by MCM View Post
      You missed one 3WE - Airline creating a negative safety culture.

      If the airline is the type that sacks all 4 (including the Captain of the next flight, who would have had very limited ability to know anything about it), no wonder they didn't want to report the hard landing!
      Indeed- I missed that! Another fascinating layer of Swiss cheese, AND pretty crappy to can the Captain of the flight out.
      Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

      Comment


      • #4
        No cheap booze? No hanky panky mongst' the crew?
        Live, from a grassy knoll somewhere near you.

        Comment


        • #5
          My God - if this is true this is unbelievable!
          Yet another AD.com convert!

          Comment


          • #6
            Capn' deserves a good whupping' for failing to alert on the strike. My lord, turning that plane over to another crew shows lack of conscience. If there is a blackball list I pray she is on it.
            Live, from a grassy knoll somewhere near you.

            Comment


            • #7
              When faced with the CVR and FDR data...
              How long is that stored? I thought it erased for the next flight cycle.

              Comment


              • #8
                Originally posted by Evan View Post
                How long is [recorder data] stored? I thought it erased for the next flight cycle.
                ...perhaps it's a "last two hours worth" kind of thing.
                Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                Comment


                • #9
                  Regarding the self-imposed "no-go around" rule, is this missed approach really that tricky?



                  Sure, there's all sort's of "high things" around, but the initial climb out seems unremarkable, and dittos for the height of the obstructions near the MAP course versus where you are supposed to be flying...

                  ...it seems like there's plenty of time to get above anything and as long as you aren't choosing random headings to fly...

                  Professional thoughts on my initial question?
                  Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Originally posted by Wikipedia article
                    She reported that she briefed "no go-around" because no takeoffs were authorized on the runway at night or in IMC conditions; however, the first officer knew this was incorrect, but did not challenge the captain.
                    I interpret the above to mean that the "no go-around rule" was a figment of the captain's imagination.

                    Or perhaps a rule existed but was impertinent - for example there could have been a "no takeoffs at night" rule for noise abatement, but that would not apply to go-arounds.
                    Be alert! America needs more lerts.

                    Eric Law

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Originally posted by elaw View Post
                      I interpret the above to mean that the "no go-around rule" was a figment of the captain's imagination.

                      Or perhaps a rule existed but was impertinent - for example there could have been a "no takeoffs at night" rule for noise abatement, but that would not apply to go-arounds.
                      Concur, but a tough discussion. The Wiki article implies it is something of a special approach and indeed there's some high terrain and obstacles.

                      Perhaps some similarity to the approaches to runway 18 at Birmingham, AL... Perfectly legal approach, perfectly safe when performed properly, complies with the TERPS standards and safety buffers, yet numerous airlines have big restrictions on the use of the approach with more airlines restricting it after the UPS crash.

                      So the question was if this missed approach was markedly more challenging than average...(I did catch it that the restriction was largely in the pilots mind- but wondering if there was perhaps a slight shred of validity- that the procedure was challenging and might be nice to avoid).

                      Of course, if I really really really WANTED to avoid a go-around (restricted or not), I think I'd pay attention to airspeed (and a couple other things).
                      Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Originally posted by Evan View Post
                        How long is that stored? I thought it erased for the next flight cycle.
                        Modern DCVR is 0.5 hour in HQ and 2 hours in standard quality on a FIFO basis.
                        Modern DFDR has many many hours of recording on a FIFO basis too. Typically you'll have several previous flights recorded together with the last one.

                        They will not erase between flights. So for example if you have an accident during the take-off the CVR will likely contain more recording of the previous flight than the accident one.

                        And remember the TAM A320 accident at Congonhas? The DFDR data let the investigators learn that the "single reverser" landing procedure was not uniformly implemented. The accident pilot apparently wanted to apply reverse TL only on the good-reverser engine. In the previous 2 flights, one pilot elected not to use reversers at all and another one applied reverse TL on both engines.

                        And remember the misrigged turboprop that stalled on take-off? (sorry, don't remember the airline, location, type, etc...). The DFDR let the investigators know that previous flights had managed to keep control because of the lower weight and more forward CG than in the accident flight, and also let them compare with flights made BEFORE the misrigging (that were still recorded too) and compare the yoke positions and find the offset (between before and after the maintenance intervention).

                        --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                        --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                          the misrigged turboprop that stalled on take-off? (sorry, don't remember the airline, location, type, etc...).
                          Air Midwest/US Airways Express Flight 5481.
                          "I know that at times I can be a little over the top." -ITS

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Originally posted by MCM View Post
                            You missed one 3WE - Airline creating a negative safety culture.

                            If the airline is the type that sacks all 4 (including the Captain of the next flight, who would have had very limited ability to know anything about it), no wonder they didn't want to report the hard landing!

                            Wow that is F-ed up! Would they have been expected to find it during walk around? Those 145s are pretty low to the ground maybe hard to see under the tail there?

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              It depends what you mean by tricky 3WE.

                              You'll see the minima for the approach is 650'. This is very high for an ILS, and could well be due to that height being required to meet the missed approach climb gradient for terrain clearance. Is it for sure? I don't know.

                              So what happens when you've continued below the minima (because you are visual), and now at 100' you need to go around? Climbing back into a black hole, from an unknown position (you're now well beyond the missed approach point), and aren't guaranteed of terrain clearance.

                              From a mindset point of view, EMB 145 pilots would be familiar with the concept of 'no missed approach' landings - from memory they have 'commit' height if they have to land engine out.

                              Just something to ponder.

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