Things not mentioned in the title:
Personality? Professionalism? Individual values? Responsibility? Sense of duty? ... Ethics anyone?
This is one of my very rare and "obscure" threads where I really don't know where I am going. But try to follow me... if you can, because I can't.
While this post goes around the Asian accident, I'm using it just an exucse to talk about a much deeper and fuzzy issue. That's why I put it out of the Asiana thread.
Different posters compared the Asiana accident with Colgan, AF 447, KLM vs Pan-Am at Tenerife, Turkish...
I don't know what was going on the minds of these three pilots at that time, but I don't think they are similar (maybe a bit with Turkish, but not too much).
This accident, in my view, is more similar to the typical "busting minimums" one, or the "low semi-arobatic passes above my girlfried's house" type.
Let's face it. Landing a perfectly functioning aircraft in severe daylight visual conditions with almost no wind or turbulence in a long, wide, sea-level, PAPI-equipped runway, is no feat. It is not in a J-3. It is not in a 777. It is not in the Concord, and it is even not in the worst glider of the Universe: the Space Shuttle.
You don't need any special skill or training (other than being able to just fly the plane), it there are no tough judgement calls to be made, and CRM my ass, single pilot can do it with no sweat.
I am 200% sure that any low time PPL or even a good simmer that takes the hobby seriously could have kept the glide slope and speed reasonably close to the target (the flare and touchdown part is more difficult, I concede)...
... IF ONLY THEY REALLY INTENDED TO DO IT.
So, they passed through 500ft.
The speed was not stabilized (and had never been during the approach).
The glide slope was not stabilized (as and had never been during the approach).
The thrust not in the "approach" range but at idle (as it had been during the whole approach).
They had not even completed the landing checklist yet.
And then, a voice calls "Five hundred".
At this point, I bet that all of them thought "this is not ok, we are not meeting the stabilized approach criteria... in many ways, we are required to go around".
But they didn't.
It was not a tough judgement call. It was not that the approach had become stabilized at this point.
The approach had never been stabilized.
And they knew it.
They had reached the stabilized approach gate.
And they knew it.
They should have gone around at that point.
And they knew it. ALL OF THEM.
But they didn't.
Training can't solve that.
Skills can't solve that.
CRM can't solve that.
This is the point of the additional words I added below the title.
You can be an expert in all the airplane systems, be stick-n-rudder guy of superior quality, pass all checkrides ant training sessions with flying colors (because you are NOT so dumb to violate the procedures in an exam, are you?), and then, go and say "fuck all this BS, I am better than all that".
Even a pristine safety culture can't ensure that it'll correct a naturally irresponsible person that lacks any commitment with duty.
I concede that it can do something.
I've worked in 2 factories (more, in fact, but these two come to the point).
In one of them, people was very reluctant of using the PPE. "It's uncomfortable". "It interefre with my tasks". "I can't see the defects well with these safety googles". "They really don't work". were the typical excuses.
In the other one, everybody used them without questions.
The really interesting thing was the new hires.
In the first one, they immediately voiced for the same excuses.
In the other one, they used it without complains. Of course, saying that it is uncomfortable or that you can't work right with it is a lame excuses when everybody else is using it 8 hours per day with no complains or job-performance impact.
I bet that, on average, the new guys were similar in both companies. So the reaction of a new hire to the EPPs was STRONGLY, CRITICALLY influenced by the company culture.
Yet, even in the "good" company, there were rebels. Of course, they wouldn't last.
My point, that I have raised before in this forum, is two fold:
- No matter how much training and knowledge an airline (or the system) instill in a person, there will ALWAYS be cases of pilots that are willing to "know better" and knowingly do something they shouldn't.
- If an airline is willing to cut corners, there will ALWAYS be a supply of pilots willing to work with that.
Because of that, while we can blame the pilots individually for their dishonest behavior, that doesn't relieve the airlines of their responsibility. The airlines KNOW that these pilot exist, so they MUST do something about that.
It's the airline's duty to either "cure" or "get rid" of the pilots that lack the necessary personality, as much as they do (or should do) regarding the skills.
So, again, the solution is two-fold:
- Strong safety culture, like in the "good" factory of my example.
- A means to detect and get rid of the rebels.
Both things are the TOP MANAGEMENT's responsibility.
And please, before someone objects my appreciation of the Asiana accident, remember this is not the Asiana thread and that I used it only as an excuse to discuss the safety issues mentioned. So please follow me and assume for a minute that the behavior of the Asiana pilots was the one I described.
Personality? Professionalism? Individual values? Responsibility? Sense of duty? ... Ethics anyone?
This is one of my very rare and "obscure" threads where I really don't know where I am going. But try to follow me... if you can, because I can't.
While this post goes around the Asian accident, I'm using it just an exucse to talk about a much deeper and fuzzy issue. That's why I put it out of the Asiana thread.
Different posters compared the Asiana accident with Colgan, AF 447, KLM vs Pan-Am at Tenerife, Turkish...
I don't know what was going on the minds of these three pilots at that time, but I don't think they are similar (maybe a bit with Turkish, but not too much).
This accident, in my view, is more similar to the typical "busting minimums" one, or the "low semi-arobatic passes above my girlfried's house" type.
Let's face it. Landing a perfectly functioning aircraft in severe daylight visual conditions with almost no wind or turbulence in a long, wide, sea-level, PAPI-equipped runway, is no feat. It is not in a J-3. It is not in a 777. It is not in the Concord, and it is even not in the worst glider of the Universe: the Space Shuttle.
You don't need any special skill or training (other than being able to just fly the plane), it there are no tough judgement calls to be made, and CRM my ass, single pilot can do it with no sweat.
I am 200% sure that any low time PPL or even a good simmer that takes the hobby seriously could have kept the glide slope and speed reasonably close to the target (the flare and touchdown part is more difficult, I concede)...
... IF ONLY THEY REALLY INTENDED TO DO IT.
So, they passed through 500ft.
The speed was not stabilized (and had never been during the approach).
The glide slope was not stabilized (as and had never been during the approach).
The thrust not in the "approach" range but at idle (as it had been during the whole approach).
They had not even completed the landing checklist yet.
And then, a voice calls "Five hundred".
At this point, I bet that all of them thought "this is not ok, we are not meeting the stabilized approach criteria... in many ways, we are required to go around".
But they didn't.
It was not a tough judgement call. It was not that the approach had become stabilized at this point.
The approach had never been stabilized.
And they knew it.
They had reached the stabilized approach gate.
And they knew it.
They should have gone around at that point.
And they knew it. ALL OF THEM.
But they didn't.
Training can't solve that.
Skills can't solve that.
CRM can't solve that.
This is the point of the additional words I added below the title.
You can be an expert in all the airplane systems, be stick-n-rudder guy of superior quality, pass all checkrides ant training sessions with flying colors (because you are NOT so dumb to violate the procedures in an exam, are you?), and then, go and say "fuck all this BS, I am better than all that".
Even a pristine safety culture can't ensure that it'll correct a naturally irresponsible person that lacks any commitment with duty.
I concede that it can do something.
I've worked in 2 factories (more, in fact, but these two come to the point).
In one of them, people was very reluctant of using the PPE. "It's uncomfortable". "It interefre with my tasks". "I can't see the defects well with these safety googles". "They really don't work". were the typical excuses.
In the other one, everybody used them without questions.
The really interesting thing was the new hires.
In the first one, they immediately voiced for the same excuses.
In the other one, they used it without complains. Of course, saying that it is uncomfortable or that you can't work right with it is a lame excuses when everybody else is using it 8 hours per day with no complains or job-performance impact.
I bet that, on average, the new guys were similar in both companies. So the reaction of a new hire to the EPPs was STRONGLY, CRITICALLY influenced by the company culture.
Yet, even in the "good" company, there were rebels. Of course, they wouldn't last.
My point, that I have raised before in this forum, is two fold:
- No matter how much training and knowledge an airline (or the system) instill in a person, there will ALWAYS be cases of pilots that are willing to "know better" and knowingly do something they shouldn't.
- If an airline is willing to cut corners, there will ALWAYS be a supply of pilots willing to work with that.
Because of that, while we can blame the pilots individually for their dishonest behavior, that doesn't relieve the airlines of their responsibility. The airlines KNOW that these pilot exist, so they MUST do something about that.
It's the airline's duty to either "cure" or "get rid" of the pilots that lack the necessary personality, as much as they do (or should do) regarding the skills.
So, again, the solution is two-fold:
- Strong safety culture, like in the "good" factory of my example.
- A means to detect and get rid of the rebels.
Both things are the TOP MANAGEMENT's responsibility.
And please, before someone objects my appreciation of the Asiana accident, remember this is not the Asiana thread and that I used it only as an excuse to discuss the safety issues mentioned. So please follow me and assume for a minute that the behavior of the Asiana pilots was the one I described.
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