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First Air 737 crash - Canada

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  • #16
    No it's not just you. Canadian bureaucrats are notoriously stingy when revealing anything. Anything.

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    • #17
      Some technical info posted here:

      Aviation Herald - News, Incidents and Accidents in Aviation

      The two female survivors reported the impact came completely unexpected with no obvious problem prior to impact. The girl received a leg fracture and was found sitting on a rock in tears by the 23 year old female, who also managed to get away from the wreckage, and taken to a safe place. Investigators could not yet speak to the male survivor due to health condition.

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      • #18
        Progress Report

        ILS was confirmed to be in service. No technical problems found with the aircraft thus far. No answers I'm afraid, just more mystery:

        Originally posted by Aviation Herald
        On Jan 5th 2012 the TSB released a first progress report stating, that the aircraft performed an ILS approach (minimum 200 feet AGL, 0.5 miles visibility) to runway 35T. 40 minutes prior the crash the weather had been reported as 10 miles visibility in light drizzle with overcast cloud at 700 feet AGL, a weather observation shortly after the crash indicated 5 miles visibility in light drizzle and mist with overcast cloud at 300 feet AGL. The crew initiated a go-around 2 seconds prior to impact, at that point flaps were set at 40 degrees, the gear was down and locked, the airspeed was 157 KIAS and the final landing checklist had been completed. The aircraft impacted terrain at 396 feet MSL (runway level 215 feet MSL) about 1nm east of the mid point of the runway. Another aircraft completed a successful ILS approach and landing to runway 35T 20 minutes after the crash, measurement flights confirmed the ILS was serviceable. Examination of the aircraft revealed no technical problem prior to impact, both engines were operating and delivering considerable power at the time of impact. The TSB currently works on the hypothesis of a controlled flight into terrain.
        I would like to know their altitude AGL at go-around.

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        • #19
          Originally posted by Evan View Post

          I would like to know their altitude AGL at go-around.
          probably under 10 feet as 2 seconds later AGL altitude was exactly zero
          moving quickly in air

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          • #20
            Originally posted by orangehuggy View Post
            probably under 10 feet as 2 seconds later AGL altitude was exactly zero
            Well, the point of impact is 180-something feet above field elevation. The listed go-around procedure is to continue on the runway heading until 2200ft, not turn off immediately into the hills as they seem to have done. If they were at MDA when this happened, and if that was around 215 MSL, they would only have been 20ft above the point of impact with the wings in a fairly steep bank. Question is: why did they turn off like that?

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            • #21
              they were not turning anywhere as far as i can tell they were descending on runway heading, unfortunately 1 mile east of where the actual runway was
              moving quickly in air

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              • #22
                Originally posted by orangehuggy View Post
                they were not turning anywhere as far as i can tell they were descending on runway heading, unfortunately 1 mile east of where the actual runway was
                On an ILS approach? Hopefully more facts will be forthcoming.

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                • #23
                  Saw the replacement at the Ottawa Airport couple days ago, untitled all white for now.
                  Flickr |Airliners.Net | Airplane-Pictures.Net | Jetphotos.Net

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                  • #24
                    Well, we got something anyway, though not much. I think I agree with Orange Huggy that when the report says the crew "initiated go-around" it might have been speaking loosely (not good form for a report), meaning that they saw the terrain and were making a last desperate effort to avoid it, rather than referring to a proper go-around procedure.

                    If they were on an ILS approach, and assuming all the equipment was functioning properly, then what other explanations are there for being so far out of alignment, particularly with respect to the fact investigators are now examining the possibility of CFIT? My assumption is that the crew misinterpreted their instruments, or were relying on visual contact when they should not have been, or that they lost awareness of what the instruments were telling them, but someone can help me out here as to what is feasible/likely.

                    I'm not surprised the replacement aircraft bears no signature that might remind us of the downed one. We'll see how fast they change the logo and colors of the airline before they repaint.

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                    • #25
                      ANother case of get-there-itis. Another unstable approach continued. Another case of cockpit gradient. Another good F/O smited by his Captain. And another underlying case of bad safety culture behind it all.

                      Aviation Herald - News, Incidents and Accidents in Aviation

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                      • #26
                        How about an incorrect course set in the ils? Has it happened before?
                        AD.com apocalypse survivor. 727 Fan.

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                        • #27
                          Originally posted by Kpeters View Post
                          How about an incorrect course set in the ils? Has it happened before?
                          Did you read the report?

                          The ILS localizer is a radio beacon. It can't be 'set' to a place other than that of the physical antenna. The beam can become distorted, but that isn't what happened here.

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                          • #28
                            Originally posted by Evan View Post
                            Did you read the report?

                            The ILS localizer is a radio beacon. It can't be 'set' to a place other than that of the physical antenna. The beam can become distorted, but that isn't what happened here.
                            I meant on the instrument, in the cockpit itself. That would mean they would never line up with the beam. At least not on rnwy heading.

                            And... I did miss the report ill check on it.
                            AD.com apocalypse survivor. 727 Fan.

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                            • #29
                              It sounds like you're talking about flying the wrong heading while trying to *intercept* the ILS which is indeed possible. Once the ILS beam is captured, unless you or the autopilot really screw up it'll always guide you right to the runway threshold.

                              There's a page that sort of explains the process here: http://l1011project.blogspot.com/201...m-capture.html
                              Be alert! America needs more lerts.

                              Eric Law

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                              • #30
                                Originally posted by Evan View Post
                                Did you read the report?

                                The ILS localizer is a radio beacon. It can't be 'set' to a place other than that of the physical antenna. The beam can become distorted, but that isn't what happened here.
                                I think that what Kpeters means is a wrong course selection.

                                You are right that the course selection doesn't have any effect on the ILS as it has in the VOR. But if you think that your wrongly selected course is the right one, you can think that you are flying an intercepting heading towards the ILS when, in fact you are still flying away from it.



                                This picture shows an HSI with a selected course of 215, a CDI that shows 2 dots left, which means that the plane is right off the track, so the pilot is flying 185, which means he is going left of 215, so he will eventually intercept the 215 track, the CDI will center, and he will be able to turn to 215 to track this track.

                                Of course, that will work if we are talking about a VOR. But if it's an ILS, the deviation of the CDI is independent of what course you select. No matter where you turn the course selector, the CDI will still show 2 dots left because you ARE 2 dots left of the ILS beam.

                                To avoid confusion and have a standard picture when flying a VOR or ILS, it is a good and universal practice to select the runway heading on the course selector when flying an ILS even if that doesn't affect the CDI indication.

                                So say that this pilot did just that: He is on an ILS, so he selected a course equal to the runway heading of 215, the ILS is 2 dots left, so he turns left towards an intercepting course of 185 expecting to have the CDI centered again soon and turn and track 215.

                                Everything nice and smooth, right? Except... that the pilot made a little mistake: The runway (and ILS) heading is not 215 but 125. Now instead of correcting to the left to intercept the ILS, with a heading of 185 he is still flying away to the right of it.

                                That is a very human mistake, understandable and expectable mistake. And was a causal link in the chain of events that led to this accident, meaning that if the pilots would have not made this mistake, the accident would have not happened. However, the pilots also:
                                Didn't verify and cross-check the navigation data with what they had selected in the instruments.
                                Didn't detect that something was way wrong when the CDI kept deflected full scale.
                                Didn't abort the approach when reaching the stabillized approach gate with a full scale deflection.

                                --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                                --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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