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  • #61
    Originally posted by snydersnapshots View Post
    ...try doing a schedule as I described in real-time. Do a flight during the day, when your at the height of your circadian rhythm and have someone count your mistakes. Then do the same flight after a schedule as I've described here and have someone count your mistakes again. I think it will be a real eye-opener.
    Thanks for the thoughful reply which considers all sides. My favorite question (generalized) is "Why didn't they just do what seems so obvious" (emphasis on just)... Easy to ask from the easy chair, right before a nap when you are feeling tired.
    Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

    Comment


    • #62
      Originally posted by 3WE View Post
      Thanks for the thoughful reply which considers all sides. My favorite question (generalized) is "Why didn't they just do what seems so obvious" (emphasis on just)... Easy to ask from the easy chair, right before a nap when you are feeling tired.
      Very true...
      The "keep my tail out of trouble" disclaimer: Though I work in the airline industry, anything I post on here is my own speculation or opinion. Nothing I post is to be construed as "official" information from any air carrier or any other entity.

      Comment


      • #63
        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
        If you read another comment in AvHerald from a very nine, smart, and handsome guy named Gabriel or something like that, you'l learn that this kind of incident CAN and actually HAS happened in an Airbus. The only difference was that the mistake, instead of hitting the wrong TOGA button, was advancing the throttles a hair short of full forward.
        And if you dig into the history of air crashes, you won't have to go very far back to see that a stall at cruise altitude, not recovered and resulting in a crash due to pilot commands can and has happened in a yoke-controlled airliner. West Caribbean 708, for example.

        So we are back to square one in the sidesticks vs yokes part.

        Comment


        • #64
          Originally posted by snydersnapshots View Post
          Okay guys... After reading Gabriel's and Black Ram's responses earlier this afternoon, I've been stewing about my reply for several hours, and it's all I can do to keep myself from hitting the caps lock in places while writing it.

          Now, instead of calling them incompetent and implying that they're a bunch of dumb$#%$ who don't know how to fly an airplane
          I also thank you for the detailed analysis and for sharing a different point for view. It is true it's very easy for forum people to evaluate pilot performance.

          I did kind of imply the crew were incompetent, however I meant something a little different. In light of the discussion about control inputs - sidesticks vs yokes, different philosophies - I meant that a dangerous situation can always arise when the crew misuse the controls, or when there is a "moment of incompetence". My point was it is useless to blame the type of control input and make claims like "this would not have happened in a *****". We end up going in circles with those.

          I completely agree this incident is mostly about human factors. However, proper pilot training should have been addressing that and all other sides of pilot performance. Is it the case with AF, or is there a flaw with their training? Even if I do say a crew is incompetent, it doesn't mean I am blaming the individuals. I look at AF's mishaps as a system failure, which is very pronounced at the airline.


          Originally posted by snydersnapshots View Post
          why don't we analyze the situation and try to find out WHY they did what they did and maybe learn from it?! Hopefully, that's what they've done in the months after the incident as well.
          I would have hoped so, but I am starting to doubt that. This is one of four "serious" AF incidents since the release of the AF447 2011 report, with three of them happening after the release of the final report. Again, I fear something may be lacking in AF's training, producing pilots prone to serious errors under certain circumstances. I suspect it would have to do with CRM, procedures training, monitoring flight parameters - training that should help crews deal better with human factors and fatigue. I personally was a believer AF would have learned a major lesson with AF447, overhauled its training entirely, but now I'm doubting that.

          Originally posted by snydersnapshots View Post
          It's also possible that one of them DID notice the change but, realizing from a systems standpoint that the aircraft would still conduct a safe autoland, elected not to say anything and to just continue the approach
          Wouldn't that be bad CRM? Isn't it considered proper for that "one of them" to communicate the change and their intentions? I don't know, but this sounds like a recipe for cockpit chaos to me.

          Originally posted by snydersnapshots View Post
          What am I going to take away from this? A reinforcement of my technique of briefing the go around callouts and procedure while over or inside the marker.
          The question is, what is AF going to take away from it? They say smart people learn from others' mistakes, so good for you. Maybe someone should suggest your technique to AF, along with some other examples of safety procedures.

          Comment


          • #65
            This is the fourth AF incident. It involves F-GLZU, the same airframe that had the rapid climb and approach to stall incident:

            Report: Air France A343 at Paris on Mar 13th 2012, intercepted mirror glide slope, large pitch oscillations and approach to stall

            By Simon Hradecky, created Tuesday, Mar 12th 2013 16:42Z, last updated Tuesday, Mar 12th 2013 16:42Z

            An Air France Airbus A340-300, registration F-GLZU performing flight AF-3093 from Bamako (Mali) to Paris Charles de Gaulle (France), was descending towards Paris for an ILS Category III approach to runway 08R but went significantly above the approach profile despite descending with speed brakes deployed. The approach was continued. When the aircraft was 9nm before the runway threshold, the aircraft had been established on the localizer however was at 4950 feet MSL about 1750 feet above glideslope, target speed selected at the FCU was 183 knots, the flaps were selected to position 1. The crew slowed the aircraft and selected flaps to position 2, at 4nm before touchdown the aircraft was at 3700 feet MSL and 2100 feet above glideslope, the glideslope indications in the cockpit had already reverted to the side band of the glideslope transmitter (mirror glideslope at 9 degrees), about 30 seconds later the crew selected the gear down. At about 2nm out, the aircraft descended through 2850 feet MSL 1600 feet above glide, the vertical channel of the autopilot mode change glideslope capture and autothrust changed to speed mode. The aircraft pitched up from about 1 degrees nose up to 26 degrees nose up, the vertical speed changed from -1600 fpm to +3300 fpm, the airspeed dropped from 163 KIAS to 130 KIAS. When the aircraft rotated through 26 degrees nose up, the crew disconnected the autopilot and pushed the side stick forward to near the mechanical stop, the pitch attitude and the rate of climb reduces, the aircraft began to accelerate to 143 KIAS again, the autothrust system disconnected. About 30 seconds later the crew re-engages autopilot 1 and autothrust in climb thrust with the intention to perform an automatic go-around, the autopilot's lateral channel engages in LOC, the vertical channel in G/S, the autothrust in SPEED, the aircraft crossed the runway threshold at 2700 feet MSL (2370 feet AGL), the pitch attitude reduces to 5 degrees nose down and the aircraft rapidly descended. The pilot monitoring recognized the modes announciated were not suitable, disengaged the autopilot, placed the thrust levers into the TOGA detent and the aircraft entered a normal go-around at 2000 feet MSL. The crew subsequently positioned the aircraft for a second approach and landed without further incident.

            The French BEA released their final report in French concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:

            - the inadequate monitoring of the aircraft's trajectory by both air traffic control and the crew while conducting a CATIII approach under radar guidance

            - the decision of the crew to continue the approach although the aircraft had crossed the final approach point above vertical profile

            Contributing factors were:

            - the absence of visual cues on the radar screen of air traffic control when aircraft intercept the vertical profile below 5000 feet MSL

            - the inappropriate methode of intercepting the glideslope from above used by the crew

            - the capture of a side band/mirror glideslope by the autopilot which resulted in an excessive pitch increase

            - fatigue by both controllers and crew which may have contributed to the serious incident
            Aviation Herald - News, Incidents and Accidents in Aviation

            Comment


            • #66
              Originally posted by Black Ram View Post
              And if you dig into the history of air crashes, you won't have to go very far back to see that a stall at cruise altitude, not recovered and resulting in a crash due to pilot commands can and has happened in a yoke-controlled airliner. West Caribbean 708, for example.

              So we are back to square one in the sidesticks vs yokes part.
              The only difference is that I've never said that a stall at cruise was unlikely to happen in a Boeing, but you've said that a failure to activate GA was unlikely to happen in an Airbus.

              Let me be clear on this:

              I prefer the Boeing yokes over the Airbus sidetsticks because I like feedback and linked motion (which again is more feedback). There are other aspects of the FBW philosophy that I also like more in Boeings. BUT:

              It is a personal preference. Airbuses are very safe planes. I've flown on them with no concerns and would fly on them again any day. The operator is much more important than the type.

              And the pilots' response to the UAS event in AF 447 would have equally stalled an A330, a B777 (Boeing's version of FBW), a DC-8 (non-FBW) or a Cessna 172. If AF would have had yokes, there is a chance that maybe the co-pilot would have noticed the crazy inputs of the flying pilot and maybe he would have taken an action and maybe it would have been the correct one, maybe before it was too late. That's the closest I've said about airplanes with yokes being non-stallable at cruise.

              Now, why do I feel that I am repeating things that I have already said?

              Oh, yes. Because I am!

              --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
              --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

              Comment


              • #67
                Originally posted by Black Ram View Post
                I also thank you for the detailed analysis and for sharing a different point for view. It is true it's very easy for forum people to evaluate pilot performance.

                I did kind of imply the crew were incompetent, however I meant something a little different. In light of the discussion about control inputs - sidesticks vs yokes, different philosophies - I meant that a dangerous situation can always arise when the crew misuse the controls, or when there is a "moment of incompetence". My point was it is useless to blame the type of control input and make claims like "this would not have happened in a *****". We end up going in circles with those.

                I completely agree this incident is mostly about human factors. However, proper pilot training should have been addressing that and all other sides of pilot performance. Is it the case with AF, or is there a flaw with their training? Even if I do say a crew is incompetent, it doesn't mean I am blaming the individuals. I look at AF's mishaps as a system failure, which is very pronounced at the airline.




                I would have hoped so, but I am starting to doubt that. This is one of four "serious" AF incidents since the release of the AF447 2011 report, with three of them happening after the release of the final report. Again, I fear something may be lacking in AF's training, producing pilots prone to serious errors under certain circumstances. I suspect it would have to do with CRM, procedures training, monitoring flight parameters - training that should help crews deal better with human factors and fatigue. I personally was a believer AF would have learned a major lesson with AF447, overhauled its training entirely, but now I'm doubting that.



                Wouldn't that be bad CRM? Isn't it considered proper for that "one of them" to communicate the change and their intentions? I don't know, but this sounds like a recipe for cockpit chaos to me.



                The question is, what is AF going to take away from it? They say smart people learn from others' mistakes, so good for you. Maybe someone should suggest your technique to AF, along with some other examples of safety procedures.
                I have to agree with you: one crew has an incident and maybe they were having a bad day. Four similar incidents following a hull loss due to a high-altitude stall? Now it looks like we have a systemic problem and should probably look a the training department. I have not had much experience with Air France in general or any of their crews in particular, so I can't speak with any authority other than what I see as an outside observer. I hope that corporate pride doesn't prevent them from looking at these incidents and making needed changes.

                One thing I will say for the company I work for is that every year they look at the data from incidents like this, both from our own carrier and from others. They de-identify them and analyze what happened, and then we discuss them in ground school the following year, so that we can learn from what has happened. One of the recent changes they've made: they've proceduralized (if that's even a word) my technique of talking through the missed approach callouts and procedure. They've also made it a policy that on the preflight briefing we talk through the procedure and callouts for an engine failure after takeoff. They didn't get those ideas from me, but I'm glad to see them making those types of changes in our procedures. I will also say that we're learning from the AF accident--there has been a renewed emphasis on stall recovery, both high- and low-altitude stalls.
                The "keep my tail out of trouble" disclaimer: Though I work in the airline industry, anything I post on here is my own speculation or opinion. Nothing I post is to be construed as "official" information from any air carrier or any other entity.

                Comment


                • #68
                  Originally posted by snydersnapshots View Post
                  Now, instead of calling them incompetent and implying that they're a bunch of dumb$#%$ who don't know how to fly an airplane, why don't we analyze the situation and try to find out WHY they did what they did and maybe learn from it?! Hopefully, that's what they've done in the months after the incident as well.
                  I fully subscribe with that. And before I go on let me make clear that, despite that I realize that I sound like I'm blaming the crew, I am deeply convinced that "pilot error" is not acceptable as cause of an accident, because then the corrective action would be "let the pilot not err", and that is not possible.

                  I think that the crew screwed up big time (VERY big time), and I think there must be one or more causes why they screwed up.

                  let's assume that they have been flying for many years in many types of airplanes and have built up a certain skill level that has allowed them to advance to the airplane they're on.
                  Sorry, I won't make that assumption. I will not assume the contrary either.

                  Then let's try to backtrack and figure out why they did what they did. I realize we're talking about the same airline that had the A340 accident.
                  And the AF 447 accident, and another almost copy-paste incident months after AF-447, and the first incident that was the basis of this thread, and this new incident that was added now, and others that have something in common. More on that later.

                  Missing a Master Caution light and beeper: According to the 777 manual, the Master Caution light and aural warning are inhibited... [etc.] Thus, I would have to assert that the Master Caution in fact did NOT illuminate, nor did the aural warning go off.
                  Well, the AvHerald report says that there was a master caution warning. And the third pilot called "Alarm", not "LAND 2" or something like that, which anyway I guess would have been hard to notice in the FMA from the observer's seat, unlike a master caution. And AvHerald reports (unlike other media) tend to be very accurate.

                  Missing the NO LAND 3/LAND 2 annunciation, which appeared as the airplane was descending through approximately 320 feet. You insinuated they were incompetent for not being glued to the PFD/FMA. Are you instrument rated? When you're approaching minimums, where are you looking? You go to a composite crosscheck where you're shifting your scan between the instruments and outside to try and pick up the approach lights.
                  I do that, yes. Or used to do. In training, because while I did some training towards the instrument rating, I am not rated. But that was single pilot op.
                  I thought that in airline class SOP the flying pilot had to be flying the plane and scanning the instruments, while the NFP had to split his workload between looking for the runway and monitoring / crosschecking the flight parameters. Especially in an autoland scenario where, as far as I understand (not a lot, I concede), the flying pilot has to be closely monitoring the instruments all the way up to touchdown even in VMC, because if the AP reverts to no autoland close to the ground a very quick action might be needed to prevent an ugly outcome.

                  In fact, the report stated: [I]"the aircraft was on final approach descending through about 350 feet AGL with the crew trying to gain visual contact with the approach lights
                  So, is it acceptable that both pilot are looking out of the window in an autoland approach?

                  It's also possible that one of them DID notice the change but, realizing from a systems standpoint that the aircraft would still conduct a safe autoland, elected not to say anything and to just continue the approach.
                  And would it have been acceptable that a pilot make a conscious decision that is in direct and clear violation of the airline's procedures?

                  "They miss that AP is still in approach mode (in the PFD).
                  They miss that the plane is still descending (altitude and vertical speed in the PFD)
                  They miss that the pitch has not gone up and is in fact going down (attitude indicator in the PFD, I know, not a very important instrument in a CATIII approach and a GA in IMC, NOT!).
                  They fight for the yoke."

                  This is where the human factors stuff I'm talking about comes into play. They screwed the pooch on this one and I wholeheartedly agree. Now let's figure out why.
                  Okay, this is the core of my argument too.

                  I'm doing some speculation here, but this is the scenario as I see it possibly playing out:

                  [Valid fatigue argument]
                  I agree that fatigue could have been a major factor here.

                  So now they're almost at the bottom of the autoland when the go-around is called. The captain mistakenly clicks off the autothrottle instead of hitting the TOGA switches. He manually advanced the power while simultaneously calling for flaps 20.
                  And that's all the go-around procedure????
                  What happened to "positive climb, gear up", just to name one example of the things that are missing?


                  Next thought--oh crap, this thing isn't climbing, so he pulled on the yoke, but not hard enough to override the autopilot and put the thing into control wheel steering.
                  Is manipulating the yoke as an acceptable mean of intentionally disconnecting the AP? I think not. And what happened to the autpilot disconnect alarm?

                  But even if you do it, then now you are not longer in AP. You are in manual flight. Now you have no choice but closely monitor the PFD. Yet, there were lots of clues that showed that the AP was still engaged. Like the lack of AP disconnect alarm, and the AP showing on in the FMA. And how do the PF miss that the plane is still descending? I mean, after the GA was called, 9 seconds elapsed where the plane kept descending and pitched down.

                  One Mississippi
                  Two Mississippi
                  Three Mississippi
                  Four Mississippi
                  Five Mississippi
                  Six Mississippi
                  Seven Mississippi
                  Eight Mississippi
                  Nine Mississippi

                  What was the PF doing AFTER calling GA and advancing the throttles? Still looking out of the window in search of the runway?

                  The IRO called "Pitch" and the captain pulled back, popping overriding the autopilot and resulting in a nearly 2 g climb initially. I think the captain probably lowered the pitch in response to the abrupt pullup before pulling again and finally getting the airplane climbing.
                  I don't think so. It took a second "Pitch!" call from the IRO (what is IRO by the way?) for the PF to release the push pressure (not to pull up).

                  Again, what was the PF looking at after now yes managing to disconnect the AP by means of yoke manipulation? He should have noticed that the plane was still descending before getting a third call from back

                  So, my analysis? Reactions slowed by fatigue coupled with a relatively unusual maneuver (as I mentioned in my previous post). A habit pattern lead to the a/t being disconnected instead of the TOGA buttons pressed, which lead to the airplane not doing what they expected it to.

                  What am I going to take away from this? A reinforcement of my technique of briefing the go around callouts and procedure while over or inside the marker. Could I do something like this in the airplane? I certainly hope not, but I'll never say never. One thing I will NOT do is label another pilot as "incompetent" until I have flown with him or her and made that determination from personal experience. Believe me, I HAVE flown with some incompetent pilots, though not at this level of the industry. Do I believe the pilots involved were incompetent? No. I truly believe that if they had been in the first hour of the flight when they were fresh instead of the 8th or 9th hour, the outcome would have been completely different.
                  The problem is that go-arounds always happen just before landing, which typically happen by the end of the flight, not the beginning. And "land shortly before take-off" is an unacceptable corrective action.

                  I don't know if the crew is incompetent, but I think that they (and especially the PF who was also the captain) acted incompetently during the incident.

                  Why? Because they are intrinsically incompetent? Well, I don't know. I wouldn't dare to say so. And I hope not.

                  As I've said, yes, fatigue very well could have been a major factor here. We don't know either, because we don't know the history of crew of the last couple of days before the accident. But why would the IRO be any less fatigued? Well, maybe he was.

                  But I tell you one thing:

                  In the AF 447 accident, the crew didn't follow the UAS procedures and mishandled the hand flying horribly, after the AP called quit. It was at the beginning of the flight and the crew had have good rest.

                  Some months after AF 447 accident, and when it was already known that a UAS event had been a major part of it, another AF crew did almost exactly the same. UAS, AP off, not complying with the UAS procedure, pitching way up beyond to ridiculous levels for crew and beyond performance, great gain of altitude and loss of speed, corrected shortly before stall.

                  In the first incident in this thread, another AF crew was at FL350 and M 0.83. After an accidental AP disconnect and pull up, they completely mishandled (or didn't handle at all) the flight, in a climb that reached more than 5000fpm and more than FL380 and M 0.66 7 229 KTS (19 KTS below the minimum selectable speed) along 55 seconds. FIFTY FIVE!
                  102 seconds after the upset began the pilot flying finally notices the autopilot had disconnected. Nobody, human or auto, was flying the plane for 102 seconds!!! What were the pilots doing in the meanwhile? Uh, important stuff: adjusting the radar range, setting speeds on the AT, making PA's, calling ATC... What ever happened with AVIETE-NAVIGATE-COMMUNICATE?
                  And this was near the BEGINNING of the flight too.

                  Then we have this new incident of the botched go-around.
                  And I'm sure there must be many more.

                  Do I blame the pilots? No.
                  I blame Air France for having pilots that can't handle manual flight after the AP disconnected and, in critical situations, spend too much time NOT paying attention important stuff like attitude, airspeed, altitude, vertical speed, and flight mode, all of them in the PRIMARY FLIGHT display, and which are the top-priority stuff that the FLYING pilot HAS to do to FLY the airplane.

                  I don't know if they hire pilots that just don't have the right stuff, or if the training is very bad, or if the safety culture is very poor not paying much attention in complying with the procedures, or if they pilots' performance monitoring and FOQuA are very bad... or what.

                  But something seems to be very wrong in AF, and this issue of basically loosing control of the plane when hand-flying seems very endemic of Air France, at least compared with the world-class western airlines like Lufthansa, British Airways, American, Delta and the like. And Air France SHOULD be in that team. It's the major airline of one of the most important European countries. And I don't think that flight scheduling (fatigue) is particularly worse in AF than in the other top airlines (but it's worth checking, though).

                  --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                  --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                  Comment


                  • #69
                    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                    Some months after AF 447 accident, and when it was already known that a UAS event had been a major part of it, another AF crew did almost exactly the same. UAS, AP off, not complying with the UAS procedure, pitching way up beyond to ridiculous levels for crew and beyond performance, great gain of altitude and loss of speed, corrected shortly before stall.
                    You serious? Where can I find some info?

                    Comment


                    • #70
                      Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                      The only difference is that I've never said that a stall at cruise was unlikely to happen in a Boeing
                      A certain pilot celebrity (whom I respect a lot as an airman) did say that many months ago and recently we all had a discussion about it.

                      Now that the yoke has also proven not good for AF, Sully must appear again on CBS and explain what's the optimal balance of feedback and automation that will work for them. The public needs to know!

                      Comment


                      • #71
                        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                        ...let me make clear that, despite that I realize that I sound like I'm blaming the crew, I am deeply convinced that "pilot error" is not acceptable as cause of an accident, because then the corrective action would be "let the pilot not err", and that is not possible.

                        I think that the crew screwed up big time (VERY big time), and I think there must be one or more causes why they screwed up.
                        Absolutely. It's so easy to blame the pilot when there's obvious other cause. And in cases where it is the pilot's fault, let's figure out why the pilot screwed up and try to fix it if possible.

                        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                        Well, the AvHerald report says that there was a master caution warning. And the third pilot called "Alarm", not "LAND 2" or something like that, which anyway I guess would have been hard to notice in the FMA from the observer's seat, unlike a master caution. And AvHerald reports (unlike other media) tend to be very accurate.
                        Perhaps I need to subscribe to AvHerald. I'm not familiar with their product. I was going with the idea that they were interpreting the Relief Officer's "Alarm" call as announcing that the Master Caution light had illuminated when, in fact, it hadn't. I would like to see a direct translation of the final report from the French, and I would like to know AF's procedures with regard to the IRO's announcement of an anomaly on the approach (i.e. is "alarm" a standard call when something is wrong and a missed approach is needed? Or is it specific to the master caution/EICAS message?)

                        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                        I do that, yes. Or used to do. In training, because while I did some training towards the instrument rating, I am not rated. But that was single pilot op.
                        I thought that in airline class SOP the flying pilot had to be flying the plane and scanning the instruments, while the NFP had to split his workload between looking for the runway and monitoring / crosschecking the flight parameters. Especially in an autoland scenario where, as far as I understand (not a lot, I concede), the flying pilot has to be closely monitoring the instruments all the way up to touchdown even in VMC, because if the AP reverts to no autoland close to the ground a very quick action might be needed to prevent an ugly outcome.

                        So, is it acceptable that both pilot are looking out of the window in an autoland approach?
                        There are a couple of techniques here:
                        1) The "monitored" approach, where the F/O flies the approach and is primed for a missed approach. The captain watches the instruments as well until 100 feet above decision height, at which time he states "Approaching Minimums, I'm going heads-up." He then transitions to looking outside. If he sees the runway environment, he calls "I have the aircraft," places his hands on the controls and executes the landing (or follows the autopilot through as it does so). If the airplane reaches minimums and the captain does not take control of the airplane (i.e. doesn't see the required visual references), then the F/O states "Minimums, going around," and executes the missed approach. This technique was more useful with the older airplanes shooting CAT II approaches with no auto-land capability and is being (or has been) phased out in favor of...
                        2) The captain flies the approach--or monitors the airplane as it flies the approach--and lands the airplane/follows through with the landing as applicable. The F/O shouldbe monitoring the instruments the entire way down to call out any changes in approach mode. Again--habit patterns dictate that the place to be looking is outside the aircraft, especially if the weather is up enough that the approach lights are visible. TRAINING and PRACTICE are the only ways to consistently get this right.


                        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                        And would it have been acceptable that a pilot make a conscious decision that is in direct and clear violation of the airline's procedures?
                        Definitely NOT.

                        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                        And that's all the go-around procedure????
                        What happened to "positive climb, gear up", just to name one example of the things that are missing?
                        The exact wording differs at various airlines, but here's a generic list of callouts for a missed approach:
                        • "Go around, flaps 20, check power"
                        • "Positive rate, gear up, check missed approach altitude."
                        • (at 400') "Heading Select" or "LNAV"
                        • (at flap retraction altitude) "Level Change, Set clean maneuvering speed"
                        • As speed increases: "Flaps 5...Flaps 1....
                        Flaps up, after takeoff check"


                        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                        Is manipulating the yoke as an acceptable mean of intentionally disconnecting the AP? I think not. And what happened to the autpilot disconnect alarm?

                        But even if you do it, then now you are not longer in AP. You are in manual flight. Now you have no choice but closely monitor the PFD. Yet, there were lots of clues that showed that the AP was still engaged. Like the lack of AP disconnect alarm, and the AP showing on in the FMA. And how do the PF miss that the plane is still descending? I mean, after the GA was called, 9 seconds elapsed where the plane kept descending and pitched down.
                        Yes and no to both statements, depending on the situation (and they say I have no career in politics!)

                        On Boeings, moving the yoke or column will put the autopilot in "Control Wheel Steering", kind of a hybrid autopilot mode where the airplane will stay in the position it is placed--i.e. if the nose is pitched up ten degrees, then the pitch will stay at ten degrees. If the airplane is rolled into a 20 degree left bank, then it will stay in a 20 degree left bank. This does not technically disconnect the autopilot, so there is no alarm. It does take quite a bit of force to put it in this mode, so I think that is the reason for the 1.84g pull-up. The captain pulled on the yoke and when it broke free and went into CWS, the pullup was fairly abrupt. I think his push over was an effort to counter the abrupt pitch up. Also, if I remember correctly (don't have the manual handy at the moment), centering the yoke/column places the a/p back in "Command" mode (it snaps back in and requires the same force to pull it out again) and that may have been what happened and why the pitch went back down again.

                        Yes--you are correct in saying that, whether in CWS or full manual, the captain should have been watching the instruments and 9 seconds is an unacceptably long time not to...

                        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                        I don't think so. It took a second "Pitch!" call from the IRO (what is IRO by the way?) for the PF to release the push pressure (not to pull up).
                        My apologies for falling into my own familiar nomenclature without explaining: "IRO" stands for International Relief Officer--the third (and/or fourth, as applicable) pilot on long flights)

                        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                        The problem is that go-arounds always happen just before landing, which typically happen by the end of the flight, not the beginning. And "land shortly before take-off" is an unacceptable corrective action.
                        True--I was using the time-frame as an example of them being more alert. No, it's not realistic to do a missed approach soon after takeoff on an 8 hour flight.
                        The "keep my tail out of trouble" disclaimer: Though I work in the airline industry, anything I post on here is my own speculation or opinion. Nothing I post is to be construed as "official" information from any air carrier or any other entity.

                        Comment


                        • #72
                          Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                          In the AF 447 accident, the crew didn't follow the UAS procedures and mishandled the hand flying horribly, after the AP called quit. It was at the beginning of the flight and the crew had have good rest.

                          Some months after AF 447 accident, and when it was already known that a UAS event had been a major part of it, another AF crew did almost exactly the same. UAS, AP off, not complying with the UAS procedure, pitching way up beyond to ridiculous levels for crew and beyond performance, great gain of altitude and loss of speed, corrected shortly before stall.

                          Do I blame the pilots? No.
                          I blame Air France for having pilots that can't handle manual flight after the AP disconnected and, in critical situations, spend too much time NOT paying attention important stuff like attitude, airspeed, altitude, vertical speed, and flight mode, all of them in the PRIMARY FLIGHT display, and which are the top-priority stuff that the FLYING pilot HAS to do to FLY the airplane.

                          I don't know if they hire pilots that just don't have the right stuff, or if the training is very bad, or if the safety culture is very poor not paying much attention in complying with the procedures, or if they pilots' performance monitoring and FOQuA are very bad... or what.

                          But something seems to be very wrong in AF, and this issue of basically loosing control of the plane when hand-flying seems very endemic of Air France, at least compared with the world-class western airlines like Lufthansa, British Airways, American, Delta and the like. And Air France SHOULD be in that team. It's the major airline of one of the most important European countries. And I don't think that flight scheduling (fatigue) is particularly worse in AF than in the other top airlines (but it's worth checking, though).
                          Gabriel, I think what we're seeing here is the second edge of the double-edged sword that is technology and yes, AF seems to be having more than their share of the incidents.

                          One of the big concerns over the use of technology is the atrophy of the pilots' skills over time. When I was flying the Jetstream and Metroliner, I had no autopilot or flight director and I hand flew approaches to 200 & 1/2 all the time--sometimes 8 or more legs a day. We executed missed approaches on a regular basis as well and we never thought twice about it. Now, in a Boeing that is far more capable than the Jetstream, hand-flying a 200-1/2 approach is practically an emergency procedure. Though I turn the magic off and hand fly two or three approaches a month, I will readily admit that my scan is not what it used to be in the Jetstream. Can I hand-fly an ILS safely on raw data? Yes--or I wouldn't be out there. Would I have the needles nailed like I would have in 1990 in my mighty Bae 3100 Jetstream? I would probably chase them a little more than I would have back then, but I'm confident that when I get to the Decision Altitude, I would be right where I'm supposed to be. Turning off the magic several times a month gives me the proficiency and confidence to know I can do the job when I have to.

                          The AF 447 accident and other incidents have brought the pilot proficiency problem to the forefront and I know at my airline, the training department has taken notice. In the simulator we're back to doing stalls and more upset training, and we're hand flying more approaches using raw data.

                          Another issue that can be a concern is the experience level of pilots being hired, and this is a supply and demand issue.

                          When I applied to United Express to fly the Jetstream, they wouldn't even talk to me before I had 1500 total and 500 multi-engine hours. I flight instructed and I flew cancelled checks in 12,000 hour Piper Senecas through some really crappy weather. So, I had a reasonably good knowledge base before I got to the airlines. Then I flew the Jetstream and Metroliner for several years before I got to Boeings. In short, when I got here, I had a good background of knowledge to draw on (and please don't take this as bragging or making myself sound like the Chuck Yeager of the airlines--I'm not. I'm only using myself as an example of an entire generation of pilots).

                          The crux of the matter is the military is not putting out pilots like it used to, and General Aviation is not going like it was 30-40 years ago either. Regional airlines are hiring pilots with 300-400 hours and 100 multi-engine, then putting them in regional jets with autopilots and flight directors and all the magic. This is not a slam against them--I've flown with many and they are very fine pilots. However, there is a lot they're missing along the way. Does that mean they're a lost cause? No! Military forces throughout the world have been taking people with zero flight time and turning out excellent pilots for a hundred years now. The difference is that for the most part, airline training has been geared toward pilots with the background I had when I came in with 5,000 hours of turboprop time. The military KNOWS they are training low-time pilots and their program is geared for it. I think as an industry the airlines are moving more in that direction, but I believe they have a way to go.

                          I agree with your assessment that AF seems to be having more issues than most airlines, and, correct me if I'm wrong, but the problem has to do more with the long-haul side of the house. Here you have the (arguably) most experienced pilots in the left seat, mid-level experience in the right seat, and lowest experience as relief pilots. They probably fly 4 trips a month with two landings each, so the captain gets one and the First Officer gets one--that's 48 landings a year. The IRO's get an occasional airplane landing and probably a few landings a year in the simulator.

                          Contrast that with the guys flying the "light twins" (737/ A320) who get many more approaches and landings in a year than do the long-haul plots...

                          Your thoughts?
                          The "keep my tail out of trouble" disclaimer: Though I work in the airline industry, anything I post on here is my own speculation or opinion. Nothing I post is to be construed as "official" information from any air carrier or any other entity.

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                          • #73
                            Originally posted by snydersnapshots View Post
                            ... Then I flew the ... Metroliner for several years ...
                            Are you In The Shade, ISGPOTM?
                            Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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                            • #74
                              Originally posted by snydersnapshots View Post
                              Your thoughts?
                              1) The vast majority of pilots are highly trained, appreciate traditional airmanship, and like to hand fly and there is not a huge systemic problem.

                              2) A few may not meet all those criteria- can we ever completely fix that with training and screening?

                              3) Independent of 1 and 2 are that humans sometimes [expeletive deleted] up.
                              Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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                              • #75
                                Originally posted by snydersnapshots View Post
                                Your thoughts?
                                I liked your two last posts very much.

                                I think that what you do, that is hand flying some approaches every month, should be mandatory.

                                I also think that some hand flying at cruise should be mandatory too. That can be a problem is RVSM, but a change of flight level could be a good opportunity because of course you don't have to keep a precise altitude, and also because transitioning from level flight to a climb/descent, establishing in the climb/descent and then transitioning to level flight again is much more rich that just flying straight and level. Decide a target airspeed and descent rate, disconnect the AT and AP, lower the nose and reduce power, adjust nose as necessary to control the airspeed the thrust for the descent rate. Keep'em both nailed, then level off and add thrust to keep the airspeed. Re-connect the AP and AT. Just like in the PPL course when the instructor told you "500fpm and 70 kts"! (except the AP and AT part, that is).

                                Pilots (not differently that car drivers) need to have a sensibility to anticipate what will be the vehicle response to what amount of control input. And the only way for that is keeping oneself current in hand flying skills, and the only way for that is of course hand flying.

                                --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                                --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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