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  • #31
    I'm not really sure how you got lost in a pretty basic question, so I'll ask it again, this time really specifically: what airlines are you NOT afraid to fly on? Names and countries, please. Thanks in advance.

    With respect to this thread, I think you're making a bit too much science out of this. If you're asking me to agree that while in severe windshear, within a spitshot of the ground is a good time to whip out the QRH, I'm afraid I can't agree to that. It IS, however, a real good time to just fly the airplane, regardless of whether it's a -200, -236A, -939Q or the Concorde. In any event, this crew did neither. They didn't follow the FCOM (ostensibly because they didn't have one), nor did they just fly the airplane (you can say they tried kinda/sorta, but not really). By the same token, if you needed this accident or this report to get the idea that second- and third-tier operators in a place like Pakistan might have poor operational and/or training standards (if they have any at all), I don't know what to tell you. I don't think it was a secret. If it was, well, now you know, and knowledge, as you said yourself, is power.

    Comment


    • #32
      Originally posted by Evan View Post
      Have you read the posts in this thread and do you have any opinion on the findings of the CAA?
      I did and I do: I strongly disagree.

      Do you understand why they referred to the lack of "automated flight deck variance type training and monitoring requirements" and "non- adherence to Boeing recommended QRH and FCOM remedial actions / procedures due to non-availability of customized aircraft documents" as causitive factors
      For "automated flight deck variance type training and monitoring requirements", I don't. My guess is that any type requires disengaging the AP during a windshear, a stall or GPWS escape. So I don't see how lack of familiarity to one given automation can be causative, except of the pilots didn't know how to disconnect it, what I doubt.

      For proper procedures specific for this type of plane, I surely see how this would have helped. Except that they didn't apply the proper procedure for this situation for ANY type of plane, ranging from a Piper Cub to the Concorde.

      which I take to mean that basic airmanship alone was not enough to get them through this? Do you disagree that proficiency on procedures would have saved them?
      You take it to mean what you want. I take that basic airmanship was enough.

      Source: The report:

      In the "Analysis" section:

      Boeing Analysis of Cockpit crew Actions after Encountering Severe
      Weather Conditions
      2.1.205 In response to the ground proximity warning annunciation and stick shaker
      activation, the cockpit crew did not increase thrust as expected, and the autothrottle
      remained engaged until the end of data. These actions did not adhere
      to the procedures provided in the Boeing 737-200 Quick Reference Handbook
      (QRH). Page 25 of 78
      2.1.206 In the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) Response section, the
      following procedures are stated for a GPWS warning involving PULL UP or
      TERRAIN (assumed annunciations):
      • Disconnect autopilot.
      • Disconnect auto-throttle.

      • Aggressively apply maximum thrust.
      • Simultaneously roll wings level and rotate to an initial pitch attitude
      of 200
      .
      Note: Maximum thrust can be obtained by advancing the thrust levers to the
      takeoff or go-around limit. If terrain contact is imminent, advance thrust levers
      full forward.
      2.1.207 In the Approach to Stall or Stall Recovery section of the QRH, the following
      procedures are outlined to be performed immediately at the first indication of
      stall (buffet or stick shaker):
      • Hold the control column firmly.
      Disconnect autopilot and auto-throttle.
      • Smoothly apply nose down elevator to reduce the angle of attack until
      buffet or stick shaker stops. Nose down stabilizer trim may be needed.
      • Roll in the shortest direction to wings level if needed.
      • Advance thrust levers as needed.
      2.1.208 The crew did not disconnect the auto-throttle and thrust was never
      advanced in these two situations. Advancing thrust would have helped the
      aircraft maintain the proper flight path.
      Summary
      2.1.209 The aircraft encountered a storm cell during approach which was capable
      of producing strong downdrafts. The mishap flight encountered two
      downdrafts reaching maximum of 40 and 50 fps, respectively. The second
      downdraft gradually increased over 15 seconds as the aircraft descended
      from 3500 feet pressure altitude to approximately 2500 feet pressure altitude.
      While in this downdraft, both autopilot channels were observed disconnected,
      but the auto-throttle remained engaged. For approximately 6 seconds
      following autopilot disconnect, no control wheel activity was recorded and no
      physical control column activity was recorded for approximately 8 seconds.
      During this period of control inactivity altitude, pitch attitude, and thrust
      continued to decrease. A ground proximity warning sounded, which resulted
      in the Captain commanding nose-up control column inputs, but thrust and
      altitude continued to decrease while airspeed started to increase.
      The
      downdraft dissipated, resulting in a rapid increase in angle of attack which
      momentarily activated the stick shaker. In response to the stick shaker, the
      cockpit crew commanded nose-down column and the stick nudger activated
      for almost 2 seconds. The Captain commanded nose-down control column
      inputs continued until the end of the data. The thrust remained at a low level
      and pitch attitude decreased to approximately 12° nose down, resulting in an
      increase in airspeed and further decrease in altitude prior to the end of data
      .
      2.1.210 The analysis showed that when the simulation was driven at Boeing facility
      with the FDR data, the resulting flight path closely matched the FDR flight
      path which confirmed that the aircraft’s motion was due to the recorded
      control inputs and calculated atmospheric conditions.
      2.1.211 Therefore, cockpit crew ineffective management of thrust, altitude, and
      flight path in turbulent atmospheric conditions resulted in ground impact short
      of the runway.
      4. Conclusion
      4.1 Factors Leading to the Accident
      4.1.1 The aircraft accident took place as a result of combination of various factors
      which directly and indirectly contributed towards the causation of accident.
      The primary causes of accident include, ineffective management of the basic
      flight parameters such as airspeed, altitude, descent rate attitude, as well as
      thrust management. The contributory factors include the crew’s decision to
      continue the flight through significant changing winds associated with the
      prevailing weather conditions
      and the lack of experience of the crew to the
      airplane’s automated flight deck
      .
      We were well until the last line, that I still fail to see how they got to that conclusion. I see no hint in the report (not regarding the lack of experience of the crew to the airplane’s automated flight deck, that is proved, but regarding how that was one of the "primary causes of accident").

      And then:

      4.2 Finalization
      4.2.1 The ineffective automated flight deck management in extreme adverse
      weather conditions by cockpit crew caused the accident.
      I beg you pardon????? Is that a joke? Are you kidding????

      The probable cause of the accident, as the report very well explains, is:
      1- The crew decision to attempt the approach into a known storm.
      2- The crew failure to initiate a go-around when the approach became obviously unstabilized.
      3- The crew failure to apply an appropriate windshear escape procedure, or at least to discontinue to approach and go around when they encountered the windshear.
      4- The crew failure to apply an appropriate GPWS escape procedure, or at least to discontinue the approach and go-around when they got a "pull-up" warning.
      5- The crew failure to apply appropriate control inputs to self-induced stickshaker activations.
      6- The crew failure to avoid contact with terrain when they had enough energy (speed, since altitude was zero) and lift reserve (low AoA) to pull up and get the hell out of there.

      Now we should put the systemic/endemic/contributory causes, none of which was "lack of familiarization with the specific automation of this 737-236A vs the 737-200". Lack of knowledge of the QRH and FCOM procedures certainly can be a contributory cause, but again, it's not like they botched the windshear, GPWS or stall because of not following the precise fine letter of the specific procedure of the QRH or handbook. Not to mention the decision to attempt the approach in the first place and not discontinue it in the second.

      I appreciate when you say that specific procedures can have specific subtle but important items (like turning off the FD or moving the TL just to take them out of the thrust lock), but this was not the case here. If they had attempted any reasonable maneuver (as per the basic airmanship or stick and rudder skills, or as per the FCOM / QRH of any type), and they failed because they didn't do it correctly for this specific type, then I would agree with you.

      --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
      --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

      Comment


      • #33
        A few years ago I was reading an obscure aviation magazine article by an obscure writer who's an ATP. My memories of this article may not be 100% correct.

        He was flying to San Antonio, arriving at about the peak of a hurricane remnant. He described strong winds, heavy rains and reduced visibility.

        I remember that he described his decision to use an auto-pilot coupled approach and how Otto nailed it, with some good bumps and lots of autothrottle input and with them breaking out at an obnoxious crab angle, on the ILS and but landing without incident.

        Clearly this is not an apples-to-apples comparison, but there's a some overlap to be considered.

        They forged ahead into a known halfway significant rainstorm (some similarities)

        The were using auto-pilot/throttle stuff (some similarity)

        Conversely and speaking relatively, inland hurricane remnants have more consistent winds and not so much thunderstorm updraft/downburst stuff. (probably important)

        I'm sure Les nailed the procedural things. (Yeah, that'd be a big contrast.)

        I also suspect that "the procedure" included Les's hands on the yoke, and throttles and his eyes nailed to the instruments, with him and his FO ready to go "stick and rudder" in the blink of an eye if certain criteria are exceeded. (Just my opinion, but I think this difference is pretty huge in importance).
        Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

        Comment


        • #34
          Got to drive about 4 hours today and had some thinking time, and I didn't died.

          If you study your procedures, but don't know your basics you can fly very well, almost all the time.

          I'd even go so far as to say you can pass check rides and recurrent training- especially if you cram a little bit.

          But if you encounter something bad in the real world, you may be in trouble.

          The issue here is that you can probably fake it
          , until you wind up like these guys- having a bad day with their procedural stuff, and then botch the basics.

          If you are suck at procedures, but have super genius airmanship skills, I'm thinking you don't pass your check rides.

          Sure, Evan, the second pilot will probably crash more planes. But the first pilot will meet your approval until he delivers you to a smoking hole in the ground.
          Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

          Comment


          • #35
            Originally posted by 3WE View Post
            Sure, Evan, the second pilot will probably crash more planes.
            Not, because he will not pass the checkride. You've just said it.

            But I agree. I remember that I've commented here the article in the same obscure magazine, that was titled "The hours that count". You can have lots of hours in your logbook, and lack basic skills and knowledge.

            You can tell that when seasoned pilots and instructors start to say nonsense that is wrong at the most basic level like "I like landing with strong winds because the air hitting the planes and control surfaces gives you more dynamic control" (whatever that means), or that "The piper Tomahawk was designed to have different static stability" (and was an experienced Tomahawk pilot), that the "Tomahawk doesn't behave so well flying with a tail wind because of the T tail", that "downward lift in the tail is the reaction to the nose-down pitching moment of the wing" (explaining what what I said, that a plane can be flying straight and level and be stable with the tail lifting upwards, was wrong, which of course isn't), or that the high wing airplanes have roll stability due to the pendulum effect, and don't get me started with the tailwind turn!

            And yet, they flew fine, but did they really know what they were doing or they just were doing what they had been taught not understanding why it worked? And if any of them ever got or gets to an airline pilot job, will he straighten his fundamentally flawed knowledge? Or will he re-inforce it by learning just new tricks again not knowing why? And I know one who was already flying a private Metroliner, very likely being in a front seat of one of your flights in the near future.

            --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
            --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

            Comment


            • #36
              Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post
              If you're asking me to agree that while in severe windshear, within a spitshot of the ground is a good time to whip out the QRH, I'm afraid I can't agree to that.
              Knowing procedure for windshear does not mean whipping out the QRH. It means knowing it from studying it beforehand, from memory. 3WE doesn't seem to understand that but I thought he said you were a professional pilot.

              Comment


              • #37
                Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                My guess is that any type requires disengaging the AP during a windshear, a stall or GPWS escape.
                guess...

                And what was his guess? That the more advanced autopilot could be left in as long as it was still functioning? That only the older systems had to be disconnected? Are you starting to understand the issue here? Because he knew no more about it than you do. And he guessed wrong.

                You assume that all pilots know that autoflight must be disconnected upon entering LLWS regardless of the automation type. I think that's a mistaken assumption. I assume the opposite. You, yourself, say that you aren't even sure if this is the case with all types. I'm not sure either.

                But the point here (very simple point, no red type needed) is that pilots should never have to guess about primary procedures like this.

                For proper procedures specific for this type of plane, I surely see how this would have helped.
                It would have saved them.

                You take it to mean what you want. I take that basic airmanship was enough.
                Now, everything you wrote here I can agree with from a basic airmanship point of view. No need to convince me. But everything you wrote assumes the pilot has good situational awareness and is not impaired by the disorientation that procedure is designed to prevent. But I can't keep saying this if it falls on deaf ears: Situational awareness and focused airmanship often goes out the window when pilots need to improvise in an unfamiliar situation in which they have never learned and practiced the recovery procedure.

                That is a proven, humbling fact.

                So quote me all the proper airmanship you want. We are not talking about airmanship. We are talking about the human mind under stress without a proper instinct. I look at this as follows:

                - The plane drifted two point off the LOC on autopilot, then it disconnected. I think the pilot was relying on the advanced autopilot up to that point and did not understand its limitations...

                - but the auto-throttle remained engaged. For approximately 6 seconds following autopilot disconnect, no control wheel activity was recorded and no physical control column activity was recorded for approximately 8 seconds. During this period of control inactivity altitude, pitch attitude, and thrust continued to decrease. There was an aural "whoop whoop whoop". DId the pilot understand the meaning of this? Over the next 8 seconds did he realize the autopilot was off? Did he believe he could leave in autothrust on this advanced type? His situational awareness was unravelling fast.

                - A ground proximity warning sounded, which resulted in the Captain commanding nose-up control column inputs, but thrust and altitude continued to decrease while airspeed started to increase. The ground proximity warning was a aural warning "pull up". And he did understand that and made the proper control column response. But he had the autothrottle on, probably expecting it to bring on thrust as a result of his control inputs. Remember: human factor: situational awareness is compromised: snap judgment is therefore flawed: prodecures are designed specifically because this is expected to happen.

                - The Captain commanded nose-down control column inputs continued until the end of the data. The thrust remained at a low level and pitch attitude decreased to approximately 12° nose down, resulting in an increase in airspeed and further decrease in altitude prior to the end of data. Crazy. Yet we've seen this before, all too often. CFIT with a perfectly good airplane. The cause is always disorientation. Disorientation is caused by improvisation in a rapidly deteriorating situation. This is exactly what procedures and CRM are designed to prevent.

                - Therefore, cockpit crew ineffective management of thrust, altitude, and flight path in turbulent atmospheric conditions resulted in ground impact short of the runway.

                This should probably read: 'ineffective management of autoflight' because if the pilot had effectively managed autoflight, he would have shut it down immediately and, hand-flying the approach, he probably would have used his -200 airmanship to get through it. We've talked about the blend of automation and manual flight a lot here. Transitioning to the -200 Advanced put him into an unfamilar blend. He likely assumed it to be a blend that worked under windshear. He should never have had to assume anything.

                Which gets me back to the point of my thread, which seems to have been completely missed: Solid basic airmanship is not enough because human factors + unfamiliar systems understanding defeat basic airmanship in too many instances. It's not an opinion, it's a matter of record. It most likely caused Renslow to stall, it probably caused AF447 to do the unthinkable, and on and on...

                The industry created memory procedures, the QRH, flight sims and training regimens to overcome these human factors. The basic idea is that practiced procedures rapidly stabilize the situation while defending against pilot error, allowing the crew to think clearly, maintain situational awareness and to calmly use airmanship and CRM to make the right moves.

                A lot of this was learned during the Apollo program.

                Tha fact that professional pilots continue to undervalue or even disregard these defences is astounding. Just wait for the AirAsia report............

                Comment


                • #38
                  Originally posted by Evan View Post
                  Knowing procedure for windshear does not mean whipping out the QRH. It means knowing it from studying it beforehand, from memory. 3WE doesn't seem to understand that but I thought he said you were a professional pilot.
                  I think it's important to have a lot of critical stuff memorized.

                  Stuff like firewall the throttles and critically manage the airspeed and attitude and go around.

                  I guess I didn't realize that the 737-200 QRH handbook suggests something different.
                  Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                  Comment


                  • #39
                    Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                    I guess I didn't realize that the 737-200 QRH handbook suggests something different.
                    Nobody is saying that.

                    What does the -200A QRH say?

                    3WE: I don't know, I've never seen it. I assume it tells you to disconnect the autoflight, firewall the throttles and critically manage the airspeed and attitude and go around.

                    Pilot of B4-213: I don't know, I've never seen it. I assume it tells you to remain in autoflight as long as possible because the advanced autopilot is designed to fly out of it.

                    Evan: I don't know, I've never seen it. I assume it tells you the right thing to do.

                    Comment


                    • #40
                      Evan, for God's sake, and for the last time: The correct procedure was to get the hell out of there. In any type. The fine print of how to perform that could be slightly different in different types, but the basics is the same. And he didn't do it. And the AP/AT didn't do it. So it was HIS job to enforce it even if he thought that the AP would do it. There is no procedure whatsoever that says that the automation MUST remain on. Not even autoland. It's not doing what you expect? Click-click, clack-clack. It's bad airmanship all over the place.

                      Again, yes, following the Airline-customized, CAA-approved, Boing QRH and FCOM procedures, would have saved the day. But it's not like they applied other procedure, from other type, from the Cessna 172 where they learned to fly, or from the "let the AP save the day" that you say they might have guessed was the the correct procedure (what that I seriously doubt they did) because they were in a 737-200 Advanced instead of a 737-200. And it's not that they intended to apply any of those procedures but did it incorrectly.

                      Originally posted by Evan
                      Originally posted by Gabriel
                      For proper procedures specific for this type of plane, I surely see how this would have helped.
                      It would have saved them.
                      Why do you assume that, had they had the procedure and had they studied it and practiced in the simulator, they would have ad the presence of mind (situational awareness) to apply it, and do so correctly? You have never seen pilots failing to apply the correct known-to-them procedure, or failing to apply it correctly? If they lost SA sitting there and watching the AP fly, it might have been even worse if you add the extra workload of actually fly the plane. They could have applied the correct procedure (click-click, clack-clack, firewall and up we go) only to flip inverted or stall at the top for the pull up. It requires airmanship to enforce the procedure correctly.

                      Bottom line:
                      Airmanship alone could have saved them, even without knowing the procedures.
                      Following the correct procedures correctly would have saved them, but that requires airmanship too.
                      Knowing the procedures by itself (to any level of knowledge that you want) would not have necessarily saved them, unless they decided to use them and to do so correctly which, again, requires airmanship.

                      THE END.

                      --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                      --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                      Comment


                      • #41
                        Originally posted by Evan View Post
                        Pilot of B4-213: I don't know, I've never seen it. I assume it tells you to remain in autoflight as long as possible because the advanced autopilot is designed to fly out of it.
                        You and I actually agree (somewhat) that that's an awful pilot response- not sure it's 100% accurate, but I do concur it reflects a confused, poorly-trained pilot doing lots of wrong things.

                        The question is WHY did he think that?

                        I don't think he thought that because he thought he was a super genius airman. He flew like anything BUT a super genius airman.

                        I tend to blame someone who thinks like Evan in his prior training going on and on about the FCOMQRHPOH of the 737-200 vs. the 737-236A, when it should have been someone who thinks like Gabriel going "Here's the QRH, with the basic, broad, fundamental procedure that works in Piper Cubs to Condordes to Airbii, that you should remember from your first 10 hours of flight school to abandon FUBAR'd approaches by applying power and maintaining control...The autopilot disconnect is by your thumb on the yoke, just like it is on most other aircraft."

                        By the way- an Edit...here's the exact sentence from above with something lemon chifonned out...

                        ...someone who thinks like Gabriel going "Here's the QRH, with the basic, broad, fundamental procedure that works in Piper Cubs to Condordes to Airbii, that you should remember from your first 10 hours of flight school to abandon FUBAR'd approaches by applying power and maintaining control...The autopilot disconnect is by your thumb on the yoke, just like it is on most other aircraft."...

                        ...Does the pilot in this version crash?
                        Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                        Comment


                        • #42
                          Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                          THE END.
                          No, not THE END. I wish it was THE END but this will keep happening until pilots get it.

                          Evan, for God's sake, and for the last time: The correct procedure was to get the hell out of there.
                          Yes, AGREED, from the moment the approach became destabilized but that didn't happen. As it often doesn't happen (remember?). The PIC thought he could get things stabilized and save the approach (human factors). This is going to happen. SO, NEXT...

                          Now they're in the sh*t. What's the procedure?

                          Again, yes, following the Airline-customized, CAA-approved, Boing QRH and FCOM procedures, would have saved the day. But it's not like they applied other procedure, from other type, from the Cessna 172 where they learned to fly, or from the "let the AP save the day" that you say they might have guessed was the the correct procedure (what that I seriously doubt they did) because they were in a 737-200 Advanced instead of a 737-200. And it's not that they intended to apply any of those procedures but did it incorrectly.
                          There are the procedures that exist, as you say, and there are ones that don't exist but are assumed, out of ignorance, like this one. The PIC left the plane on autopilot and let it fly the plane, a homegrown procedure! I suspect the parlour talk around the office was that the 200A could fly itself out of windshear.

                          Why do you assume that, had they had the procedure and had they studied it and practiced in the simulator, they would have ad the presence of mind (situational awareness) to apply it, and do so correctly?
                          Because procedural training builds presence of mind. The correct memory procedure (AFAIK) was to disconnect autopilot, TO/GA thrust and disconnect autothrust, from the get go. Then maintain as much pitch as possible. Not complicated stuff. If they had just done this they would have been ok.

                          Airmanship alone could have saved them, even without knowing the procedures.
                          Could have if lack of procedure hadn't interfered with it. You're not following me. Lack of procedure creates improvised psuedo-procedure. (human factors)

                          Following the correct procedures correctly would have saved them, but that requires airmanship too.
                          I keep saying it's NOT either or, but it HAS to be both.

                          Knowing the procedures by itself...
                          ...is not even going to get you in the cockpit.

                          Comment


                          • #43
                            Originally posted by Evan View Post
                            Knowing procedure for windshear does not mean whipping out the QRH. It means knowing it from studying it beforehand, from memory. 3WE doesn't seem to understand that but I thought he said you were a professional pilot.
                            There's got to be a reason why you keep refusing to answer my question, and instead start to question my qualifications. I'll ask it now for the third time: what airline(s) will you fly on?

                            I'm starting to suspect the answer is actually "none". Why the secrecy, though? You're a free man in a free society, nothing says you HAVE to fly. I'm getting the sense most of your writing is little more than a desperate attempt to justify and legitimize your fear, which seems like a lot of work for nothing.

                            Comment


                            • #44
                              Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                              You and I actually agree (somewhat) that that's an awful pilot response- not sure it's 100% accurate, but I do concur it reflects a pilot doing lots of wrong things.

                              The question is WHY did he think that?
                              The -200 Advanced is a pronounced step up from the classic -200 flight deck. In fact, the -200A flight deck is almost identical to the -300. There is a full AFDS MCP with an FMC. There are many new automated functions. There is color weather radar. The aerodynamic are improved, lift is increased for short field performance. The engines are more powerful. It's not just a -200 with some minor tweaks. It is damn near a -300.

                              I think, out of ignorance, this pilot who had flown 10,000+ hours on a primitive autopilot saw the -200A automation as being more capable than it was. He had nothing to tell him otherwise. Like you with your HAL computer references and things like FCOMQRHPOH he began to believe his own BS. It's human nature. To put a -200 pilot into a -200A with no procedural reference and training is insane and criminal behavior.

                              BTW - this is obviously an extreme example. I'm using it because I thought (wrongly) that it would make the problem more apparent than, say, a 744 pilot going to a 777. But the ignorance and disregard for procedure and CRM in favor of basic airmanship instincts (performed erroneously due to human factors) continues to be the leading cause of major air disasters today. I'm tired of reading in reports that the procedures and CRM were not performed. Now I have to read about it again with AirAsia. Well, AirAisa is not exactly Bhoja Air is it? What will be their excuse?

                              Oh, right, all you need is basic airmanship....

                              Comment


                              • #45
                                Originally posted by Evan
                                I haven't answered your question because:

                                - it is pointless to this thread and is only asked as part of a personal attack
                                - it would be a long list.
                                - I've already stated that I will fly on any airline with a good safety culture so make yourself a list of those arilines and be done with it.

                                I am beginning to suspect you haven't read this post:
                                http://forums.jetphotos.net/showpost...1&postcount=29
                                -It's not an attack of any kind, I'm genuinely curious.
                                -Name three
                                -Won't work, your definition of safety culture and mine are probably not quite the same.

                                Seriously, why the secrecy?

                                You can respond via PM, if you're more comfortable, I don't bite.

                                Comment

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