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The approach should have never been attempted to begin with, since there was no reason to take a risk to try a non-precision approach down to minimums with all the top of the government on board when they knew very well that they would end going around.
There was some confusion first with the minimum altitude, with 100 meters being called three times, maybe reading different altimeters (baro vs radio) or with different settings. We know that they changed the setting of one altimeter to avoid GPWS warnings.
That, combined for poor CRM and lack of sterile cockpit (the captain was doing almost everything and different people were calling the same things), made for a late decision to go-around.
The go around was still possible, though, but it was botched due to some reason, which I think is the key doubt right now, probably some procedural error about flying the go-around on AP.
To make things worse, the plane was descending at a vertical speed much higher than that of a normal approach, which made the margin (in seconds) between the minimums and the crash much lower than should, so the pilots had little time to recognize the failure of the go-around and take corrective actions before it was too late.
There was never the intention to bust minimums. The captain said several times that they would try once down to 100m and then go around, and he called the go-around more or less at the same time than the last 100m call (when they were lower than 100m)
...and the descent started past the proper TOD and was never stabilized.
This mission called for en elite, highly trained crew. This was not an elite, highly trained crew.
The approach should have never been attempted to begin with, since there was no reason to take a risk to try a non-precision approach down to minimums with all the top of the government on board when they knew very well that they would end going around.
There was some confusion first with the minimum altitude, with 100 meters being called three times, maybe reading different altimeters (baro vs radio) or with different settings. We know that they changed the setting of one altimeter to avoid GPWS warnings.
That, combined for poor CRM and lack of sterile cockpit (the captain was doing almost everything and different people were calling the same things), made for a late decision to go-around.
The go around was still possible, though, but it was botched due to some reason, which I think is the key doubt right now, probably some procedural error about flying the go-around on AP.
To make things worse, the plane was descending at a vertical speed much higher than that of a normal approach, which made the margin (in seconds) between the minimums and the crash much lower than should, so the pilots had little time to recognize the failure of the go-around and take corrective actions before it was too late.
There was never the intention to bust minimums. The captain said several times that they would try once down to 100m and then go around, and he called the go-around more or less at the same time than the last 100m call (when they were lower than 100m)
Yeah, this is possible (though, IMHO, improbable) theory. I mean, certain parts are less likely that others. E.g. I doubt the GA at 100m was attempted and I see no reason to doubt busting minimums was intentional (following Yak-40 suit).
That said, I really want to know Northwester's opinion. It doesn't seem he'd accept your theory, or anything close.
I...The approach should have never been attempted to begin with...
Bull $hit Mr. QC Black and White thinker.
1) There should be no risk with a properly flown approach.
2) What is the difference in these two approaches in risk:
A. The weather is slightly above minimums and you initiate the approach, but you reach the MAP just after a giant ass chunk of scud or fog bank moves in...you don't see what you need to see you go around using the proper procedure.
B. The weather is zero zero, you initate the approach reach, the MAP, don't see what you need and go around using the proper procedure.
I know A is technically allowed and B is technically not- but factually, scientifically- WHAT THE HELL IS THE DIFFERENCE?
You are guiding the aircraft soley by reference to the instruments- as you are trained and supposedly competent to do, and flying an approach that is set up with "adequate" safety margins for "competent" pilots.
Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
1) There should be no risk with a properly flown approach.
2) What is the difference in these two approaches in risk:
A. The weather is slightly above minimums and you initiate the approach, but you reach the MAP just after a giant ass chunk of scud or fog bank moves in...you don't see what you need to see you go around using the proper procedure.
B. The weather is zero zero, you initiate the approach reach, the MAP, don't see what you need and go around using the proper procedure.
I know A is technically allowed and B is technically not- but factually, scientifically- WHAT THE HELL IS THE DIFFERENCE?
You are guiding the aircraft solely by reference to the instruments- as you are trained and supposedly competent to do, and flying an approach that is set up with "adequate" safety margins for "competent" pilots.
My dear 3BS,
1) You are the one full of... it. Both A and B are technically allowed.
2) The risk is the same in A and B.
3) Instrument approaches down to minimums in general, non-precision approaches down to minimums in particular, and NDB approaches down to minimums in super-particular, do have an inherent risk (the same for A and B) that is more than the risk of just flying or doing an ILS approach with a 5NM visibility under a 600ft ceiling.
4) Also, go-arounds in IMC have an inherent risk that is more than that of just flying or approaching, seeing the runway without busting minimums, and landing.
5) All these risks in 3) and 4) are deemed acceptable though.
6) Risks are assessed BEFORE the act, not after. For example, the risk of trying an approach, bust minimums, and land uneventfully is zero (you landed uneventfully after all). Thus, you must compare the risks between attempting an approach in reported marginal weather vs an approach in reported zero-zero (without talking about the outcome).
7) Thus, there is after all a difference in the risks of A and B. The lower the weather, the greater the chances of a go-around with its associated risks. Thus B is more risky.
8 ) But the difference is not so much in the risk by itself. The difference is in the necessity, urgency, utility or potential benefit of facing such a risk. In A you say "It's fairly possible that I'll see the runway and achieve the mission objective of landing at the intended destination". Then you can decide if the potential benefit is worth the risk. In B you should say "I won't see the runway, so I'll have to go-around and go for an alternate, I won't get a potential reward for facing these two risks", and not attempt it. Different would be the situation of the mission objective was to train approaches and go arrounds in bad weather. But it wasn't.
Hence, given 1 to 8 above, I keep my claim that (full paragraph that you clipped) "The approach should have never been attempted to begin with, since there was no reason to take a risk to try a non-precision approach down to minimums with all the top of the government on board when they knew very well that they would end going around".
Is it that they don't teach risk management in the SMRFS any more?
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
1) You are the one full of... it. Both A and B are technically allowed.
2) The risk is the same in A and B....
I believe the weather was fluid AND a plane got in earlier.
Thus (for the moment) I say that the pilots decision to take a look (at the minimums ONLY) was valid.
There WAS pressure to get El Presidente to the destination, and I'd think that Poland's best could fly a common, certified instrument approach procedure.
Just fly the approach properly (including the go-around) and the risks are acceptable.
Another way to reduce risk would have been to not take off.
Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
I believe the weather was fluid AND a plane got in earlier.
Perhaps busting minimums. And another plane had to go around after it and before the accident one. And the pilot had reports, just minutes before the crash, both from the tower and the plane that got in earlier, that the weather was impossible and worsening.
There WAS pressure to get El Presidente to the destination,
Tell that to Northwester.
... and I'd think that Poland's best could fly a common, certified instrument approach procedure.
Tell that to Evan.
Another way to reduce risk would have been to not take off.
Ok, but taking off had the potential benefit of taking El Presidente to his intended destination. Attempting an impossible approach didn't.
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
There WAS pressure to get El Presidente to the destination, and I'd think that Poland's best could fly a common, certified instrument approach procedure.
Poland's best would not have attempted this approach with Poland's most important on-board.
Originally posted by Gabriel
The difference is in the necessity, urgency, utility or potential benefit of facing such a risk.
There was a political necessity, urgency, utility or potential benefit here. The mission was to help save an unpopular president from further demerit. To assure that the mission would be carried out, Poland's best were traded for Poland's most obedient.
Yeah, this is possible (though, IMHO, improbable) theory. I mean, certain parts are less likely that others. E.g. I doubt the GA at 100m was attempted and I see no reason to doubt busting minimums was intentional (following Yak-40 suit).
That said, I really want to know Northwester's opinion. It doesn't seem he'd accept your theory, or anything close.
Let me address the Yak-40 issue first. The minima for the airfield for Yak-40 are 1000/100. The visibility, as per ATC, was 1000m. The pilots got a permission from the ATC to execute the approach.
The sequence of events:
09:14:09 ATC 2 on course on path
09:14:22 ATC 1 on course on path
09:14:35 ATC Watch for RWY, higher.
09:14:41 ATC Go around.
The pilots could see the runway from the MM. At +/-1k ATC confirms everything is OK. 13 seconds later, or about 1000m (the plane is above RWY threshold) - ATC's correction. At 09:14:41, 400m later, when the plane must be almost touching the ground, ATC calls for GA.
If anyone should be accused of anything here, it is the ATC.
That said, I really want to know Northwester's opinion. It doesn't seem he'd accept your theory, or anything close.
The approach should have never been attempted to begin with, but I understand why they did it. They discussed two options, either hanging around for a bit to see if the weather might change, or flying to an alternate. They knew that a lot of people were waiting for the President, and the whole event was important. They felt responsible for making a decision based on real conditions. That justified in their minds the increased risk. But there was no intention to go below 100m, so the risk was limited.
The issue around the 100m altitude is not quite clear. I don't think they were confused about the altitude. The PIC had 3 altimeters, 2 baro and 1 radio, the F/O the same, the Nav had a baro altimeter on his panel, and the Engineer had a baro altimeter. Only one baro was set to the wrong pressure. And right next to that one was another baro set to the right pressure. The Nav was reading altitude numbers, at some point the infamous General reads 100 from the Engineer's baro altimeter, right before he says "no visibility". BTW, that does not smell and does not feel like a lot of pressure.
What happened after that is a mystery. Cpt. Protasiuk was known as an instrument pilot, prefering computers to manual controls. It is hard to believe that he did not know how to press 2 buttons to execute GA in auto mode.
Once more, to continue approach below 100m and to land they should have turned the AP off at 100m. They did not do it.
Why was the plane descending at some point at about 15 m/s? What were the N2 values at that moment?
Going back for a moment to the radio vs baro issue. Here's a quote from the manual. Crystal clear.
Let me address the Yak-40 issue first. The minima for the airfield for Yak-40 are 1000/100.
Again, the wrong column. A dual NDB approach is 1500m. And I can't see a separate value for 2 NDB+GPS (with Russian coords entered as WGS84) approach.
And don't forget the ceiling - estimated as low as 60m. Anyway, the POLISH side has DETERMINED that they busted the minimums. Actually, I think the pilots themselves admitted they did (would have to search for reference, though).
If anyone should be accused of anything here, it is the ATC.
The approach should have never been attempted to begin with, but I understand why they did it. They discussed two options, either hanging around for a bit to see if the weather might change, or flying to an alternate. They knew that a lot of people were waiting for the President, and the whole event was important. They felt responsible for making a decision based on real conditions. That justified in their minds the increased risk.
Sure. So they chose the third option, trying an approach instead. With full knowledge that landing without busting minimums is impossible.
I don't think they were confused about the altitude. The PIC had 3 altimeters, 2 baro and 1 radio, the F/O the same, the Nav had a baro altimeter on his panel, and the Engineer had a baro altimeter. Only one baro was set to the wrong pressure.
Sure, the one used by PIC. They descended below runway elevation, why?
The Nav was reading altitude numbers
Yeah, radio altitude.
Cpt. Protasiuk was known as an instrument pilot, prefering computers to manual controls. It is hard to believe that he did not know how to press 2 buttons to execute GA in auto mode.
That's also my idea. Also (as he demonstrated) he did know how to go around (or at least initiate) without using those buttons. A bit late, unfortunately.
Once more, to continue approach below 100m and to land they should have turned the AP off at 100m.
Doesn't this alone mean the PIC had wrong altitude?
Why was the plane descending at some point at about 15 m/s?
Suspecting a malfunction?
What were the N2 values at that moment?
Aren't they in the reports?
Going back for a moment to the radio vs baro issue. Here's a quote from the manual. Crystal clear.
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