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TransAsia airplane crashes in Taipei (ATR 72)

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  • Originally posted by guamainiac View Post
    I will strongly disagree with you on the innate or instinctual (your version) of the students reaction.

    You can "chalk talk" a student to death telling them they have to push down to recover from a stall but when confronted for the first time while actually flying the plane, with no prompting from the right seat, a noo-bie will pull back.

    It's a simple matter of "fight or flight" (in this case flight meaning to flee), when confronted by danger.

    My parachute friends tell me that most everyone (military training), will start to "run" in the air when they go out for the first time and that many will wet themselves. That is innate or instinctual.

    In Japan they would say that it needs to be like "mu shin" or trained to react. Martial arts are a perfect example as is the cartoon (bear with me here), "The Pink Panther". When you watch the cartoons the Panther will have his "associate" or man Friday, ambush him and he never even blinks or pauses while he blocks the attack and just carries on as if it didn't happen. Mu shin means "no thought" or "no mind", it is something that requires daily training but once the training stops being daily, the skill degrades. That leaves me with the question of how often should a pilot practice recovery motions to maintain proficiency?

    When I taught skiing the old Austrian instructor who mentored me would have me out practicing basic school maneuvers every morning when the lifts opened up. Others went off for that first recreational hour and had fun, but I went our and practiced beginner maneuvers. Most guys, no matter how well they could ski fast, would fold like a cheap suit when asked to demonstrate basic beginner techniques.
    Can you guess what was the natural and immediate reaction of this low time PPL that had not touched an airplane in 15 years?

    I expect nothing less from any pilot that is paid for flying.

    --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
    --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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    • Originally posted by Evan View Post
      I think this has a lot to do with that 'pilot material' criteria. I expect operators to screen for that.
      While you need some raw material to work on and you can't teach a dunky how to fly an airplane, "pilot material" is pretty much created. Almost anyone has the potential to be a good pilot.

      I blame the PPL schools.

      --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
      --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

      Comment


      • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
        For the record (and for whatever it's worth):
        Evan explicitly removed me (and MCM) from the official morons' list.
        But you do speak on the role of fundamental concepts in training and operation of aircraft? Considering them somewhat important and integral? Possibly having some advantage to air safety?

        Or did you in fact study the POH on procedures for doing a 720 degree steep turn, with memory sub-checklists that told how to respond if a stall warning sounded and that's the only reason you didn't died?
        Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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        • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
          ...I blame the PPL schools.
          For what?

          Strongly emphasizing procedures to the detriment of basic, broad fundamentals, perhaps?
          Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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          • Originally posted by Evan View Post
            I have NEVER said that.

            ...ALWAYS...ONLY......only...NEVER...100.0%...ALL...anything...
            The absolutes betray you.

            "ALWAYS follow procedures" When someone suggests alternatives, you often object.

            "ONLY when they exist" doesn't change anything.

            Yeah, you are admitting that the fundamentals matter, but you still maintain a seemingly absolute infatuation with procedure as the only thing a pilot can and should do. If the procedure doesn't exist. Ok then use some fundamentals and sound logic.

            But don't use any fundamentals or sound logic when there's a procedure. You don't say exactly that, but it's inferred when you use the absolute terms.

            By all means, screen, screen, screen. Train, train, train. Know your plane, learn the specifics. If it's 1 kt past V1 you really need to continue even if you are on one of Denver's 14,000 ft specials on a cold day with a light load.

            Conversely, I would tend to believe that Air France A-330 pilots and the BA-737 engine shutdown pilots were screened and trained very well.

            But if you are on short final and in bad ass downdraft, full power, and pull up as much as you safely can and go around (applicable to any make and model!)
            Last edited by 3WE; 2015-02-12, 23:53. Reason: Added bold in hopes that Evan might notice.
            Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

            Comment


            • Originally posted by Brainsys View Post
              Except this is the 4th TranAsia ATR-72 to go down. Look back at the previous three and you seem to get a pattern of poor piloting and a stress by the airline to fly in conditions others would not. A really fatal combination.

              So those statistics don't surprise me. What does surprise me is that the local CAA hasn't apparently gone through the operation of this airline with a fine tooth-comb and discovered these issues beforehand. How many warning signals do they need?

              This time it could have been pure bad luck. But I would bet the farm it was more likely to be a systemic failure by the airline in not having pilots who can get out of a jam and, more importantly, not get into one in the first place. Whether by selection, training or management is the real question.

              my point exactly

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              • Originally posted by Brainsys View Post
                Except this is the 4th TranAsia ATR-72 to go down...a systemic failure by the airline...
                and who wonders if the maintenance of the blown engine might not not be a big part of the equation too...
                Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                Comment


                • i dont think flying or being a pilot is at all special and it certainly doesnt require an extremely high iq. some folks have created this mystique about it, when most if it is simply following a few checklists and doing the same thing a train operator does: operate the controls.

                  come to think of it, the act of flying is not any more difficult than riding a motorcycle... lean in the turns, but lean too far and you crash. climb when necessary, but pull up too hard or long and crash. sure the cues might be different (feeling vs stick shaker/stall warning) but the concepts are the same.

                  professional riders practice all the time. pilots don't really practice, since they are flying full time.

                  yeah, there are more things that can go wrong in an airliner so the use of a sim is required. sim time costs money. wall street doesn't like airlines spending money and safety is shoved in the trunk somewhere despite the crap the execs talk about. so pilots get less sim time than they probably should.

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by Brainsys View Post
                    And if the pilots were under trained and/or under undue pressure than simply dumping pilot error on them is letting the root cause go free.
                    I've learned by now not to throw all the blame on pilots for pilot error, although I think a certain degree of blame falls on them for not being proactive about requesting supplemental training and practice on the sim and for not studying the FCOM, the FCTM and keeping up on the trade periodicals. There's a dreadful responsibility there that I hope would drive pilots to do these things. But the greater blame goes to those who are supposed to be ensuring that no pilot without the proper skills, knowledge and training makes it past the cockpit door.

                    So even if it goes higher than the CAA, into politics, I still blame those entrusted with oversight for not coming forward. They will ultimately be morally responsible when lives are lost and that is also a dreadful responsibility. If they tell you to throw people into gas chambers, you can't absolve yourself later by citing political pressure, and as extreme as that analogy might be, we are talking about taking people's lives in both cases. The ICAO should be made aware of any state (France included) that is not providing proper, unrestricted civil aviation oversight and the ICAO should classify them as Category 2 and let the flying population know this. A political issue in Taiwan is going to curtsy to a international flight ban. That's real pressure.

                    Of course in the real world all governments are infested with corruption and often the blame never makes it back to where it really belongs. But that shouldn't stop us from blaming them. There is still power in the press... if they could only get their stories straight...

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                      "ALWAYS follow procedures" When someone suggests alternatives, you often object.

                      "ONLY when they exist" doesn't change anything.
                      Well, look: the actual commercial pilots we have discussed this with agreed that procedures should be adhered to whenever they are available for a given situation. I am now officially blue in the face from trying to explain to you why that is... CRM... stealth factors... human factors... human lives... but ALWAYS (I'm also blue in the face from explaining) with the following caveats: 1) The PF should first stabilize on the flight path using memory procedures and basic airmanship before going to procedural items, and 2) procedures should be adhered to unless a particular circumstance contradicts the safety or effectiveness of the procedure. And where no procedure exists, it's all you. Now can you please burn that into your mind and stop leaving out the important parts?

                      Yeah, you are admitting that the fundamentals matter, but you still maintain a seemingly absolute infatuation with procedure as the only thing a pilot can and should do. If the procedure doesn't exist. Ok then use some fundamentals and sound logic.
                      Wrong. Now read again what I wrote above, which I have already written so many times before...

                      But don't use any fundamentals or sound logic when there's a procedure. You don't say exactly that, but it's inferred when you use the absolute terms.
                      I think what we have here is an inference problem. You don't need inference. I am stating things plainly. If I didn't say it, I didn't infer it either.

                      Conversely, I would tend to believe that Air France A-330 pilots and the BA-737 engine shutdown pilots were screened and trained very well.
                      Wrong wrong wrong! My god, you haven't learned one thing from that tragedy have you? They were NOT well-trained on upset procedures or the high-altitude manual flight skills that were entirely absent in that crash. That is why it happened.

                      The one thing I want to hear you acknowledge is that procedures (memory items, practiced procedures and FCOM/QRH items) are written by airman and engineers with advanced fundamental airmanship and sound logic and do not contradict that in any way. They are occasionally improved as the basic understanding improves but they are not written by some clueless bureaucrat working at the post office. I don't know where you get this aversion to procedures. ..

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by Evan View Post
                        The one thing I want to hear you acknowledge is that procedures (memory items, practiced procedures and FCOM/QRH items) are written by airman and engineers with advanced fundamental airmanship and sound logic and do not contradict that in any way. They are occasionally improved as the basic understanding improves but they are not written by some clueless bureaucrat working at the post office. I don't know where you get this aversion to procedures. ..
                        Clearly you have a comprehension problem.

                        1) There is very often a problem with absolute statements. I agree and have stated on numerous occasions which you cannot remember due to your severe mental block, that procedures and fundamentals are closely interwoven and that pilots should know their procedures cold AND know the fundamentals behind them? In fact, go look at Post 110..it's there in black and white.

                        But you threw in that "they do not contradict in any way"

                        2) Well, they do contradict sometimes. Was it just yesterday that you cited a P-38 where John King's general procedure wasn't right? Did you not recently cite jets with underslung engines where maybe blindly powering up in response to a stall-related situation might be a problem?

                        Who's the one not listening?
                        Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by Evan View Post
                          Wrong wrong wrong! My god, you haven't learned one thing from that tragedy have you? They were NOT well-trained on upset procedures or the high-altitude manual flight skills that were entirely absent in that crash. That is why it happened.
                          No! This is the part were we can't agree.

                          This is not enough to explain why it happened.

                          I don't want t sound pedantic but I will, and I will say what no pilot should ever say.

                          This could have never happened to me. I received no UAS training, let alone in the specific procedure for the A330. No upset recovery training either. And I the highest I ever flew was 8000ft so there you go for high altitude manual flight skills.

                          I might have crashed the plane in some other way (although I doubt it too). Maybe while landing at Paris. But NOT in the way they did.

                          So how would you explain that?

                          --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                          --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                            But you threw in that "they do not contradict in any way"

                            2) Well, they do contradict sometimes. Was it just yesterday that you cited a P-38 where John King's general procedure wasn't right? Did you not recently cite jets with underslung engines where maybe blindly powering up in response to a stall-related situation might be a problem?
                            Yes, right. How do either of those procedures contradict basic airmanship?

                            The procedure for the P-38 is actually the same as any twin: reduce power below Vmca, but the case of the P-38 Vmca occurs at an unsually high speed so the procedure was written to emphasize NEVER adding full power to the live engine on take-off or when below (in the case cited) 120kts. That does not contradict basic airmanship.

                            The cautious use of thrust on underslung engines is now written into the stall avoidance procedure for such aircraft. That does not contradict basic airmanship.

                            A valid example is the one I previously cited, where an emergency descent procedure for rapid decompression could be altered if there is structural damage. In that case the vertical speed of the procedure (which does not contradict basic airmanship) would be unsafe. That's what I mean by a caveat. Once again: Procedures are not there to oppress the pilot, they are there to help him react. But he still has to be 100% in the game.

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                            • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                              No! This is the part were we can't agree.

                              This is not enough to explain why it happened.

                              I don't want t sound pedantic but I will, and I will say what no pilot should ever say.

                              This could have never happened to me. I received no UAS training, let alone in the specific procedure for the A330. No upset recovery training either. And I the highest I ever flew was 8000ft so there you go for high altitude manual flight skills.

                              I might have crashed the plane in some other way (although I doubt it too). Maybe while landing at Paris. But NOT in the way they did.

                              So how would you explain that?
                              1. Indeed.

                              2. Concur.

                              3. Be careful, one might infer that you are a moron.

                              4. Where does upset recovery come in? I don't recall that they were upset. I am thinking they stayed well within normal category attitudes. I know there was turbulence, but I don't recall it being unusually severe.

                              5. What high-altitude manual skills did they need? Does high altitude not give indicated airspeeds that are healthy...dynamic forces over control surfaces that make the plane behave pretty much like it does down low at a healthy, similar IAS?

                              I thought they did an OK job of controlling the plane... In spite of nasty stall-related wing wallows, they kept it upright. They were able to keep the nose up- pretty much where they wanted it. I don't see that big of issues with them controlling the plane- they got the plane to do more or less what they asked it to do!

                              Would high altitude hand flying training have taught them to not pull up relentlessly? Does this contrast with low altitude flying where you should not pull up relentlessly? Or Cessna flying where you should not pull up relentlessly? Or the procedure for steep, descending 720 degree turns in a PA-28 where you should carefully pull up aggressively but not pull up relentlessly?
                              Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                                No! This is the part were we can't agree.

                                This is not enough to explain why it happened.

                                I don't want t sound pedantic but I will, and I will say what no pilot should ever say.

                                This could have never happened to me. I received no UAS training, let alone in the specific procedure for the A330. No upset recovery training either. And I the highest I ever flew was 8000ft so there you go for high altitude manual flight skills.

                                I might have crashed the plane in some other way (although I doubt it too). Maybe while landing at Paris. But NOT in the way they did.

                                So how would you explain that?
                                It happened because improvisation was all he had to work with, that and his under-practiced hand flying skills and his very confused situational awareness. Air France put them and all their entrusted passengers in that situation without providing them the proper defenses.

                                The pilot was acting alone and the PNF was acting alone. If they had followed proper procedure these things would not have happened. Why? Because the procedures are very simple and are designed to give the crew the means to respond from memory to stabilize on the flight path and then assess the situation with two heads, calmly, and thereby establish and maintain situational awareness. In the absence of memorized procedure, the PF could do nothing but improvise and he improvised in an unthinkable yet demonstrated way. Neither pilot seemed to know how to work together at that moment. Despite obvious indications of UAS there was no call-out for a significant period of time, well into the climb before actions were taken. We have a pilot flying through a situation and he doesn't even know what the situation is.

                                Yes, what he was doing was insane. Yes, there were adequate stall warnings. Do you really think he was clueless about stall and AoA? I don't think that's even remotely plausible for a pilot with his hours rated on an A330. So why did he do it? Why did Renslow, an instructor pilot, do it? Renslow taught stall avoidance and recovery technique. It definitely isn't pull-up relentlessly without adding full power. So why are these pilots defying ther own logic? Human factors Gabriel. Shock. Choke factor. Disorientation. Some keep their head, other's lose it. But a crew with two heads working through memorized procedural training is the best defense we have against these things. Two heads working together with a bunch of other heads who wrote the damned things.

                                I was hoping a sort of humility would run through the pilot community after AF-447, an awe of how the mind can be altered under confusion and a new respect for the tools that the industry has laid out to avoid that. Instead we still have the same epidemic problem of hubris on a good day and improvisation under stress on a bad one. And now we've lost two more for probably the same reason.

                                I don't mean to suggest that you would have done anything like that. Probably you would have sailed right through it. I also would have because I would have gone to the memory procedure. Bring the pitch to 5°, wings level, move the thrust out and back into CLB. Switch off the FD's, get better pitch setting from the PNF when he has things under control**. Let him sort out the ECAM. Ride it out. Simple enough. Just like all the times I would have rehearsed it in the sim, (except for the turbulence). Unless of course either of us succumbed to that humbling phenomena that we can never quite appreciate until we're in it. But yes, twelve out of thirteen cases of UAS did the right thing without following the procedures. And then thirteen was the accident waiting to happen. Ultimately, I think it happened because of the other twelve where nobody recognized the need to practice and strengthen those defensive procedures.

                                Then, a terrible tragedy and the industry woke up. Procedures and training were revitalized. It always has to take a tragedy. Always hindsight. There never seems to be enough foresight.

                                And now it seems we are losing hindsight as well...

                                **I'm reciting that from memory, from reading it years ago.

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