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TransAsia airplane crashes in Taipei (ATR 72)

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  • #61
    You would have thought British Midlands would have been enough of a wake up call but I guess some operators slept through that one too. Instincts: No. Procedure: Yes

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    • #62
      I agree with 3WE in one point here, Evan.

      Turboprops typically barely manage to do 500 fpm flying precisely at the blue line and after the plane has been completely cleaned up and the bad engine feathered, in a good day at sea level ISA conditions. That takes not only good CRM and procedures to feather the engine and ensure it's the good one, but also very good stick and rudder skills to control the airspeed precisely and to apply the right amount of rudder and ailerons to keep coordinated flight that will be achieved NOT with the ball centered. A failure to achieve that can lead to a critical loss of control that will be impossible to recover in 1000 or 1500 ft: rolling inverted.

      On the other hand, the AF pilots, when the AP and AT quit, could just have both gone for a pee and by when they were back they would have found the plane still flying mostly straight and level and well within the flight envelope, and with the ASI back in working order.

      What surprises me is that retarded the throttle of the good engine in several steps and along several seconds. How could they miss that they were retarding the throttle of the GOOD engine?

      --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
      --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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      • #63
        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
        I agree with 3WE in one point here, Evan.

        Turboprops typically barely manage to do 500 fpm flying precisely at the blue line and after the plane has been completely cleaned up and the bad engine feathered, in a good day at sea level ISA conditions. That takes not only good CRM and procedures to feather the engine and ensure it's the good one, but also very good stick and rudder skills to control the airspeed precisely and to apply the right amount of rudder and ailerons to keep coordinated flight that will be achieved NOT with the ball centered. A failure to achieve that can lead to a critical loss of control that will be impossible to recover in 1000 or 1500 ft: rolling inverted.

        On the other hand, the AF pilots, when the AP and AT quit, could just have both gone for a pee and by when they were back they would have found the plane still flying mostly straight and level and well within the flight envelope, and with the ASI back in working order.
        I don't follow you at all. I think we can assume that the pilots of GE-235 were pilots and not zombies, so yes, a bit of rudder input was required, maybe a bit of aileron, so what? I'm not suggesting they could just climb into the back seats and pray. AF447 also required more than just... nothing... in turbulence, in thrust lock, it required basic piloting in manual flight. If they just went for a pee they very well might have ended up inverted for all we know. But of course, that's absurd, in both cases the plane needed to be flown by hand, and merely stabilized on the flight path. In neither case was the crash about the difficulty of doing just this.

        The ATR-72-600 will do about 400fpm with a engine shutdown. Whatever. Do 400 fpm or 0 fpm. Either way you are fine.

        3WE does not have a point. The lesson here is that procedure and CRM wasn't instilled in these pilots and without procedural reactions they improvised, failed to verify the failed engine and lost situational awareness until the very last moments.

        There is nothing basic airmanship alone can do to overcome that. Once the mind is set on a flawed interpretation of SA, confirmation bias kicks in. You may beg to differ but then please then explain what happened here to two airman with plenty of airmanship experience. Enough with this denial...

        They obviously fucked up. Why? This is what training on CRM and abnormal ops is designed to defend against. Without it you have no defense. This is what GE-235 and AF-447 have in common. Ignorance, arrogance, ineptitude. (Soon to add QZ-8501 to the list)

        NO PILOT SHOULD BE ALLOWED IN A COCKPIT WHO FAILS TO UNDERSTAND THE INVIOLABILITY OF PROCEDURE FOR THE MOST BASIC MEMORY ITEM SCENARIOS. THEY MIGHT AS WELL BE INTOXICATED.

        I'd feel a whole lot better if the pilot community was as angered about that as I am.

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        • #64
          Latest is they lost thrust on BOTH engines!

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          • #65
            Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
            Latest is they lost thrust on BOTH engines!
            Yes, after they lost #2 and incorrectly killed #1. We've been discussing this for several pages already. Or do you mean something else?

            --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
            --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

            Comment


            • #66
              Evan, the only point that I think 3WE has is that it takes much more skills to keep control of twin prop that has just lost an engine in climb out than to keep an airplane in control after loosing the ASI at cruise.

              It's not "just a little rudder and maybe a little aileron". It a very good bunch of rudder and some 5° of bank angle (that should require no aileron once established, if the amount of rudder is the correct one) to keep the plane in coordinated flight (i.e. with no sideslip) which must be done without the help of the turn coordinator (i.e. ball) because it will be misleading, while at the same time manage the airspeed very cautiously (blue line -0 +5kts) in conditions where the performance is marginal, the directional stability is gone (let go on the rudder and you'll see), the lateral handling is funny to say the least, the plane tries to go tail-first and roll inverted (which you have to fight) which makes the accurate speed control quite more difficult than usual.

              The statistic show that the rate of fatal accidents after an engine failure is higher in twin props than in singles, despite the former having much better engine-failed performance and are flown by pilots with much more experience and training. The reason? Pilots of singles know that can't sustain flight and make a survivable crash landing, while pilots of twins tend to lose control and end in an unsurvivable crash while trying to squeeze performance of the remaining engine. EVEN IF THEY DIDN'T KILL THE GOOD ENGINE.

              --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
              --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

              Comment


              • #67
                Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                Evan, the only point that I think 3WE has is that it takes much more skills to keep control of twin prop that has just lost an engine in climb out than to keep an airplane in control after loosing the ASI at cruise.
                No. That point is correct, but so is this one:

                It's more like a little brain fart versus what seems like a total misunderstanding of how a plane flies.

                Evan's black and white thinking is "Pilot makes a mistake, plane crashes, stop mistake"

                Sure, that's correct, but a split second brain fart where you are following procedures but just grab the wrong lever in a critical, low-energy situatoin versus 6 min of sustained violation of the most basic concepts and procedures while fat dumb and happy with altura y velocidad preserva su postereortura.

                It's two different types of mistakes- one is insidious and somewhat understandable. The other is Gabriel-makes-multiple-giant-wtf-rants with 3WE saying wow, yeah, this defies almost all logic.

                And again, it's a fat, dumb, happy and forgivable environment versus one that's unforgivable with narrow margins.

                ...and I dare say that the stats bear it out. Sadly, a lot of guys have messed up engine out scenarios and killed the good engine. This is a well known "classic" type of accident. However, folks who did 6-minute, relentless pull ups and stalled their way all the way in...are there really that many? (The four one oh dudes recovered from their stall quite nicely). The AF deal is one for the textbooks!
                Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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                • #68
                  Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                  Evan, the only point that I think 3WE has is that it takes much more skills to keep control of twin prop that has just lost an engine in climb out than to keep an airplane in control after loosing the ASI at cruise.
                  Originally posted by 3WE
                  And again, it's a fat, dumb, happy and forgivable environment versus one that's unforgivable with narrow margins.
                  In terms of stick and rudder skills, maybe so (although I do recall reading an account of an A320 that lost speeds at cruise testifying to the extreme difficulty they had staying in the envelope under severe turbulence).

                  But this crash was not a failure of stick-and-rudder skills. It was a procedural failure. They shut down the wrong engine.

                  Again, what the two accidents have in common is an ignorance of procedure where plenty of time existed to follow procedure. What they both have in common is a subsequently flawed situational awareness that prevented them from recovering. Most importantly, what they both have in common is a negligent lack of procedural training.

                  Unlike the Beechcraft video you posted, where the pilot reacts quickly to feather the prop and advance the throttles, the ATR-72 will feather the dead prop, cut fuel to the dead engine and (depending on factors) uptrim the good engine... all automatically. So the crew doesn't have to do any of this immediately and can first stabilize on the flight path and then follow the correct procedure of cross-confirming the affected engine before moving any levers. Moving the levers is part of the relight procedure, and relight is not necessary to get safely back to earth.

                  In both GE-235 and AF-447 there was no need to make improvised panic decisions. In the case of British Midlands, the F/O made a snap decision, first calling the correct engine, then instantly changing his mind to the wrong one because he smelled smoke in the cockpit and assumed that meant it had to be #2. This was true of the 737 classic but not of the 737-400 to which he was not accustomed. A better indication would have been to follow procedure and to LOOK at the engine indications and there was plenty of time to do this calmly. The PIC did begin the review procedure but was distracted by coms and then forgot about it.

                  PIC Kevin Hunt made this statement in a later documentary about the crash:
                  "We made a mistake—we both made mistakes—but the question we would like answered is why we made those mistakes."
                  Indeed. The answer to that question is human factors and a lack of in-depth type training for procedural dissimilarities. All of these things can be addressed and defended against through aggressive training. Ultimately the accident was the fault of the operator and perhaps the CAA as well. Same with AF447. Same, I feel pretty convinced at this point with GE-235 and QZ-8501.

                  That's the point I'm making. That's the similarity—the trend— I am seeing. 3WE doesn't make a valid counterpoint to that.

                  Comment


                  • #69
                    Originally posted by Evan View Post
                    They shut down the wrong engine.

                    Most importantly, what they both have in common is a negligent lack of procedural training.
                    you must have an inside guy since you apparently know FOR A FACT what hasn't been officially released.

                    more ass-umptions, since it appears that you think that if a pilot is not negligently untrained, she/he will never make a mistake--you know, those things all humans except EVAN make every once in a while, sometimes with catastrophic results.

                    you sir are nothing but all about the blame. like 3we says, you are all black and white.

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                    • #70
                      Sorry for the "stage aside" but as these engine out scenarios come and go I wonder what the stats were like prior to the requirements for having a flight engineer on board. I realize the ATR probably didn't carry quite the passenger numbers but still wonder.
                      Live, from a grassy knoll somewhere near you.

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                      • #71
                        Black and white and with a comprehension problem.

                        Originally posted by Evan View Post
                        It's bordering on that AF447 level of bizarre pilot error.
                        I know it's sad, but there's quite a history of pilots, in the heat of the moment, making a small, fateful, momentary mistake and killing the good engine. It's not all that bizarre. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kegworth_air_disaster

                        As a contrast, someone executing the memory checklist on how to do a deliberate stall and holding it all the way down from 35,000 feet for 6 minutes against procedures and their first hour of training in a 150...

                        That's bizarre.

                        And the mistakes and training and human factors behind them differ significantly.
                        Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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                        • #72
                          Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                          And the mistakes and training and human factors behind them differ significantly.
                          How so?

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                          • #73
                            Pulling back the stick or yoke of an aircraft and holding it back for a few minutes is akin to to ramming home the throttle and holding it there (as if it would move; it wouldn't), for that ammount of time. It defies any comprehension. Doing a momentary "ooops" on the panel is much more understandable.
                            Live, from a grassy knoll somewhere near you.

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                            • #74
                              Originally posted by Evan View Post
                              How so?
                              well let's see now....

                              for one, the pilot errors in the AF tragedy lasted 6+minutes while trans asia lasted error (if there was one at all) took a few seconds and was over in a total of 72 seconds.

                              difference? nah..........

                              Comment


                              • #75
                                Auf YouTube findest du die angesagtesten Videos und Tracks. Außerdem kannst du eigene Inhalte hochladen und mit Freunden oder gleich der ganzen Welt teilen.
                                Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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