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Fifth Estate: Swissair 111 The Untold Story 1998

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  • Fifth Estate: Swissair 111 The Untold Story 1998

    Hello people,

    I have just been watching a documentary on You Tube called "Estate: Swissair 111 The Untold Story 1998". They suggest that some sort of incendiary device may have somehow been placed on this aircraft. I have dismissed that, because I can't see how anybody could have got it onto the plane, or how they could have got it into the electronics bay behind the cockpit.

    I have seen how easily a plastic coated copper electric cable could catch fire if it is shorted. A technician where I work accidentally caused a short on a cable between a 12V, 500 Amp battery, and the charger. It took only seconds for the copper to get red hot, melt the plastic and it caught fire.

    I was wondering, was the cable insulation on the MD11 fire resistant? Were the cables on the entertainment system on the MD11 fire resistant. I should rather say, “Not flammable under any conditions?

    Why didn't the fuse blow? Was a fuse ever installed for the entertainment system?

    See the video. What do you think? http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ZXMaFtwBKU

  • #2
    Originally posted by Gandalf123 View Post
    Hello people,

    I have just been watching a documentary on You Tube called "Estate: Swissair 111 The Untold Story 1998". They suggest that some sort of incendiary device may have somehow been placed on this aircraft. I have dismissed that, because I can't see how anybody could have got it onto the plane, or how they could have got it into the electronics bay behind the cockpit.

    I have seen how easily a plastic coated copper electric cable could catch fire if it is shorted. A technician where I work accidentally caused a short on a cable between a 12V, 500 Amp battery, and the charger. It took only seconds for the copper to get red hot, melt the plastic and it caught fire.

    I was wondering, was the cable insulation on the MD11 fire resistant? Were the cables on the entertainment system on the MD11 fire resistant. I should rather say, “Not flammable under any conditions?

    Why didn't the fuse blow? Was a fuse ever installed for the entertainment system?

    See the video. What do you think? http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ZXMaFtwBKU
    All good questions. I shook my head the first time I heard this story. A plane lost due to entertaining passengers. Really.

    Comment


    • #3
      Sadly this tragedy would probably have been avoided had the Captain not insisted that they go out over the water and dump fuel to avoid an overweight landing. Your on fire but worried about landing over max landing weight!

      Comment


      • #4
        Originally posted by Gandalf123 View Post
        I should rather say, “Not flammable under any conditions?
        There is hardly such a thing. Almost anything can burn under the right conditions.

        Think of things in the plane: aluminum, glass, steel, all can burn (have you heard of aluminum oxide a.k.a. alumina, silicon oxide a.k.a. silica, iron oxide a.k.a. rust?). So imagine what's left for organic compounds, rich in carbon and hydrogen, like plexiglass (acrylic), fabrics, rubber, plastics and, let's not forget, Jet-A.

        If you've ever seen what's left after an aircraft is consumed by fire, it should be clear that about everything in there is indeed flammable.

        --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
        --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
          Sadly this tragedy would probably have been avoided had the Captain not insisted that they go out over the water and dump fuel to avoid an overweight landing. Your on fire but worried about landing over max landing weight!
          I tend to agree with you on this.

          However, for the record, the official investigation said that they would not have made it even if they had gone straight for the landing.

          I have doubts, though.

          But since we are at this, is there a specific to put the plane on a runway ASAP in really daring moments like this? I imagine keeping Mne up there at cruise until reaching the point where Mne/Vne would be kept in a dive at idle with full spoilers and you'd level-off at 2000ft AGL with the spoilers still full, bleeding off speed and lowering the landing gear and extending the flaps (minimum setting possible for landing) and you's somehow reach the glide slope intercept exaclty when you've slowed down to Vref+20 some (remember, minimum flaps setting so it's a high Vref) 4/5 NM out, and from there you do a stabilized approach for the about 2 minutes that it'll take to loose these 2000ft.

          But I figured that it would be very difficult to figure the TOD to meet all these targets.

          --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
          --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

          Comment


          • #6
            Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
            I tend to agree with you on this.

            However, for the record, the official investigation said that they would not have made it even if they had gone straight for the landing.

            I have doubts, though.

            But since we are at this, is there a specific to put the plane on a runway ASAP in really daring moments like this? I imagine keeping Mne up there at cruise until reaching the point where Mne/Vne would be kept in a dive at idle with full spoilers and you'd level-off at 2000ft AGL with the spoilers still full, bleeding off speed and lowering the landing gear and extending the flaps (minimum setting possible for landing) and you's somehow reach the glide slope intercept exaclty when you've slowed down to Vref+20 some (remember, minimum flaps setting so it's a high Vref) 4/5 NM out, and from there you do a stabilized approach for the about 2 minutes that it'll take to loose these 2000ft.

            But I figured that it would be very difficult to figure the TOD to meet all these targets.
            I vaguely remember this story. Did they expect their plane to land on its belly?

            Comment


            • #7
              Originally posted by EconomyClass View Post
              I vaguely remember this story. Did they expect their plane to land on its belly?

              What? They did not have a gear problem. THEY WERE ON FIRE! Put the damn gear right through the wings if need be but get the airplane on the ground. You can buy a new airplane, human lives can't be bought!

              Part of my standard take-off briefing is: ANY problems before 80 knots I WILL abort the take-off. Between 80 and V1 I WILL ABORT for ANY FIRE, ANY ENGINE FAILURE, or ANYTHING that will make it unsafe to fly. After V1 it will be considered an airborne emergency. If we ARE FIRE WE COME BACK AND LAND IMMEDIATELY! NO FUEL DUMPING JUST LAND THE A/C and EVACUATE!

              Comment


              • #8
                Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                I tend to agree with you on this.

                However, for the record, the official investigation said that they would not have made it even if they had gone straight for the landing.

                Not the way I remember reading the report at all. And I remember it quite well. The ATC controller and the first officer were trying to get the Captain to land the aircraft. He INSISTED that he needed to dump fuel to get below maximum landing weight.

                Comment


                • #9
                  The flight took off from New York's John F. Kennedy Airport at 20:18 Eastern Standard Time (00:18 UTC). Beginning at 20:33 EST (00:33 UTC) and lasting until 20:47 (00:47 UTC), the aircraft experienced an unexplained thirteen-minute radio blackout. The cause of the blackout, or if it was related to the crash, is unknown.

                  At 22:10 Atlantic Time (01:10 UTC), cruising at FL330 (approximately 33,000 feet or 10,100 metres), the flight crew—Captain Urs Zimmermann and First Officer Stephan Loew—detected an odor in the cockpit and determined it to be smoke from the air conditioning system, a situation easily remedied by closing the air conditioning vent, which a flight attendant did on Zimmermann's request. Four minutes later, the odor returned and now smoke was visible, and the pilots began to consider diverting to a nearby airport for the purpose of a quick landing. At 22:14 AT (01:14 UTC) the flight crew made a "pan-pan" radio call to ATC Moncton (which handles trans-Atlantic air traffic approaching or departing North American air space), indicating that there was an urgent problem with the flight, but not an emergency (denoted by a "Mayday" call) which would imply immediate danger to the aircraft, and requested a diversion to Boston's Logan International Airport, which at that time was 300 nautical miles (560 km) away. ATC Moncton offered the crew a vector to the closer Halifax International Airport in Enfield, Nova Scotia, 66 nm (104 km) away, which Loew accepted. The crew then put on their oxygen masks and the aircraft began its descent. Zimmermann put Loew in charge of the descent while he personally ran through the two Swissair standard checklists for smoke in the cockpit, a process that would take approximately 20 minutes and become a later source of controversy.

                  At 22:18 AT (01:18 UTC), ATC Moncton handed over traffic control of Swissair 111 to ATC Halifax, since the plane was now going to land in Halifax rather than leave North American air space. At 22:19 AT (01:19 UTC) the plane was 30 nautical miles (56 km) away from Halifax International Airport, but Loew requested more time to descend the plane from its altitude of 21,000 feet (6,400 m). At 22:20 AT (01:20 UTC), Loew informed ATC Halifax that he needed to dump fuel. ATC Halifax subsequently diverted Swissair 111 toward St. Margaret's Bay, where they could more safely dump fuel but still be only around 30 nautical miles (56 km) from Halifax.

                  In accordance with the Swissair checklist entitled "In case of smoke of unknown origin", the crew shut off the power supply in the cabin, which caused the recirculating fans in the ceiling to shut off. This caused a vacuum in the ceiling space above the passenger cabin, which induced the fire to spread into the cockpit. This also caused the autopilot to shut down; at 22:24:28 AT (01:24:28 UTC), Loew informed ATC Halifax that "we now must fly[...]manually." Seventeen seconds later, at 22:24:45 AT (01:24:45 UTC), Loew informed ATC Halifax that "Swissair 111 heavy is declaring emergency", repeated the emergency declaration one second later, and over the next 10 seconds stated that they had descended to "between 12,000 and 5,000 feet" and once more declared an emergency. The flight data recorder stopped recording at 22:25:40 AT (01:25:40 UTC), followed one second later by the cockpit voice recorder. The plane briefly showed up again on radar screens from 22:25:50 AT (01:25:50 UTC) until 22:26:04 AT (01:26:04 UTC). Its last recorded altitude was 9,700 feet. Shortly after the first emergency declaration, the captain can be heard leaving his seat to fight the fire, which was now spreading to the rear of the cockpit; the Swissair volume of checklists was later found fused together, indicating they were possibly used to fan back the flames.[8] The captain did not return to his seat, and whether he was killed from the fire or asphyxiated by the smoke is not known. Physical evidence provides an indication that First Officer Loew may have survived the inferno only to die in the eventual crash; instruments show that Loew continued trying to fly the now-crippled aircraft, and gauges later indicated that he shut down engine two due to an engine fire warning approximately one minute before impact, implying he was still alive and at the controls up until the final moments of the flight. The aircraft struck the ocean at 22:31 AT (01:31 UTC), at an estimated speed of 345 miles per hour and with a force of 350g. The force of the impact killed all on board instantly and caused the aircraft to break apart into millions of pieces. The crash location was approximately 44°24′33″N 63°58′25″WCoordinates: 44°24′33″N 63°58′25″W, with 300 meters' uncertainty.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
                    At 22:14 AT (01:14 UTC) the flight crew made a "pan-pan" radio call [...] ATC Moncton offered the crew a vector to the closer Halifax International Airport, 66 nm (104 km) away, which Loew accepted[/U][/B].

                    [...]

                    The flight data recorder stopped recording at 22:25:40 AT (01:25:40 UTC), followed one second later by the cockpit voice recorder. The plane briefly showed up again on radar screens from 22:25:50 AT (01:25:50 UTC) until 22:26:04 AT (01:26:04 UTC). Its last recorded altitude was 9,700 feet.[...] The aircraft struck the ocean at 22:31 AT (01:31 UTC)
                    So it was 16 minutes since the PAN-PAN to the crash, and we don't know how much until they had positive control and physical ability to control the plane, which very likely it was some time before the crash or they would have attempted a smoother ditching.

                    I agree with what you say: They should have not lost any second from the shortest way to get the plane down, so diverting to dump fuel was definitvely not a good choice, and it certainly could have made a difference, but...

                    What the TSB judged was that, even if they had gone straight to Halifax, they would have still not been able to make it.

                    Again, I have doubts, and that's why I asked you about the technique to get the plane on a runway ASAP (see my previous post). I'd appreciate you (or someone's else) word on that.

                    --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                    --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                      So it was 16 minutes since the PAN-PAN to the crash, and we don't know how much until they had positive control and physical ability to control the plane, which very likely it was some time before the crash or they would have attempted a smoother ditching.

                      I agree with what you say: They should have not lost any second from the shortest way to get the plane down, so diverting to dump fuel was definitvely not a good choice, and it certainly could have made a difference, but...

                      What the TSB judged was that, even if they had gone straight to Halifax, they would have still not been able to make it.

                      Again, I have doubts, and that's why I asked you about the technique to get the plane on a runway ASAP (see my previous post). I'd appreciate you (or someone's else) word on that.

                      An immediate vector to the closest runway! Slow down below max gear extend speed, drop the gear and the airplane will come down like a rock. Add some boards if you need to, but probably won't be necessary.

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                        So it was 16 minutes since the PAN-PAN to the crash, and we don't know how much until they had positive control and physical ability to control the plane, which very likely it was some time before the crash or they would have attempted a smoother ditching.

                        I agree with what you say: They should have not lost any second from the shortest way to get the plane down, so diverting to dump fuel was definitvely not a good choice, and it certainly could have made a difference, but...

                        What the TSB judged was that, even if they had gone straight to Halifax, they would have still not been able to make it.

                        Again, I have doubts, and that's why I asked you about the technique to get the plane on a runway ASAP (see my previous post). I'd appreciate you (or someone's else) word on that.

                        Between the 20 minutes of check list reading and the diversion to dump. They could have been on the ground, evacuated all the passengers, and been at the bar sipping a cold one.

                        RULE NUMBER ONE!! IF YOU ARE ON FIRE, GET THE F*****G AIRPLANE ON THE GROUND, NOW!!!!!!

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
                          RULE NUMBER ONE!! IF YOU ARE ON FIRE, GET THE F*****G AIRPLANE ON THE GROUND, NOW!!!!!!
                          Yep...you can sort out whether it was a false alarm or just a weird smell later.

                          Interesting fact I read on the wikipedia page:

                          The lack of flight recorder data for the last six minutes of the flight added significant complexity to the investigation and was a major factor in its duration. The Transportation Safety Board team had to reconstruct the last six minutes of flight entirely from the physical evidence. The plane was broken into 2 million small pieces by the impact, making this process time-consuming and tedious. The investigation became the largest and most expensive transport accident investigation in Canadian history, costing C$57 million (US$48.5 million) over five years.

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
                            Between the 20 minutes of check list reading and the diversion to dump. They could have been on the ground, evacuated all the passengers, and been at the bar sipping a cold one.
                            Except they were in the water and dead in 16 minutes. The 20 minutes checlist is what it would take, not what they did.

                            RULE NUMBER ONE!! IF YOU ARE ON FIRE, GET THE F*****G AIRPLANE ON THE GROUND, NOW!!!!!!
                            Again, I fully, 100%, doubtlessly, absolutely agree with that.

                            The question is, HAD they attempted to do just what you say, would they have made it? The TSB's opinion is not.

                            At 21:19, the controller instructed SR 111 to turn left to a heading of 030 for a landing on runway 06 at the Halifax, and advised that the aircraft was 30 nm from the runway threshold. The aircraft was descending through approximately FL210 and the pilots indicated that they needed more than 30 nm.
                            Up to that point, there had been no diversion to dump fuel or whatever.
                            They were all dead by 22:31, and probably they were not able to control the plane some time before that (considering that they hit the water in a -20 deg pitch, 100 deg bank, and 300kts).

                            So, from the point that they diverted from the direct route to Halifax, they would have had some 10 minutes to:
                            Descend from FL210 to 0
                            Fly 30 NM
                            Slow down from high speed to landing speed.
                            Land, stop and evacuate.

                            Is it doable?
                            I think, with extreme measures, maybe.

                            Before you answer, take into account:
                            The loss of primary flight displays and lack of outside visual references forced the pilots to be reliant on the standby instruments for at least some portion of the last minutes of the flight. In the deteriorating cockpit environment, the positioning and small size of these instruments would have made it difficult for the pilots to transition to their use, and to continue to maintain the proper spatial orientation of the aircraft.

                            In the last minutes of the flight, the electronic navigation equipment and communications radios stopped operating, leaving the pilots with no accurate means of establishing their geographic position, navigating to the airport, and communicating with air traffic control.
                            The Canada's TSB's official conclusion was that:
                            From any point along the Swissair Flight 111 flight path after the initial odour in the cockpit, the time required to complete an approach and landing to the Halifax International Airport would have exceeded the time available before the fire-related conditions in the aircraft cockpit would have precluded a safe landing.

                            --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                            --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                              Except they were in the water and dead in 16 minutes. The 20 minutes checlist is what it would take, not what they did.

                              Zimmermann put Loew in charge of the descent while he personally ran through the two Swissair standard checklists for smoke in the cockpit, a process that would take approximately 20 minutes and become a later source of controversy.


                              Above is from the accident report, he did run the checklist. I do not want to open a can of worms here but. The Germanic mentality at the time was to ALWAYS do things by the book. This accident had many effects on the changing of training at most of the major airlines around the globe.

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