Sukhoi Superjet missing in Indonesia

[Gabriel]

Originally Posted by mawheatley

I have this feeling they're going to be very quick to say "pilot error" in an attempt to protect sales/shareholders.

What interest would the Indonesian investigators have in that?

[Evan]

Originally Posted by Gabriel

What I suspect (and I have no proof, just an intuition) is that both pilots were distracted showing off the plane to the customers and press (look, this switch is to do this, and that screen is for that), and there was nobody looking out the windshield to maintain visual separation with vapour and granite. A typical case of "nobody flying the plane".

And the EGWPS was inhibited for some reason...?

I think the first question to answer is why they requested clearance to descend at that point. Was this a normal approach vector or were they demonstrating a certain technological finesse for dodging mountains, one that might appeal to an indonesian customer...

I wonder if they weren't flying in VFR in a right turn intending to pass between the two ridges, somewhat distracted for a moment, and then found themselves in a sudden isolated pocket of fog without clear positional awareness. It looks like 50 meters to the right and they would have made it through.

[Gabriel]

Originally Posted by Evan

And the EGPWS was inhibited for some reason...?

I don't know.
Other questions:
Did this plane have EGPWS or "just" GPWS.
GPWS might not give a warning with enough anticipation if the terrain climbs too steeply.
EGPWS needs a terrain database and a 3D nav system. Were they ok?
If they entered a cloud, maybe they got the GPWS or EGPWS warning in time but were unsure of the geography and didn't know where to run other than up but it wasn't enough. Maybe they saw a peak in a moving map and turned away from it only to find another peak.

Maybe, maybe, maybe...

At this point, maybe it was a bomb or a Polish revenge.

...or were they demonstrating a certain technological finesse for dodging mountains, one that might appeal to an indonesian customer...

I wonder if they weren't flying in VFR in a right turn intending to pass between the two ridges, somewhat distracted for a moment, and then found themselves in a sudden isolated pocket of fog without clear positional awareness. It looks like 50 meters to the right and they would have made it through.

I can't think of a professional pilot in a commercial airliner with passengers on board to attempt something that, had it gone right, would have mowned the grass of a mountain with the wingtip.

Then I can't think of pilots doing so many things that they did indeed.

[mawheatley]

Originally Posted by Gabriel

What interest would the Indonesian investigators have in that?

Well the Indonesian investigators on their own would have no interest, but it's not going to be a unilateral investigation. It's a joint investigation with the Russians.
http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/82...e-sukhoi-crash

And the last paragraph of that article would indicate imply there could already be thoughts of "limited transparency."

"The Russian team must really conduct the investigation and do it transparently to make the case clear. There must be no cover-ups," he added.

[orangehuggy]

All nationalities have pilots that make mistakes, with regards to professionalism though, I think some Russian pilots are falling behind. Recently both RusAir 9605 and Aeroflot 821 were alcohol related crashes, further back in time we remember the crash caused by the captain’s young son being allowed to fly. If here it is determined that the pilot compromised safety to “show off”, it would emphasize the point. Perhaps great skill, much experience, but low on professionalism.

[Evan]

Originally Posted by Gabriel

I don't know.
Other questions:
Did this plane have EGPWS or "just" GPWS.

Maybe I'm wrong, but I can't imagine a 21st century airliner design like this not having EGPWS.

EGPWS needs a terrain database and a 3D nav system. Were they ok?

A good question.

At this point, maybe it was a bomb or a Polish revenge.

Were there any missing cellphones?

I can't think of a professional pilot in a commercial airliner with passengers on board to attempt something that, had it gone right, would have mowned the grass of a mountain with the wingtip.

Then I can't think of pilots doing so many things that they did indeed.

Like letting their kids fly the plane you mean?

[James Bond]

Just a word of warning in case you go looking for Sukhoi crash photos: Some idiot, presumably imbedded in the SAR team took photos of some of the bodies and posted these to Twitter. Other idiots are RT them.

What were they thinking?

[snydersnapshots]

Originally Posted by Fear_of_Flying

Could you (or another pilot here) please explain the basics of how pilots navigate in a situation like this, and what possible scenarios could have led to CFIT?

I took a picture of a Jeppesen aeronautical chart that covers that area (needless to say, the Jepp chart copyright belongs to the Jeppesen company). I'll insert the picture here and try to answer your questions below it (to see a larger copy of the picture, please click on the thumbnail):



The radio stations are called VOR's and are the primary ground based navigation system used world wide for the last 50+ years (before some of you go there, yes, I know the airplane probably had inertial reference systems with GPS updating--I'm discussing airway deisgn here, not aircraft equipment).

From the HALIM VOR, you see two airways going southwest. R206 which is on the 196 degree radial from HLM, and B235 which goes out the 238 degree radial. If you look below the airway designator for R206 you'll see the number "10000" in brown. That is the minimum enroute altitude (MEA) for that airway--the lowest altitude that will give you 2000 feet of terrain separation within a certain distance either side of the airway. Note that the MEA on B235 is 8000 feet (that one's hard to read...sorry). Note also the pale green 121 right between the airways. That is the minimum off-route altitude (MORA) for the area bounded by the green latitude and longitude lines. That is the lowest altitude you can go down to off the airway and be assured of terrain clearance.

How do we use these in day-to-day operations? If I'm flying up R206 from the south toward the HLM VOR and the controller clears me to an altitude lower than 10,000 feet, I will NOT descend below 10,000 until I'm on an airway or a segment of an instrument approach with a minimum altitude lower than 10,000 feet.

The MORA is for operations when you're not on an airway for some reason. Example: Let's say that, for some reason, I was given a heading by a controller that took me off the airway and then given a descent. Now, I don't know exactly WHAT is below me, so the only safe option is to stay above the MORA (in this case, 12,100 feet) until I am on an airway or published segment of an approach with a lower minimum altitude.

Sorry this is so wordy, but I hope it explains the basics. Now...why were they turning off the airway and requesting descent to 6,000 feet? Possibly they didn't realize how far south they were. Thinking they were NORTH of the mountains, they began their descent and a turn toward Jakarta. Directly into the mountain. Unfortunately, by the time the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (aka Terrain Avoidance Warning System--TAWS) went off, the climb capability of the airplane was not sufficient to carry them above the terrain. This is my speculation only....

[Fear_of_Flying]

Originally Posted by snydersnapshots

I took a picture of a Jeppesen aeronautical chart that covers that area (needless to say, the Jepp chart copyright belongs to the Jeppesen company). I'll insert the picture here and try to answer your questions below it (to see a larger copy of the picture, please click on the thumbnail):

Attachment 4842

The radio stations are called VOR's and are the primary ground based navigation system used world wide for the last 50+ years (before some of you go there, yes, I know the airplane probably had inertial reference systems with GPS updating--I'm discussing airway deisgn here, not aircraft equipment).

From the HALIM VOR, you see two airways going southwest. R206 which is on the 196 degree radial from HLM, and B235 which goes out the 238 degree radial. If you look below the airway designator for R206 you'll see the number "10000" in brown. That is the minimum enroute altitude (MEA) for that airway--the lowest altitude that will give you 2000 feet of terrain separation within a certain distance either side of the airway. Note that the MEA on B235 is 8000 feet (that one's hard to read...sorry). Note also the pale green 121 right between the airways. That is the minimum off-route altitude (MORA) for the area bounded by the green latitude and longitude lines. That is the lowest altitude you can go down to off the airway and be assured of terrain clearance.

How do we use these in day-to-day operations? If I'm flying up R206 from the south toward the HLM VOR and the controller clears me to an altitude lower than 10,000 feet, I will NOT descend below 10,000 until I'm on an airway or a segment of an instrument approach with a minimum altitude lower than 10,000 feet.

The MORA is for operations when you're not on an airway for some reason. Example: Let's say that, for some reason, I was given a heading by a controller that took me off the airway and then given a descent. Now, I don't know exactly WHAT is below me, so the only safe option is to stay above the MORA (in this case, 12,100 feet) until I am on an airway or published segment of an approach with a lower minimum altitude.

Sorry this is so wordy, but I hope it explains the basics. Now...why were they turning off the airway and requesting descent to 6,000 feet? Possibly they didn't realize how far south they were. Thinking they were NORTH of the mountains, they began their descent and a turn toward Jakarta. Directly into the mountain. Unfortunately, by the time the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (aka Terrain Avoidance Warning System--TAWS) went off, the climb capability of the airplane was not sufficient to carry them above the terrain. This is my speculation only....

Thank you for taking the time to give this explanation. It helps a lot. Your speculation is sort of what I had been wondering, as well. I mean, there aren't too many reasons that a pilot would be requesting clearance that is below the safe minimum that I can think of, but one of the most obvious is just what you have said: he thought he was already past the mountain ready to begin his descent. I almost wonder if the CVR (assuming it's found) will reveal that they hit that mountain without ever even flinching, in mid-sentence. By the sounds of things, there was just a huge bank of cloud and fog enshrouding the mountain, so they probably just saw grey when they looked out the window. I'm sure there are safeguards that should prevent such a navigational error from occurring, so perhaps other circumstances conspired against them as well.

I also read that the terrain warnings can sound almost continuously when you fly over mountainous terrain, so they aren't necessarily that useful (kind of like having your radar detector in your car turned on when you drive through a downtown area.) Is that true?

Of course, it seems that virtually all of the air disasters in the past few years have resulted from incomprehensible blunders of the most basic kind, and I have an uneasy feeling such will be the case again here.

I also note that while the Russian media usually is quick to point to derelict equipment in its initial reaction to plane crashes, this time the opposite is true, so in that sense, I share in Mawheatley's cynicism of how the Russians would like to see this unfold, though not necessarily in how the investigation will be conducted.

[snydersnapshots]

Originally Posted by Fear_of_Flying

I also read that the terrain warnings can sound almost continuously when you fly over mountainous terrain, so they aren't necessarily that useful (kind of like having your radar detector in your car turned on when you drive through a downtown area.) Is that true?.

In the early days of ground proximity warning systems--nearly 40 years ago--they did have a lot of false alarms. The technology and hardware have been vastly improved in the years since. I've been flying with GPWS since 1995 and EGPWS since 1999 and I have never had a false terrain warning. My dad flew in the airlines from 1968 to 1995. I'll have to ask him about false GPWS warnings in his "generation."

Originally Posted by Fear_of_Flying

Of course, it seems that virtually all of the air disasters in the past few years have resulted from incomprehensible blunders of the most basic kind, and I have an uneasy feeling such will be the case again here. .

I share your feeling. In the early days many accidents were caused by mechanical failure. Engines and airframes weren't as reliable as they are now. As accidents were analyzed and technology evolved, gradually the trend shifted to the point where most accidents were caused by human error. Case in point: GPWS development was largely driven by Eastern flight 401 (as was the aural warning for autopilot disconnect). EGPWS was driven by the American accident at Cali, Colombia.

All accidents (aviation and nonaviation) are caused by a chain of events. If any link in that chain is broken, the accident doesn't occur. Just because a pilot has several thousand hours doesn't mean he or she is beyond making mistakes. And making mistakes doesn't make him a bad pilot--just a human pilot.

Originally Posted by Fear_of_Flying

I also note that while the Russian media usually is quick to point to derelict equipment in its initial reaction to plane crashes, this time the opposite is true, so in that sense, I share in Mawheatley's cynicism of how the Russians would like to see this unfold, though not necessarily in how the investigation will be conducted.

I am somewhat cynical with regard to accident investigations as well. In the United States, Canada, and Britian (and others I'm sure), it has been recognized that the best way to enhance aviation safety is an impartial scientific investigation into accidents. This way, all parties involved are more willing to give true information and analysis as to what happened. This helps the aviation industry come up with fixes for the problems that caused the accident (see examples above). We'll never know how many accidents have been prevented by those improvements.

In other countries, the accident investigation process is political, concentrating more on "who screwed up" instead of "why the accident happened". In a previous post someone asked why the Indonesian government was worried about the accident. I suspect they don't want their air traffic control system to be found at fault (and thus financially liable), so they'll point the finger at the Russian airplane. The Russian government and Sukhoi don't want the airplane found at fault, so they'll point the finger at the pilot. The poor pilots are not around to defend themselves, so I suspect they'll take all the blame.

For another example of this type of finger pointing, research the Concord accident in 2000...

[Dmitry]

Look at the picture.
https://sites.google.com/site/raskry...y/18384071.jpg
Where's the crater produced by the hit of the fuselage if it were CFIT?
Fully agree here with mawheatley. Alexander Yablontsev was a very professional and experienced pilot.
http://theworldbiography.blogspot.co...of-sukhoi.html Well, they had a navigator. I dont think he knew the area quite well, but he shouldnt have let the plane dangerously descend in low-visibility, at least minding the fact of their complex trajectory near the mountain.

Alongside with numerous questions and doubts, one thing is clear to me:
the preparation of the promotional flights was bad. Please excuse me, but I will add "as usual in Russia".

[James Bond]

Bizarre how that laptop is just sitting there....

[Evan]

Originally Posted by snydersnapshots

Sorry this is so wordy, but I hope it explains the basics. Now...why were they turning off the airway and requesting descent to 6,000 feet? Possibly they didn't realize how far south they were. Thinking they were NORTH of the mountains, they began their descent and a turn toward Jakarta. Directly into the mountain. Unfortunately, by the time the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (aka Terrain Avoidance Warning System--TAWS) went off, the climb capability of the airplane was not sufficient to carry them above the terrain. This is my speculation only....

The crash site seems very far from Halim Perdanakusuma Airport for a request to descend to 6000 during a normal approach. Also, during a demonstration flight, would they have filed a flight plan and/or be flying on designated airways?

[SAMRPICS]

Sad to see such a tragic end to such a new aircraft but i have to wonder how on earth they managed to get into the situation they found themselves in. The first pictures i saw of the crash site just reminded me of Japanair 123

[Fear_of_Flying]

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2...retrieved.html

Herry, however, said once the KNKT had hold of the black box, the agency would analyze it in the country.

“The box will be analyzed here because it is we who are in charge of the rescue effort and also because it took place in Indonesia,” he told The Jakarta Post by phone on Saturday. “If we are able to analyze it by ourselves, then we will do it on our own.”

Herry said Indonesia had the technology to read data from the flight data recorders and equipment for undertaking the job, which is available at the KNKT’s office in Jakarta.

Earlier, Transportation Minister E.E. Mangindaan was quoted by Antara as saying the investigation of the crash would be led by an Indonesia team and the 78 Russian experts would provide assistance in the investigation.

[Dmitry]

Originally Posted by Fear_of_Flying

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2...retrieved.html

That's good that the black boxes would be analyzed in Indonesia. Maybe we'll know the truth one day. Cause you know, Russian authoprities are interested in saving their one and only project, so to trust the investigation process to them is simply wrong, knowing the way they do it.

[snydersnapshots]

Originally Posted by Evan

The crash site seems very far from Halim Perdanakusuma Airport for a request to descend to 6000 during a normal approach.

The site is not really that far. In looking at the chart I referenced earlier, I see the mileage between the HLM and CKG VOR's is 22 miles (the 22 in the box above the "A585" designator). I looked at the distance of the crash site from HLM, compared it with the distance between HLM and CKG, and took a wag (a highly technical aviation term that means "wild-assed guess" ) and I figure the distance to the crash site is in the neighborhood of 25-27 miles. A comfortable profile for a descent is 3 miles per thousand feet, so if he was 27 miles out, he should be around 9,000 feet. At 18 miles, around 6,000 feet. So if he thought he was north of the mountains, it is not unreasonable at all to be descending to 6000 feet that far out. Having said that, the 3:1 profile I talked about is a rule of thumb--quite often we'll use a steeper descent due to terrain or noise considerations.

I don't know the runway configuration or the approaches into HLM. Tomorrow night I'll try to dig the Jakarta approach plates out and take a look. That might give a clue as to what they were doing.

Originally Posted by Evan

Also, during a demonstration flight, would they have filed a flight plan and/or be flying on designated airways?

I'm sure they probably did, especially if they were flying in the clouds.

[snydersnapshots]

Originally Posted by SAMRPICS

Sad to see such a tragic end to such a new aircraft

Don't get me wrong--I love airplanes and it saddens me to see them destroyed. I've found pictures on here of "old friends" being slowly dismantled, like this Jetstream that I flew as a young airline pilot. That makes me sad.

Having said that, when it comes to an accident like this, where people are killed, who cares about the airplane? It's a hundred-thousand pounds of aluminum, rubber, computers, fabric, and wiring. Easily replaced--especially since it's a new production model. What breaks my heart is thinking of the people lost. The wives and kids who kissed their husband or father as he went out the door on a trip that was to last a few days, but will never see him again. How about the pretty daughters who were the flight attendants? Friendly, vivacious girls who wanted a career of excitement and adventure. And who are now mourned by moms and dads who will never get another hug from their daughter; will never share another birthday or holiday with them, will never walk them down the aisle at their wedding, will never know the joy of watching grandchildren grow up, will never get another phone call just saying "hi Mom and Dad. I love you." That, my friend, is the real tragedy. Not the loss of the airframe.

Originally Posted by SAMRPICS

but i have to wonder how on earth they managed to get into the situation they found themselves in. The first pictures i saw of the crash site just reminded me of Japanair 123

Here you hit the nail on the head. If anything useful is to come from the loss of life, hopefully it will be the discovery of what caused the accident so that a fix can be put in place that helps prevent future loss of life...

[Evan]

Originally Posted by snydersnapshots

I looked at the distance of the crash site from HLM, compared it with the distance between HLM and CKG, and took a wag (a highly technical aviation term that means "wild-assed guess" ) and I figure the distance to the crash site is in the neighborhood of 25-27 miles.

I think that's about right. Halim 215 AL is 9.2 miles from the runway, so I used that as a rough measure. But given the terrain issues and the actual approach paths, is it normal to make a drop from 10,000 to 6,000 so early in the approach. I'm just wondering if they were doing this to show the aircraft's ability to navigate mountainous terrain, or to give those aboard a 'memorable' experience. I also wonder if test pilots are a little less culturally programmed with passenger safety in mind, more confident and more prone to taking risks. Especially if you work for a company that had exclusively designed military aircraft.

If it is normal to go that low a bit north of the mountains, then I think your theory is compelling. Airblue 202 basically misjudged position and turned too late (compounded by a pilot error with the FCU interface). And that was a state-of-the-art A321.

I don't know the runway configuration or the approaches into HLM. Tomorrow night I'll try to dig the Jakarta approach plates out and take a look. That might give a clue as to what they were doing.

These were posted on the internet from 2009 (hopefully you have something more relevant):

[Gabriel]

You can see in both charts that the MSA south of HLM is 6900ft.
(I think that that's up to 20 NM around HLM)