Ideas for improving safety ?

[StickShaker]

I have long been an aviation enthusiast, and have watched all episodes of Mayday. The more Mayday I watch, the more I don't understand why safety measures like the following aren't in place !!!

1 - External cameras to monitor the following: engines, wings (and flaps/slats/spoilers), both stabilizers, landing gear, other critical parts (pitot ports ?), and an overall view of the fuselage to check for damage

There have been countless flights that could have benefited from the above measure. Kegworth (shut down the wrong engine), Eastern 401 (couldn't check if the landing gear was locked), Aeroperu 603 (blocked pitot static port), perhaps even flights during which flaps/spoilers hadn't been deployed (a visual inspection pre-landing/takeoff might have helped), and AirTransat (fuel leak)

2 - Internal cameras to monitor cabin/cargo (esp. for fires): AirCanada 797 (toilet), SwissAir 111, SouthAfrican 295 (cargo), Nigeria 2120 (wheel well area)

In a lot of these crashes, at the first sign of trouble, the flight crew would have been able to gauge the severity of the problem, thus saving precious minutes, esp. in the SwissAir 111 case

3 - Some sort of fast cabin-cockpit communication relay: I don't know how this might be implemented ... perhaps a "panic" button that is accessible to passengers, to alert the flight attendants that it's not just a request for a gin n tonic, but something serious. Of course, that could be abused

What I mean by this is that, if/when a passenger notices something that none of the flight crew have noticed, like the contamination of a wing in icy conditions prior to takeoff, or a strange smell, or sparks coming out of an engine, he/she should be able to convey that rapidly to the cockpit. Normally, the passenger has to alert a flight attendant who then has to run to the phone, bla bla ... seconds can save lives.

Of course, I realize that this could result in a lot of junk information being relayed, which could defeat the purpose, and even make things worse, but in the Kegworth incident, one passenger did notice that the wrong engine had been shut down.

Cameras would have been better, of course, but a passenger-cockpit relay could have worked too, as a last resort.

4 - Cockpit *Video* Recorder - Again, during many crash investigations, investigators were often puzzled as to how/why a certain control input was produced and by whom ... things that cannot be heard, only seen.

Example - Eastern 401, where the captain presumably bumped the control column accidentally, thereby disabling the altitude hold feature of the autopilot.

Not to mention, cases of intentional pilot actions (SilkAir crash and EgyptAir 990 crash) ... quite easy to see a pilot deliberately flying a plane into the Earth, no ? I understand that a pilot with bad intentions could/would disable/block the camera, but ...

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Yes, there are instruments and sensors that can be monitored, but ain't a picture (or 30 pictures/second) worth a thousand words ? And FAR quicker to inspect ?

[3WE]

...3 - Some sort of fast cabin-cockpit communication relay: I don't know how this might be implemented ... perhaps a "panic" button that is accessible to passengers, to alert the flight attendants that it's not just a request for a gin n tonic, but something serious...

Soo...you see that the flaps are up and you're pulling onto the runway.

You hit the panic button.

I got a beer that says, 1) The FA's stay seated, 2) They pretty much blow you off with, "I'm sure the captain has the flaps set correctly." 3) Even a moderate risk they have no idea what you are talking about.

[Evan]

I don't understand why safety measures like the following aren't in place !!!

Because the world has changed, altruism and civic responsibility are no longer corporate considerations, airlines are competing by controlling the minutia of cost-per-passenger-mile and EVERYTHING has to be justified as a requirement.

Safety improvements (and comfort improvements) are only put in place when a) they are justified as a marketing advantage or b) they are required by regulators.

The major airframers are competing by considering what is valuable to the operators, not the passengers. Thus, the new 737MAX has more efficient engines and wings but still retains the old, occasionally noxious bleed air system for cabin air while AIrbus has given the NEO a hepafiltration system to add value as a marketing advantage. THE 737MAX has an added exit door, not because it adds safety but because they are using slimline seats to stuff more passengers into the same space and thus the added door is an FAA requirement. Certainly engineers are putting forth new safety features all the time, but airplane manufacturers are rarely going to include them simply because they improve safety. It's a cynical business. It's about selling planes and hitting your break-even as early as possible. It's about rewarding investors.

Now, if civil aviation authorities deem a safety feature necessary, they will add the feature. If the feature isn't deemed necessary, than the aircraft is considered perfectly safe without it.

So, the short answer to your question is: Because they aren't required and the airlines don't want to pay for them.

A better question to ask is: Why aren't these things required?

I think the cockpit video recorder should be required. I think there is push-back from pilot's unions over privacy issues.

Additional cameras on the airframe are becoming more realistic to implement, both in terms of technology and cost. They would be useful for certain situations but honestly, if a crew shuts down the wrong engine in spite of the obvious left-right orientation of the indicators, warning lights and controls, I doubt a camera (and who has time to go to video under that workload?) is going to help there.

Additional interior cameras in inaccessible places? Yes.

Panic button? This would be a disaster. About .0001% of passengers would have the knowledge and discretion to use them correctly. They would just freak everybody else out, every third asshole would be pushing them for kicks and they would add dangerous distraction to the cockpit. Imagine you are commencing a take-off roll without the flaps set and you get a buzz from the passenger in 34A? Are you going to stop to take that call? No, because the last twenty times it was someone concerned that a dog was trapped in the cargo compartment (PTU noise) and anyway you've already gotten the configuration warning when you advanced the thrust levers. I'm afraid that solution isn't going to appeal to anyone in the pointy end OR the accounting department. For visual things like fuel leaks and ice contamination, better external cameras are a better idea.

[Highkeas]

I have long been an aviation enthusiast, and have watched all episodes of Mayday. The more Mayday I watch, the more I don't understand why safety measures like the following aren't in place !!!

...........................................

Many of your suggestions have been considered in depth and rejected for valid reason or already exist using different methods. Safety is a key concern to commercial aircraft companies (and to airlines and regulatory agencies) and safety features are implemented on an ongoing basis.

[3WE]

...Many of your suggestions have been considered in depth and rejected for valid reason...

...No...I do not believe you...I am not listening...loud noises...

[StickShaker]

Soo...you see that the flaps are up and you're pulling onto the runway.

You hit the panic button.

I got a beer that says, 1) The FA's stay seated, 2) They pretty much blow you off with, "I'm sure the captain has the flaps set correctly." 3) Even a moderate risk they have no idea what you are talking about.

Hehe

Yes, I get it. But, the panic button may be disabled for takeoff, and enabled at cruising, when the FAs are up and about and available ?

Like I said, I understand that there's a potential for junk information or noise being communicated. But, an intermediary like the FA, or perhaps (here's an idea) someone onboard who is qualified (flight engineer, mechanic, etc) can consider the information to see if it's credible.

I don't have the solution. Just an idea.

[3WE]

...But, an intermediary...perhaps (here's an idea) someone onboard who is qualified (flight engineer, mechanic, etc) can consider the information to see if it's credible...

Indeed.

[StickShaker]

Evan, thanks for the detailed response ! I think those are the answers I was looking for.

Yes, I understand ... it's glaringly obvious that it's all a money game for airlines/manufacturers. Alaskan airlines was a prime example (jackscrew failure in the horizontal stabilizer).

You're right, I guess what I'm really asking is why the FAA and ICAO haven't mandated such measures. Seeing how advanced technology is, I just think it's a shame ... because it would be really easy to achieve this higher level of safety.

I agree about the panic button ... huge potential for noise and mayhem. But, just like the emergency brake on trains, anyone who pushes it should be held accountable and should have to justify their use of the button. And, an intermediary (like a flight attendant) would, of course, serve as a buffer/liaison so not all the crap would be relayed. And the FAs can receive more technical training to know what info is credible and what's not.

LMAO at the PTU dog noise ! Today, I learned what a PTU is and what it sounds like

[Highkeas]

Coincidentally I received this in my email today:

http://aviationweek.com/century-aviation-week/100-years-attention-safety-brings-results

[Evan]

Coincidentally I received this in my email today:

http://aviationweek.com/century-avia...brings-results

They managed to leave out the accident that happened three days before 2015, caused by sheer pilot ignorance and reckless procedural training.

I think, at this point the largest threats to aviation safety are 1) Fatigue and lax training due to corporate profit-taking-induced recklessness 2) Inadequate CAA oversight and enforcement and 3) inherent vulnerabilities beyond the reach of current technologies, such as blast radius damage from an uncontained engine failure. All three of these threats can be mitigated by strict adherence to a strong safety culture that includes unwavering maintenance, training that both meets and exceeds the minimum requirements, is type-specific and exposes pilots to a deeper systems-level understanding, diligent CAA oversight and CAA enforcement penalties that are severe and costly to operators.

The panic button should be in the voting booths.

[StickShaker]

Coincidentally I received this in my email today:

http://aviationweek.com/century-avia...brings-results

Thanks for sharing ! Interesting stuff, for sure.

I love how some dumbass comedian thinks we can build a whole airplane out of "that stuff" (blackbox casing material). Umm, yeah, if we could tolerate a 100x increase in ticket prices. Not to mention that it would probably make the airplane 10x heavier and unable to fly efficiently (unless there is some magical featherweight composite material I don't know of).

[StickShaker]

The panic button should be in the voting booths.

[StickShaker]

Imagine you are commencing a take-off roll without the flaps set and you get a buzz from the passenger in 34A? Are you going to stop to take that call? No, because the last twenty times it was someone concerned that a dog was trapped in the cargo compartment (PTU noise) and anyway you've already gotten the configuration warning when you advanced the thrust levers.

All I can say is "Northwest Airlines Flight 255"

(Wikipedia) "Contributing to the accident was the absence of electrical power to the airplane takeoff warning system which thus did not warn the flightcrew that the airplane was not configured properly for takeoff" - NTSB report

Take off config warning didn't sound.

[Evan]

All I can say is "Northwest Airlines Flight 255"

(Wikipedia) "Contributing to the accident was the absence of electrical power to the airplane takeoff warning system which thus did not warn the flightcrew that the airplane was not configured properly for takeoff" - NTSB report

Take off config warning didn't sound.

Same with Spanair Flight 5022. But this was due to non-standard maintenance IMPROVISATION instead of manufacturer approved procedure. Flawed safety culture.

Anyway, the before taxi checklist is all you should need to prevent this from happening. If your pilots are skipping that, bad safety culture, fatigued pilots or both.

Currently there are two layers of defense against missing takeoff configuration. A panic button accessible to the .001% of pax who even know what flaps are would probably be a very weak third layer.

[Gabriel]

Same with Spanair Flight 5022. But this was due to non-standard maintenance IMPROVISATION instead of manufacturer approved procedure. Flawed safety culture.

Anyway, the before taxi checklist is all you should need to prevent this from happening. If your pilots are skipping that, bad safety culture, fatigued pilots or both.

Currently there are two layers of defense against missing takeoff configuration. A panic button accessible to the .001% of pax who even know what flaps are would probably be a very weak third layer.

Actually, there are 3 layers: Both airplanes were recoverable after they lifted off without flaps.