Originally posted by Vnav
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What was overlooked was the uneven skill level of pilots, particularly under startle effect and overwhelming workload. Sooner or later a not-so-adept crew was going to mess this up.
Airbus forsaw this and created a foolproof memory procedure with the airlines. Many of the airlines didn't train for it. Sooner or later a not-so-adept crew was going to mess this up.
Some of the prior incidents had gotten pretty tangled up riding it out. Then It happened. It was probably inevitable.
In the wake of the crash, a very obvious lesson was learned. A STANDARDIZED memory procedure was needed to allow ALL crews to stabilize until they can regain full situational awareness.
Why, because good pilots cannot simply use their flawless airmanship? No, because not-so-good pilots (or good pilots on a not-so-good day) do not have flawless airmanship.
As the passenger in 22B, I have to demand that these procedures are adhered to, because I don't get to vet my pilots from seat 22B.
If pilots are still improvising UAS procedure, we still haven't learned the very obvious lesson.
Essentially the procedure should be:
- Stabilize at flight level
- Remain stabilized at flight level for at least four minutes to allow transient UAS to clear
- Use those four minutes to get full situational awareness
- If UAS persists, consider changing flight level using the QRH values. But first weigh the benefits against the risks.
- Be aware that the potential for ice contamination increases at lower altitudes and any vector away from relatively stable flight adds risk.
If the JetStar crew followed this procedure, than no harm, no foul. If they didn't, we still have a big lesson to learn.
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