BAN ALL RUDDER PEDALS!!!!!

[Gabriel]

Okay, what is the non-Cessna-172 CRM that they should have followed? Don't name the UAS procedure because the upset was started before UAS was (or had a chance to be) identified. Again, by then, the plane had already 2 stall warnings, the load factor had reached 1.5, the pitch had gone from zero to 10 ANU, and VS had reached 5000 fpm, and the thrust levers had not been touched.

By the way, the plane still had 2 pilots, 2 fully functioning sets of controls, alternate law that provides for hands-off flight path stability, 3 perfectly working attitude indicators, heading indicators and altimeters, 2 perfectly working VSI indicators.

That was PIECE OF CAKE compared with what single-pilots of GA airplanes have to deal with in one of the most common system failures in IMC in a typical 6-pack instrument layout: Vacuum failure. You've lost the ONLY attitude indicator and the ONLY directional gyro. Now you have to revert to the turn-and-slip indicator for roll (indirectly), to the magnetic compass for heading, and to the altimeter for pitch (indirectly).

By the way, 3WE and myself managed to successfully perform, single pilot in a C-172, ILS approaches down to minimums with low clouds, fog and rain and with strong gusting winds and nasty turbulence.
Ok, that was in MSFS and 3WE did much better than myself, so it doesn't count

[Evan]

Okay, what is the non-Cessna-172 CRM that they should have followed?

I suppose something like this, but in French:

PF: "I have the controls" (focuses complete attention on the PFD to counteract roll and achieve wings-level, ball-centered 5° pitch)

PM: "Autoflight lost. FD's off."

PF: "Check" (does this) What's going on down there?

PM: "We've lost autoflight.... We've lost the speeds... Alternate law protections."

PF: "Got it, how's the engine data? (he had been concerned about ice ingestion)."

PM: "Uh, all good... Thrust is locked. Move the thrust levers"

PF: "Max climb?

PM: "Yeah, just put it back in the detent. You're pitch is coming up, keep it pegged at five for now."

PF: "Trying..."

PM: "Max speed 330"

PF: "I don't have speeds!"

PM: "Just keep it steady. We've lost uh... the rudder limiter... TCAS... ADR1...

PF: "Damn! Can you reset it?"

PM: "Dunno. QRH... Unreliable speeds..."

PF: "Just tell me what to do."

PM: "Ok, keep the thrust there. Fly at 3° pitch. Just keep it steady."

PF: "Piece o' cake."

PM: "ADR check procedure... (in the QRH)"

PM: "Looks like speeds are coming back now..."

etc....

That will never happen in a Cessna.

[Gabriel]

Why do you have 5deg pitch in the first line, before the UAS was identified? Before your 4th line, where the PM identified the UAS, the flight was completely unstabillized, the stall warning had already sounded twice, the 1.5G peak had already happened, the pitch was already 10 deg and increasing, the VSI was already 5K and increasing...

Before your 4th line, I would have expected the PF just to fly the plane and keep it stable. That would have been good CRM, here in the A330 at transonic speeds and 35000ft or in a 172 at 90kts and 1000ft.

[Evan]

Why do you have 5deg pitch in the first line, before the UAS was identified?

Sorry, make that 1° pitch, the pitch that was 'known' before the event.

The reason the rest doesn't happen here is because the PF is concentrating on the task of flying and the PM, running through the ECAM and the UAS procedure, is keeping him honest. Also, they are COMMUNICATING.

Before your 4th line, I would have expected the PF just to fly the plane and keep it stable. That would have been good CRM, here in the A330 at transonic speeds and 35000ft or in a 172 at 90kts and 1000ft.

No no no Gabriel. CRM is COMMUNICATION, not flying skills. When you are flying alone, be it in a 172 or an A330, you are not communicating and nobody is helping you keep your mind on flying the plane.

[Gabriel]

So, again, what failed in the first line? The blue part (the communication) happened, the red part didn't or was absolutely ineffective.

PF: "I have the controls" (focuses complete attention on the PFD to counteract roll and achieve wings-level, ball-centered 5° pitch)

So how would your version of CRM have fixed that?

(By the way, there are versions of CRM for single pilot, you can divide and prioritize task with yourself, you can talk with yourself, you can exchange opinions with yourself).
CRM is how you manage the RESOURCES, other persons around are a key resource, but not the only one.
Aviate, navigate, communicate, is an example of single-pilot CRM, or SRM.
And in any event, for a multi crew pilot, the aviate part should be even a greater focus for the PF, CRM or not.
The FP said "my plane", so it should have been clear the role that each of them were (or should have been) assuming.

Lack of CRM was a problem here. But the problem began earlier, before the CRM (or the meaning of CRM that you use) had a chance to fail or succeed.
Immediately upon the AP disengage warning, the PF did call "I have the controls", the PM replied "Ok". and the PF asks "What's going on?"
The PF pulls up, Gs reach 1.5, the stall warning sounds twice, the altitude warning also sounds, the pitch goes from zero to 10, the VSI from zero to 5K (note that one minute earlier they had discussed that they could not climb to the filled altitude because they lacked the required performance due to the unusually high temperatures), and the PF says: "There is no good speed indication." and the PM replies " SO we lost the speeds then".
9 seconds had elapsed, just 9 seconds since the AP disengaged, the communication between the pilots so far followed almost verbatim your suggested CRM, and the flight was already heading to hell (but still perfectly recoverable by a crew with any degree of situational awareness).

The fact that the PF was managing roll well and was the first one to identify that the speed was not good means that he was looking at the PFD where the pitch, altitude and vertical speed are also displayed.

In the subsequent seconds, the PM tells the PF like 10 times to lower the nose, that he was climbing, that he was still climbing, to go down, to descend... what the PF didn't fully comply with. He did lower the nose, partially, for a while, reducing the climb rate, and the plane started to gain speed (by the way, one pitot cleared in this period and they started to get one good speed indication, 35 seconds after all started) before starting to pull up again (at which moment a second pitot also clears and the avionics returns basically to normal, 50 seconds after all started).

I think that the best CRM at that point was for the PM to say "my plane, you monitor the transponder ident light". I don't think that reminding the PF to hold 5 deg of pitch would have helped, as it didn't help to tell him to lower the nose a dozen of times. Due to the shitty airmanship the PM was too busy monitoring the basic flight instrument and telling the PF what to do (to lower the nose). He had no time to reach the QRH to look for the UAS, and, anyway, in 50 seconds since all started and 40 seconds since the UAS was identified I doubt he could have gotten to the QRH's UAS section, looked up the airplane's weight and altitude, and looked up the right pitch and thrust in the table.

Yes, if they had had a proper UAS training I would have expected someone calling or enforcing 5deg pitch, but again, the PM calling it would not have helped since telling to the PM repeatedly to lower the nose was not helping either.

But let me go back. Please explain me what CRM (of your type, that doesn't include "fly the airplane first" for the PF) that didn't happen would have helped in the first 9 seconds, up to the point where the UAS was identified?. Up to this point, the CRM (communication) was reasonable and quite matching your expectations.

[ATLcrew]

No no no Gabriel. CRM is COMMUNICATION, not flying skills.

That's like saying math is division, not addition.

[Evan]

That's like saying math is division, not addition.

CRM: The term "cockpit resource management" (later generalized to "crew resource management") was coined in 1979 by NASA psychologist John Lauber who had studied communication processes in cockpits for several years. While retaining a command hierarchy, the concept was intended to foster a less authoritarian cockpit culture, where co-pilots were encouraged to question captains if they observed them making mistakes.

Yes, it extends to individual actions but it is centered upon improving communication and this avoiding the errors of any individual pilot. It's also centered on clear division of tasks to allow each pilot to retain focus and situational awareness.

In a single-pilot cockpit, you cannot have "crew resource management". Misinterpretations of the term do not apply.

[ATLcrew]

[In a single-pilot cockpit, you cannot have "crew resource management". Misinterpretations of the term do not apply.

A crew of one is still a crew. Said crew of one has resources available to it. Keep in mind that some of said resources may even be outside the cockpit. All those resources need to be managed, therefore you absolutely can (even should, I would even say must) have CRM in a single-pilot environment also. I dare even say that proprer CRM can (at times) be even MORE vital in a single-pilot cockpit, since one can only grow so many hands. Just something to think about.