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  • #46
    Originally posted by MCM View Post
    You have an unrealistic ideal about just what a pilot can, and should, be.
    I don't think you understand me MCM. I'm just putting the idea out there that perhaps AIRBUS has an unrealistic expectation. What I'm really getting at is that Airbus might have been too ahead of their time, leaping too fast. I remember the futuristic optimism of the 1970's. Most of that optimism was shot down by the realities of human nature. It was based on the idea that we would all excel in adapting to new technologies. It assumed we would all be eager to do so. We weren't. As it turned out, new technologies needed to excel in adapting to us. When Airbus designed the A320 I don't think that lesson had yet been learned.
    Training is always going to be limited. Its just the world we live in. If the cockpit design is such that it can't be learned thoroughly in the equivalent time that another manufacturers cockpit can be learned, then there's got to be questions about its practicality in the modern world.
    Acknowledged, but we're still talking about the sidestick issue, right? From what I can tell, the problem isn't in teaching pilots how to fly the A320 under normal circumstances; that's the easy part. It is in supplementing this training with a deeper understanding of the selected guidance modes, systems behaviors and the procedures for abnormal operations. Those things are universal demands for NG aircraft, including the 777 and 787. And yes, the commitment to training is inadequate. I'm not convinced that "Its just the world we live in", though, this is what I'm questioning.
    We favour conservatism because it is not old aircraft types that are having incidents, its the new systems with the new technology that are!
    Perhaps, but I am not seeing a greater incidence of pilot error attributable to the sidestick methodology. What I am seeing is a consistent theme of unfamiliarity on type, a superficial understanding of the aircraft automation, a failure of basic airmanship, complacency and ignorance of CRM procedure behind most of the incidents over the past years. That is happening on Airbus, Boeing, Embraers, the old McD's etc. Again, I think this can also be attributed to a failure on the operator's part to step-up to the training commitments of the new technology, not the technology itself.

    And keeping in mind that the commitment to digital flight control and FBW has been made across the industry. That added training goes along with it.
    Lets be realistic here - airline pilots are going to become less skilled as airlines push for lower wages and the shear demand for pilot numbers increases. Cockpits DO need to become more idiot-proof, because we're going to be putting lower and lower standard pilots into these aeroplanes, whether you or I like it or not.
    That's basically what I'm getting at. I think some very advanced thinking went into the A320 and then supply-side economics (my Machiavellian reference) let them down. I feel bad for the people who designed the thing because I think at this point in our evolution it should be realistic. But perhaps you are correct and it isn't.
    So what you're saying here is that we've created a brand new type of aeroplane control system, and then blaming the training and the pilots for not understanding it?!
    Yes! Like a lot of people, I work in a field turned upside down by 'disruptive technologies'. We have had to learn new ways of doing everything, new instincts, new complexities. Our hard-earned artisanal skills from our past that have become obsolete, literally useless! We have had to put a lot of effort into keeping up with it all. This is the age we live in. Why should airlines pilots not be expected to do the same? The fact that I, a non-airline pilot, can do the research and understand these systems on a basic level in my spare time makes me believe a pilot on a payroll with hundreds of lives in their charge should be expected to do at least that much. I'm sorry but I expect pilots to also meet the challenges of rapid technological change in a disruptive age.
    How is this 'lowering expectations'? I find this a bizarre sentiment.
    Ok, perhaps I should say 'altering expectation'. When Airbus made the leap to a new way of flying, they obviously expected pilots to make the leap as well. They expected operators to train them accordingly. This isn't happening. Adapting systems to revert to the instincts of the old methods (physical feedback as the primary means of information) betrays a capitulation to altered expectations.

    That might mean their original expections were unrealistic or misguided. It may turn out that a physically informative control column is simply using more of the human senses and is therefore the wiser choice (as in the 787).

    But, from an objective standpoint, all the information needed to have clear situational awareness is present in the A320 cockpit. The thrust levers don't move but the TLA donuts show you where the power setting is (I agree with Gabriel that they should be servo-driven). You have to look rather than feel. The trim wheel moves silently to indicate the stab trim. You have to look rather than listen (but I think this is also true of the 777 and 787). The ECAM provides enhanced situational awareness if you have the training and discipline to use it properly with CRM procedure (mainly through the PM). You have to learn to fly in a less physical, more cerebral way. This is true of many professions today, all in the name of efficiency.

    I'm merely asking the question: did Airbus overestimate the human pilot's ability to reliably concentrate and the commitment of the industry to adapt to new technologies? Because modifying them to emulate old technologies would be a statement that they had. That's what I find interesting about all this.

    And I'm not saying it would be a bad idea to go back to the yoke if that is what is needed. I'm not an Airbus conservative either. Unlike all of the AIrbus hang-wringers out there, I just prefer to have an informed opinion.

    Comment


    • #47
      Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post
      Then again, I just fly these things for a living, what do I know?
      Are you a real-world Airbus pilot? If so please tell us what you know. I hope you know a lot more than a some other Airbus pilots seem to know.

      Comment


      • #48
        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
        The trim is a good example. The trim wheel doesn't move anymore. But you have a scenario where the plane trims all the way up and then it gets stuck there (by design) and the pilot has to figure out this condition while trying to recover from a stall. It's very hard!!! We will agree that the plane should have never reached this condition to begin with. But if (when) it does, the next layer is weakened.

        I prefer that, if the plane decides to trim up, it will turn a big black wheel with white stripes and a clacking sound as it turns.
        Ok, the pitch trim wheel does move, but not nearly as much and without the old-school sound effects. AFAIK, the 777 and 787 are also silent.

        However, it is not going to become 'frozen' unless you get yourself into unusual attitudes. Like ridiculous AoA. How does a properly trained, competent pilot get there in the first place?

        Secondly, the procedure, if you are trained properly, is to use manual pitch trim as well as elevator in extreme situations. The trim wheel will always show you where the trim setting is.

        Comment


        • #49
          Originally posted by Evan View Post
          Are you a real-world Airbus pilot? If so please tell us what you know. I hope you know a lot more than a some other Airbus pilots seem to know.
          I'm sure I know more than some and less than others. At the very least I have an "informed opinion".

          Comment


          • #50
            Originally posted by Evan View Post
            Ok, the pitch trim wheel does move, but not nearly as much and without the old-school sound effects. AFAIK, the 777 and 787 are also silent.
            I don't know but I hope you are wrong.

            However, it is not going to become 'frozen' unless you get yourself into unusual attitudes. Like ridiculous AoA. How does a properly trained, competent pilot get there in the first place?
            Yes, but they do get there in the first place. That's what I said:
            We will agree that the plane should have never reached this condition to begin with. But if (when) it does, the next layer is weakened.
            Secondly, the procedure, if you are trained properly, is to use manual pitch trim as well as elevator in extreme situations. The trim wheel will always show you where the trim setting is.
            Put this in the perspective of an airplane where you never EVER touch the trim except, maybe, in initial training and in SOME of the yearly sim sessions.

            --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
            --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

            Comment


            • #51
              Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
              Put this in the perspective of an airplane where you never EVER touch the trim except, maybe, in initial training and in SOME of the yearly sim sessions.
              Alright, to put everything into perspective, we have to first place our crew in one of the situations where the automatic pitch trim 'freezes' at the current setting. They are:

              - Pitch attitude > 50° ANU or 30° AND
              - Bank angle > 125°
              - AoA > 30° or < -10°
              - Speed > 440kts or < 60kts
              - Mach < .91 or < .01

              All places no competent pilot—let alone flight crew—should ever EVER find themselves in and WILL NEVER find themselves in under normal law.

              So now let's assume the pilot has been properly trained and has been taught in supplemental unusual attitudes recovery training that recovery procedure requires MAN PITCH TRIM (which always has priority over the auto trim even if it isn't 'frozen'). Furthermore, let's teach our pilot that the VERY FIRST action to take IN ANY SITUATION in which pitch commands do not produce the expected result is the USE MAN PITCH TRIM. The nature of that training would be a memory item with a similar (but even simpler) memorable rule as the one used for emergency descent (which is Turn - Pull, Turn - Pull, Pull'). This should be a reasonable expectation; pilots should be expected to become proficient (in the SIM) on this small, simple bit of procedure, even under the stress of the moment. Like emergency descent.

              Now what we have is something you never otherwise need to do in a situation you will probably never encounter. Like the other memory items, pilots need to know how instinctively how to use their fallbacks and redundancies.

              Or is that an unrealistic expectation as well. How low should we set the bar?

              Comment


              • #52
                Originally posted by Evan View Post
                Furthermore, let's teach our pilot that the VERY FIRST action to take IN ANY SITUATION in which pitch commands do not produce the expected result is the USE MAN PITCH TRIM.
                Oh boy.

                Comment


                • #53
                  Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post
                  Oh boy.
                  What then would you recommend in this scenario?

                  We recently discussed the Boeing version of frozen (blocked) stabilizer trim and unresponsive pitch. The trim was eventually moved manually.

                  Originally posted by Gabriel
                  I have never seen one single case so far where elevator down + trim down would not have been enough.
                  You disagree?

                  Comment


                  • #54
                    I'm merely asking the question: did Airbus overestimate the human pilot's ability to reliably concentrate and the commitment of the industry to adapt to new technologies? Because modifying them to emulate old technologies would be a statement that they had. That's what I find interesting about all this
                    To me, the absolute answer to this question is YES, particularly to the first part. The limitations on human concentration, and the cognitive process has been well known for a long time.

                    The bigger issue is that human factors experts could have told them that to begin with. Airbus made a massive leap of faith, and I'm not sure they got it right.

                    But, from an objective standpoint, all the information needed to have clear situational awareness is present in the A320 cockpit. The thrust levers don't move but the TLA donuts show you where the power setting is (I agree with Gabriel that they should be servo-driven). You have to look rather than feel. The trim wheel moves silently to indicate the stab trim. You have to look rather than listen (but I think this is also true of the 777 and 787). The ECAM provides enhanced situational awareness if you have the training and discipline to use it properly with CRM procedure (mainly through the PM). You have to learn to fly in a less physical, more cerebral way. This is true of many professions today, all in the name of efficiency.
                    But we know that 'look' isn't always the best way to provide information to a person. Feel, and sounds, are very important cues. Again, this is known human factors information. Just look at what the military are doing with the F-35.

                    I'm sorry but I expect pilots to also meet the challenges of rapid technological change in a disruptive age.
                    Can you show me how the Airbus cockpit design increases efficiency, particularly if you then have to train pilots for longer on how to use it? Its not like Airbus aircraft are operating in environments or on routes that other manufacturers can't. Pilots have absolutely adapted to new technology - GPS/GLS/RNP approaches, fly by wire, datalink, flying in an environment where cost is king, and we need to save money wherever we can. To think that all pilots don't try to learn their aircraft type is offensive, and wrong.

                    The point is perhaps that the Airbus people did make major leaps in what they expected of pilots, but that they were significantly misguided in making those leaps and failed to take heed of existing human factors knowledge.

                    I also question that they did it for any reason other than to make their aircraft cheaper (due to less training required, and cheaper flight decks), but they might have got that one wrong too.

                    I imagine that Airbus were hoping that the new generation of pilots, who'd only ever flown Airbus aircraft, would be brilliant at flying their aircraft. But I'm not seeing that either.

                    For what its worth - I don't think that Airbus have got it all wrong at all. There is some great stuff in their design that works wonders, and in general there's nothing wrong with the way they expect their aircraft to be operated. But it is significantly different, and it isn't intuitive. To Airbus' credit they have fixed a lot of the bizarre things in the latest generation of aircraft, but they still insist on having visual feedback as the only feedback, and I think that will, at some point, need to change.

                    Comment


                    • #55
                      Originally posted by Evan View Post
                      Alright, to put everything into perspective, we have to first place our crew in one of the situations where the automatic pitch trim 'freezes' at the current setting. They are:

                      - Pitch attitude > 50° ANU or 30° AND
                      - Bank angle > 125°
                      - AoA > 30° or < -10°
                      - Speed > 440kts or < 60kts
                      - Mach < .91 or < .01

                      All places no competent pilot—let alone flight crew—should ever EVER find themselves in and WILL NEVER find themselves in under normal law.
                      Unless there is a faulty sensor, or maybe a windshear, or maybe mechanical failure (jammed elevator), or a gross pilot screw up (mistake rudder trim for door open switch, and yes, I know that it was in a Boeing, but I'm sure that we can find something stupid to do in an Airbus too), or any of the reasons that may make the unusual attitude recovery training useful.

                      --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                      --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                      Comment


                      • #56
                        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                        Unless there is a faulty sensor, or maybe a windshear, or maybe mechanical failure (jammed elevator), or a gross pilot screw up (mistake rudder trim for door open switch, and yes, I know that it was in a Boeing, but I'm sure that we can find something stupid to do in an Airbus too), or any of the reasons that may make the unusual attitude recovery training useful.
                        Yes, which is why I said 'should ever find themselves in', not 'would ever find themselves in'. There's always a possibility. That's why we need the memory item.

                        Interestingly, in the case of a probe failure, reaching the AoA threshold for Abnormal Attitudes Law will not trigger it because the AoA would already be ruled invalid along with the affected ADR's. You would have to exceed one of the other criteria as well. AF447 never switched to Abnormal Law, for this reason, and the pitch trim was never frozen. All they had to do was lower the pitch and keep it there.

                        And the door switch is nowhere near the rudder trim. Point Airbus...

                        Comment


                        • #57
                          And the door switch is nowhere near the rudder trim. Point Airbus...
                          Depends which model Airbus you're talking about!

                          Comment


                          • #58
                            Originally posted by Evan View Post
                            Ok, the pitch trim wheel does move, but not nearly as much and without the old-school sound effects. AFAIK, the 777 and 787 are also silent.
                            Originally posted by Gabriel
                            I don't know but I hope you are wrong.
                            There are no pitch trim wheels on any of these larger aircraft. On the 777 I'm guessing there is no audible effect aside from the click the levers might make. Maybe BoeingBobby or MCM can tell us what the similar 747 levers sound like (do they move with the electrical trim?). The 787 has only electrical switches and no levers, and this is the state-of-the-art. Both the A380 and the A350 also use electrical switches with no mechanical back-up (but they added a pitch trim hat switch on the stick for direct law). I think the A330/340 is probably the heaviest western airliner to use mechanical pitch trim wheels.

                            Comment


                            • #59
                              The pitch trim levers/electrical switches on 747's, 767's both do not move, other than when you push them, and so have no sound associated with them.

                              The A380's I've seen don't have a pitch trim switch on top of the side stick, but on the centre pedestal - but its possible that is user-customisable. No idea about the A350.

                              Comment


                              • #60
                                Originally posted by MCM View Post
                                The pitch trim levers/electrical switches on 747's, 767's both do not move, other than when you push them, and so have no sound associated with them.

                                The A380's I've seen don't have a pitch trim switch on top of the side stick, but on the centre pedestal - but its possible that is user-customisable. No idea about the A350.
                                How do you become quickly aware of a trim runaway?

                                And wouldn't it help have an obvious feedback of trim movement to increase the awareness of for example deteriorating speed in VS, ALT or GS AP modes?

                                We praise Boeing for its obvious yokes that physically move which provides an excellent feedback of what oneself or the other pilot (human or otto) is doing, but the fact is that the AP flies pitch mostly with the trim, so there it goes our feedback.

                                --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                                --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                                Comment

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