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  • #16
    Originally posted by 3WE View Post
    Where did I say I was against thorough knowledge of the plane and procedures.
    Where? Waaay back where this all started when you insisted that it wasn't important for pilots to follow the memory procedure for UAS because familiar pitch and power settings were all they needed.

    I tried to point out that this would overlook important procedural steps for the A330 such as switching off the FD's and getting the thrust out of thrust lock. I tried to point out that in a number of other situations there will be specific steps that should be taken that are not universal to piloting. I tried...

    In the process, I NEVER said that this should be done at the expense of basic airmanship. On the contrary, I said that this is now a part of the advanced airmanship needed to pilot advanced aircraft.

    Meanwhile, you still don't understnad those procedures. The first level, memory procedures, are very simple to execute, not complex lists as you keep suggesting. The second tier, QRH procedures are also designed to be followed under high-stress in the most straightforward means possible. The reason they exist is to SIMPLIFY the situation, optimize CRM and avoid the pilot error that often comes from improvisation by pilots under stress.

    And of course the procedures you keep inventing to make your point are preposterous products of your imagination.

    Originally posted by 3WE
    Loss of ASI:
    1) Manage complex, cryptic, multi mode computer control system.
    But do not call on basic knowledge regarding pitch, power and airspeed
    By this I assume you mean UAS. The A330 procedure is to stabilize the aircraft at 5° pitch and to move the thrust levers out of the climb detent and back into the climb detent to assure full climb power, then (with the aircraft now stabilized safely in the speed envelope), the PNF can calmly go to the QRH, get the current weight from the computer and reference a very simple chart of weight ranges and altitudes to get a more accurate pitch value (I believe 3° in the case of AF447). Within a minute airspeeds are back and no harm is done.

    Now how does that become "Manage complex, cryptic, multi mode computer control system"?

    Or... you can do what they did: Ignore the procedures and just fly the plane without the proper CRM or concentration that procedures create, leaving the PF to hand fly while focusing on the ECAM instead of the PFD with his concern directed more at engine flameout than flight path and inadvertently climbing into a stall. The thing you refuse to admit 3WE, though it is quite obviously true, is that if these subpar pilots had simply followed procedure nothing tragic would have occurred. Procedures protect us from subpar pilots or pilots who are momentarily startled and disoriented.

    I won't ever convince you of this. The industry is convinced of this but in your mind all of these industry professionals are mere fools. You continue to argue against me and them with fanciful inventions of 'HAL' and absurd examples of procedure. Pilots continue to ignore procedure and CRM and the death toll goes on and this does not convince you either. I show you examples of where basic airmanship without procedural proficiency and CRM discipline would not have saved the day. This doesn't convince you.

    I can debate things with Gabriel because he does his research and argues with facts (and often wins) and it's a learning experience for me. I can't debate anything with you because you argue with your imagination.

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    • #17
      You show me someone who can land a simulator and I'll show you someone who can land a simulator. It's a great training device, but I still say it's nothing like flying a real plane full of real people in real weather or a during a real emergency.

      With that said, even though I haven't watched the video, I have no doubt that these guys have spent a lot of time studying. Still, I'd bet those procedures don't go as smoothly when the world is whizzing by at 150kts and a really loud bang goes off and the plane starts to shake like it's coming apart.
      Parlour Talker Extraordinaire

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      • #18
        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
        Ok, I prefer the "gimme my frigging plane back" switch. No need to turn off two potentially perfectly working flight control computers and leave a potentially malfunctioning one.
        The FBW will not rely on a single (malfunctioning or otherwise) FAC, which is why this gets you into direct law. Two switches.

        Comment


        • #19
          Originally posted by Vnav View Post
          You show me someone who can land a simulator and I'll show you someone who can land a simulator. It's a great training device, but I still say it's nothing like flying a real plane full of real people in real weather or a during a real emergency.

          With that said, even though I haven't watched the video, I have no doubt that these guys have spent a lot of time studying. Still, I'd bet those procedures don't go as smoothly when the world is whizzing by at 150kts and a really loud bang goes off and the plane starts to shake like it's coming apart.
          Hey, Vnav, how nice having you back. Where have you been? Still flying the same atique type?

          I agree. Or how a comment on the youtube video said (in response to the poster who said that he was sure he would have no problem to land the real plane):

          Well, "absolutely NO PROBLEM" is a little bit to optimistic. That was a simulator. In a real situation (after the pilots died from a fish poisoning or after a nice litte fight with some terrorists) you would first shit your pants and then try to land the airplane. Things will be a little different then
          The psychological aspect of an emergency is one of the greatest problems. You never know how a person (no matter how many hours in the real plane) will react to stress and fear to death. And the simulator can't simulate that.

          That said, pilots go from the sim to revenue flight with zero hours on the real type, and after a few flights of initial line experience (with a third pilot as a required crewmember) they are in a position where they should be able to handle a flight alone after the sudden LOC of the guy on the left seat.

          But if the two pilots did have the fish, a dummy like this one (or like 3we, or the heck, even like Evan if there's nothing better ) at the controls is a better chance than the average stewardess. In fact, it's a much better chance. Not nearly as good as a qualified pilot, but chances are that you will survive after some hospitalization.

          --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
          --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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          • #20
            Originally posted by Evan View Post
            The FBW will not rely on a single (malfunctioning or otherwise) FAC, which is why this gets you into direct law. Two switches.
            So switching all 5 FCC (2 SEC and 3 ELAC or something like that) is ok too?

            --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
            --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

            Comment


            • #21
              Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
              So switching all 5 FCC (2 SEC and 3 ELAC or something like that) is ok too?
              THe reason I say I 'know' that the FAC method works is because I read this recently in an official report though I can't recall just now what the incident was. If you remember back when we discussed the 'give me the plane' switch back in response to the Quantas 72 incident, it was pointed out that shutting down all 3 IR's using both the pb's and the rotary switches would get you direct law. That conforms with the FCOM reversion diagrams, while the double FAC failure does not. Apparently it works however and the crew of that incident quickly used this method to get direct law control.

              There are only 2 ELAC's and I question whether is is possible to shut down all the FAC's and SEC's in flight but in any case it is unnecessary.

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              • #22
                Originally posted by Evan View Post
                ...too many accidents come at the hands of high-hour pilots with inadequate systems and procedural knowledge of the aircraft that are currently flying. Don't bore them with systems, they can fly anything...
                The interesting contrast is that "too many accidents come at the hands of high hour, recurrently trained pilots who dive into procedural knowledge while seeming oblivious to basic aerodynamic laws and basic airmanship.

                But I liked your comment. Indeed there are pilots who say "to hell with procedures" and mess up. I liked it so much that I made a whole new post to say the same thing again...

                Let me also counter that 'your' pilots "who are bored with systems and can fly anything" are also very much bored with 'everything' including the basics...let's zoom climb to FL410 and not consider the broadly applicable ramifications of being very slow (increased drag) and at an altitude of limited power, or that a stall will screw up the airflow to the engine and cause a flame out...

                Or what the hell- let's not understand the authothrottle system quite well enough AND let's not watch the airspeed during short final.

                Your sloppy (or cocky) pilots are sloppy (or cocky) with everything- procedures AND the fundamental laws that you disparage.

                My (and Gabe's) pilots know their basics and don't forget their basics if HAL seems a little bit off.

                And they don't forget their basics when dealing with problem scenario 193,454- which calls for this switch being flipped on that display and the computer reverting to 'alternative law #7' where the flight-safety-briefing-incomplete flag in the software prevents the application of takeoff power when the flaps are at 15 degrees.

                And since they are human and there are tons of procedures...maybe they remember the basics, but have to get out the book sometimes for all those different procedures...(no don't tell anyone!).
                Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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                • #23
                  Originally posted by Evan View Post
                  THe reason I say I 'know' that the FAC method works is because I read this recently in an official report though I can't recall just now what the incident was. If you remember back when we discussed the 'give me the plane' switch back in response to the Quantas 72 incident, it was pointed out that shutting down all 3 IR's using both the pb's and the rotary switches would get you direct law. That conforms with the FCOM reversion diagrams, while the double FAC failure does not. Apparently it works however and the crew of that incident quickly used this method to get direct law control.

                  There are only 2 ELAC's and I question whether is is possible to shut down all the FAC's and SEC's in flight but in any case it is unnecessary.
                  Look at all those acronyms...I have no clue what most of them are.

                  However, I do know some power settings and attitudes that give me healthy airspeeds and that it's a good idea to watch your airspeed on short final.
                  Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                  Comment


                  • #24
                    Originally posted by Me
                    Loss of ASI:
                    1) Manage complex, cryptic, multi mode computer control system.
                    But do not call on basic knowledge regarding pitch, power and airspeed.
                    Originally posted by Evan
                    By this I assume you mean UAS. The A330 procedure is to stabilize the aircraft at 5° pitch and to move the thrust levers out of the climb detent and back into the climb detent to assure full climb power, then (with the aircraft now stabilized safely in the speed envelope), the PNF can calmly go to the QRH, get the current weight from the computer and reference a very simple chart of weight ranges and altitudes to get a more accurate pitch value (I believe 3° in the case of AF447). Within a minute airspeeds are back and no harm is done.
                    Maybe I was talking about someone I have actually met who actually had an iced over pitot tube in a Piper Cherokee and had to maintain known attitude and power settings to maintain airspeed?

                    Maybe I was talking about some other airliner that lost it's airspeed indication (it doesn't only happen to A330's you know).

                    You don't know who I am talking about and maybe I don't know who I'm talking about.

                    But what I am talking about is a procedure maintains a healthy airspeed (on ALL aircraft with no cryptic acronyms whatsoever.)
                    Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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                    • #25
                      3we, I think you are overstating Evan's understating of the stick and rudder.

                      Remember this when we were talking about stalls, full stalls and obscene stalls:

                      Originally posted by Evan
                      I think it would be more constructive to make the cockpit obscene pilot resistant.
                      Originally posted by 3WE
                      ...but I thought that was what the "Airbus system" did?
                      Originally posted by Evan View Post
                      I'm talking about the cockpit door.

                      --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                      --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                      Comment


                      • #26
                        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                        3we, I think you are overstating Evan's understating of the stick and rudder.

                        Remember this when we were talking about stalls, full stalls and obscene stalls:

                        In other words, "Are some pilots Dummy's?"

                        Using that analogy- it seems that a Dummy can land an airliner.

                        (I know the real question is if a well trained MSFS jock can land an airliner.)

                        And of course, one of the better answers is that you probably could teach someone all of the necessary button pushing to dial up the full autoland procedure.

                        ...and we've reached the elusive fuzzy gray area.

                        Traditional airmanship involves procedures- which returns me to my true point- the concern is when overly specific, cryptic, frequently-rehearsed procedures become detrimental to fundamental stuff- fundamental stuff which involves unforgiving things like laws of physics, the fact that wings don't work well at much over 15 degrees AOA, the rule of Aviate, Navigate, Communicate and Pitch + Power = Lateral + vertical speed.
                        Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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                        • #27
                          Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                          Ok, so let's play a bit.

                          3we, name accidents and incidents that could NOT have been saved ONLY by following the procedures, but that in the other hand could have been (or were) been saved using good stick and rudder skills.

                          Evan, name accidents and incidents that could NOT have been saved ONLY using good stick and rudder skills, but that in the other hand could have been (or were) saved by following the procedures.
                          I'm not going to play- because you have (possibly intentionally) gotten into that game of absolute words and black and white comments (no not totally- but I see the words )! Plane crashes are much more complicated than that.

                          American 191 in Chicago comes to mind where the pilots did an outstanding job of following the engine out procedure, nailing the engine out climb out speed- where had they been reckless, screw-the-procedure, cowboys, they might have nosed over, built speed, had crummy climb ability, but possibly enough aileron and rudder authority to keep it level, and maybe diagnosed that the slats were up on the left, retracted the right side and gone around to land- possibly causing great harm to the brakes with the high-speed flapless landing.

                          Of course was that THE cause of the crash? Was improper maintenance part of it? The slat system that allowed independent movement? The lack of a slat warning system? The routing of the hydraulic lines? The design of an engine mount that would allow the engine to flip up, over and smack the wing? Or do we need a big pool of some sort of foam to catch planes that sometimes fall out of the sky on takeoff...maybe that was the cause? (I know Evan will gravitate to the need for a slat warning system and an asymmetrical slat memory checklist and not that lowering the nose and increasing speed almost always improves control authority in almost all aircraft).
                          Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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                          • #28
                            Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                            Traditional airmanship involves procedures- which returns me to my true point- the concern is when overly specific, cryptic, frequently-rehearsed procedures become detrimental to fundamental stuff- fundamental stuff which involves unforgiving things like laws of physics, the fact that wings don't work well at much over 15 degrees AOA, the rule of Aviate, Navigate, Communicate and Pitch + Power = Lateral + vertical speed.
                            Ok, now that you've finally stated your true point, present us some true evidence: real world procedures that are detrimental to 'fundamental stuff' and contrary to physics and aerodynamics.

                            (And before you go there: I mean current procedures, NOT the flawed stall procedures that both Boeing and Airbus provided in the past.)

                            Comment


                            • #29
                              Originally posted by Evan View Post
                              Ok, now that you've finally stated your true point, present us some true evidence: real world procedures that are detrimental to 'fundamental stuff' and contrary to physics and aerodynamics.

                              (And before you go there: I mean current procedures, NOT the flawed stall procedures that both Boeing and Airbus provided in the past.)
                              United Airlines 232:

                              The highly trained pilots, who performed admirably, were unfamiliar with phugoid oscillations, with the pilot saying "it would have helped to be familiar with the basic behavior".

                              Hui Theiu Lo & Sum Ting Wong:

                              Quite competent at flying a Boeing 777 especially, all of it's complex systems, complex international long range flights, and lots of manipulations with the autopilot/auto throttles that are so complicated that SOME people blame the autothrottles...fail to do the most basic thing of watching airspeed on short final as you make increasing nose-up inputs which tend to slow aircraft.

                              (I'm not going to argue as to whether they should have been smarter on the auto throttles, maybe they should have been...but they sure as hell should have been smarter at the basic thing of watching the airspeed, and I'm sure they had extensive procedural training and extensive simulator time and extensive check outs, that I wonder if you or I or Gabriel could pass!- but the training so short on basics that the dude is scared of hand flying!)

                              American Airlines 191 above:

                              Procedure:
                              1) If an engine fails AFTER V1, continue takeoff
                              2) Fly at engine out speed which is a pretty slow airspeed not too far above the limits of lateral control, but which maximizes climb.

                              Versus the basic: More speed = more roll control = the calculated ability to counteract the asymmetrical slats.

                              Gabriel- "the middle man" who sees both sides of this...I'm sure you can list several more where flight crews were fully involved and engrossed following lots of detailed, specific procedures while violating some crazy basic things.
                              Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                              Comment


                              • #30
                                Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                                United Airlines 232:

                                [...]
                                Originally posted by 3WE
                                Traditional airmanship involves procedures- which returns me to my true point- the concern is when overly specific, cryptic, frequently-rehearsed procedures become detrimental to fundamental stuff- fundamental stuff which involves unforgiving things like laws of physics, the fact that wings don't work well at much over 15 degrees AOA, the rule of Aviate, Navigate, Communicate and Pitch + Power = Lateral + vertical speed. (red font so will notice it this time)
                                Name the procedures that are responsible for preventing the crew from using basic airmanship in addition to following those procedures, because that IS your point.

                                Keeping in mind that all procedures use CRM to divide tasks, allowing the PF to focus on flying the plane with his basic airmanship as well as his procedural tasks while the PNF is assigned to such things as the QRH and ECAM/EFIS messages.

                                Keeping in mind that no procedure requires a pilot to override his basic airmanship in a dynamic and unique situation. Procedures are there to help him, not oppress him.

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