If this is your first visit, be sure to
check out the FAQ by clicking the
link above. You may have to register
before you can post: click the register link above to proceed. To start viewing messages,
select the forum that you want to visit from the selection below.
Still gives me the willys. My instructor was a senior Delta L-1011 captain and when he decided to solo me there was the mother of all boomers on the horizon. He said that I have about 15 minutes so keep it under 10 since we were going to have weather for the next few days and that was the last window. Off and with each turn, I watched the 1,000 pound gorilla approaching, it was dead calm when I landed, got the plane into the old barn and after a nervous cigarette and congratulations the fit hit the sham.
The flight crew noticed the isolated storms ahead, but decided to proceed through them anyway, which resulted in the aircraft getting caught in a microburst.
Two very different discussion points.
I certainly think it's good to convey weather information from the ground, but would also agree that on-board weather radar and the veiw out the front of the plane as well confirmation from the crews discussion meant/indicated that they knew very well what was going on- including the correct suspicion they were going to lose a chunk of airspeed when they detected the speed gain.
Conversely
The "storms" that afternoon really did not look all that menacing. I believe I looked at the cloud from about 5 miles away at about the time of the crash (I'd call it a towering afternoon cumulus cloud / airmass shower...definately NOT some 60,000 ft mega prarie rotating supercell at all). Shots from news helicopters not long after the crash showed the cell as a very mundane rainshower.
Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
As the aircraft flew over Louisiana, a thunderstorm formed directly in its path as well as in the path of a whole shitpot of other airplanes also flying the same arrival...
Fixed.
Oh, and by the way, the cell in question was also in the path of planes flying over Oklahoma from the North, and Texas from the Western, and Southern arrivals.
Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
3WE, I am typing this very slowly so maybe you will finally understand this.
CONVECTIVE CLOUDS, YOU NEVER KNOW WHAT MIGHT BE HIDING IN THERE WAITING FOR YOU!
What you don't understand Bobby is that I don't fly into convective clouds- except when I'm sitting in row 23 and someone does it for me.
But from my observations, at really busy airports: planes will land really really really really close to storms...and big wind gusts and heavy rainfall are not perfecly correlated with each other.
I'd extremely be happy to have you fly me during stormy weather- but I've got really bad reports on the beverage service and IFE with your airline.
Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
Neither the plane ahead (nor it's pilot) reported conditions.
Nope, Don't think so! Excerpt From the JC forum, AA351 - which was ahead of DL191 - encountered conditions:
"Incidentally, in the Delta 191 accident, Archie's analysis is badly flawed. They were never pointed AT that storm until final approach. IT was camouflaged by a dissapating storm in front of it. They were at LOW LEVEL and had no tilt capabilities to see what awaited them. AA#351 was asked if they could see the airport and replied: "When we get out of THIS RAINSHOWER we will." That was the last report Capt Connors heard. A big deal was made of the lighning strike. That was a FLASH 1.5 miles to the east of the approach course. The tower controllers saw NINE STRIKES ON THE SOUTH side of that storm and told no one. Capt Toler in Piedmont 70 stopped his plane so his crew could see: "I've seen squall lines before, but this was a monster. I wanted my crew to see it and couldn't believe they were landing planes through it." His wind shear began at 800' AGL. All wind shear training prior to that was Dr. John McCarthy, and his $499 training tape ENDED with "Remember, fellows, you HAVE to be BELOW 500'." He has immediately then amended UAL's FOP manual to state that wind shear can be entrapment at 1,000' and below.
Capt Connors had refused a South arrival, because "we're not tangling with thunderstorms" and was given a holding pattern at SHV for 23 minutes. On the Blue Ridge arrival with vectors, he was never pointed at that storm until he was committed to the approach. He had a 31 yr flawless career, nine type ratings, and a line checkman on 3 heavies. His F/O and F/E were training center instructors."
Also, read here the chronology from 5:50 onward regarding AA351:
As to the decision, I wholeheartedly agree with Rudi Kapustin's observations about it. But this was never included in the final report because Kapustin had retired at the time of the investigation:
But indeed, your source is better. Please carry on.
It's an incomplete assessment of the incident. The final report included none of Kapustin's observations and they were all valid points and Kapustin came to some of the same observations as the OP above. I suggest also reading "Fire and Rain" Quite a good account of the event.
He had a 31 yr flawless career, nine type ratings, and a line checkman on 3 heavies. His F/O and F/E were training center instructors."
If only someone had told that microburst that it was not supposed to kill a nine-type-rating-carrying check airman + 2 instructors, all would have been well.
If only someone had told that microburst that it was not supposed to kill a nine-type-rating-carrying check airman + 2 instructors, all would have been well.
Gwinn and Kapustin's observations are spot on. Neither are idiots and neither were the crew of DL191. Watch the pilot in the sim handle the conditions in the doc. With the finger of fate pointing down at any one of you, I doubt you'll be so flippant if the time ever comes.
It's an incomplete assessment of the incident. The final report included none of Kapustin's observations and they were all valid points and Kapustin came to some of the same observations as the OP above. I suggest also reading "Fire and Rain" Quite a good account of the event.
Ok, dude the plane ahead was a Lear 25. He encountered a pretty nasty wind shear BUT did not report it.
Now, do you want to discuss if the DL 191 crew was wrekless or if they were operating at a high level of competence? That's a whole different discussion!
I do not think they were wreckless becasue they attempted to land through what one minute was a tall cloud, three minutes later a nasty nasty little cell and then shortly later, a gentle rainshower... The stars indeed aligned really bad for them.
And, a lot of untrained crews flew simulated flights through a simulated version of the wind shear and crashed.
However & Blame Gabriel for this....
Their screw up was that the first officer shoved nose down a bit too hard and then was a bit too wimply pulling back up.
Gabriel and I have argued about this before....I'm sure you are aware that the plane technically could have "out climbed" the downburst and not touched down nor taken out the car.
...in fact, modern flight crews, with improved training, only rarely crash from this simulation.
I argue that the pilot was in some pretty extreme turbulence and that lowering the nose a bit isn't neccesarily a stupid reaction...There's a factoid that this is the strongest wind shear ever recorded.
Gabe argues that he shoved over awfully darn hard and that the aircraft attitudes were not all that extremely nose-up...
My point is valid and his point is valid, but maybe he wins on this and that was their one big mistake.
One final comment- It's very easy in Microsoft Flight Sim to program in a 70 kt wind shear loss, kicking in between 400 and 600 ft AGL, load a tri-star/DC-10 and make an approach to 17L at DFW...
I won't argue that MSFS has wonderful accuracy...
BUT
...I will say that I found it very disturbing when I touched down a few thousand feet short of 17L...and of course, I KNEW IT WAS COMING!
Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
We process personal data about users of our site, through the use of cookies and other technologies, to deliver our services, personalize advertising, and to analyze site activity. We may share certain information about our users with our advertising and analytics partners. For additional details, refer to our Privacy Policy.
By clicking "I AGREE" below, you agree to our Privacy Policy and our personal data processing and cookie practices as described therein. You also acknowledge that this forum may be hosted outside your country and you consent to the collection, storage, and processing of your data in the country where this forum is hosted.
Comment