Spanair 5022 Off Runway In Madid on T/O

[Tanner_J]

No real details...

http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/20/plane.crash.madrid/index.html

[ultraflight]

7 dead it is feared and more injured. Fire in one engine on take off. (BBC TV)

[ultraflight]

Flight JK5022 destined to Gran Canaria. No info on type etc. Departure from "Terminal T4" (Radio Television Española)
A/C is an MD-80, runway = 36 (ABC newspaper website)

[tra738]

According to Dutch radio at least 7 people are dead and 20 are injured. Around 160 pax where on board the Spanair plane.
According to http://www.luchtvaartnieuws.nl/news/?id=27313 (sorry Dutch only) the plane was a MD-82.

Tra738

[delta092b]

Aircraft type MD-82. El Pais reporting 20 people dead.

[turbotraker]

Death toll has gone up to at least 21 (BBC)

[tra738]

Death toll has gone up to at least 21 (BBC)

http://headlines.nos.nl/ (dutch only) also reports at least 21 fatalities.

R.I.P

Tra738

[G-DALE]

Early reports state atleast 25 dead and 57 injured now :( The aircraft is an MD-82, reg. EC-HFP. The plane aborted first attempt at take off - returned to the gate for mechanical check.. on the second attempt reports of an explosion on engine no. 1, aircraft has come to rest between two runways.

[photoid=6274538]

[ultraflight]

Website by newspaper El Mundo now claims that 100 people have been killed. 21 people have been pulled from the A/C badly wounded. I fear for the rest of the 166 people on board.

[G-DALE]

Reports are now stating that all but 25 of 175 passengers are dead :(

[turbotraker]

I dare say there will be a few wild numbers given about casualties. Sky news are now reporting (from Spanish Emergency Services) that there are 25 survivors from the 173 passengers on board.

It is a sad day.:(

[Tbun]

One engine blew parts out thru the fuselage and took the other out? or... took the tail out.

Poor design again.

[turbotraker]

One engine blew parts out thru the fuselage and took the other out?
.


Nobody knows yet, I am sure they will want to get to the cause of this accident asap. There are 'reports' of an engine 'problem'.

[ultraflight]

file:///Users/mini/Library/Caches/TemporaryItems/moz-screenshot.jpgfile:///Users/mini/Library/Caches/TemporaryItems/moz-screenshot-1.jpgDrawing of the airport lay-out with the place of the accident. (El Pais)
<IMG SRC=http://www.jetphotos.net/user-uploads/20080820elpepusoc_6.jpg>

[JPL]

A Spanish airliner bound for the Canary Islands swerved off the runway and caught fire during takeoff from the Madrid airport......


http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080820/ap_on_re_eu/spain_airport_accident

[Tbun]

Ironic image on google earth at the airport. Follow the runway and an MD shadow is seen 'burnt' into the grass. :nonono:

[LX-A343]

Doesn't look good. Apparently many people died, but I won't post numbers, as they differ from source to source.

It was EC-HFP (http://www.jetphotos.net/showphotos.php?regsearch=ec-hfp)

Gerardo

[Alessandro]

Yes, left engine is supposed to have caught fire, the flight was also a codeshare flight with Lufthansa.

[C-FMWQ]

I was watching the news and apparently at least 45 people air dead and rest are injured. They were saying it was an engine fire on takeoff. here's the link from Spanair's website. There were 164 passengers and 9 crew members. The incident occurred at 14:45 Madrid time and 08:45 Eastern time

JK 5022 was an MD82 from Madrid to Palma de Majorca

http://www.spanair.com/web/en-gb/DSite/Last-official-notice/

RIP and Condolences to all the victims of JK 5022
C-FMWQ :(

[RingwaySam]

Terrible news. BBC now reporting 100+ have died. It just shows how lucky the passengers of the Air France A340 crash at Toronto and the British Airways 777 at London Heathrow were.

JK 5022 was an MD82 from Madrid to Palma de Majorca

The flight was flying to Las Palmas (Gran Canaria) in the Canary Islands.

[JPL]

147 killed from Yahoo:
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080820/ap_on_re_eu/spain_airport_accident

[pdeboer]

El Pais reporting 45 dead now, here is a link to their site, it is in Spanish but the images do not need a translation:
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/avion/estaba/todo/partido/todo/estaba/lleno/cuerpos/elpepuesp/20080820elpepunac_16/Tes

[ultraflight]

http://www.jetphotos.net/user-uploads/1219237335_extras_ladillos_2_g_0.jpg
From "El Mundo" website.

[Alessandro]

Swedish media claim, Danish, Norwegian, Spanish and Swedish citizens onboard, two passengers flew from Arlanda/Stockholm to connect with this flight.

[cegro27]

Reports now seem to converge on the number lost to be at least 140 pax...pretty terrible for an accident resulting from an engine fire/malfunction.

[O_K]

http://www.jetphotos.net/user-uploads/1219237335_extras_ladillos_2_g_0.jpg
From "El Mundo" website.

If these pictures are true they did not run out of runway, they turned of it for some reason. Could it support the theory that they were airborne?

[Airbus_A320]

Reports now seem to converge on the number lost to be at least 140 pax...pretty terrible for an accident resulting from an engine fire/malfunction.
Seems like the aircraft was airborne for a bit before it crashed, or at least had enough energy to cause an impact/fire that pretty much destroyed the whole thing, will be interesting to see what caused this.

[Dmmoore]

NBC is reporting the #1 engine began burning "AFTER" take off.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26309867/

I at a loss to explain this one from the available information.

[Alessandro]

Swedish media claim, 2 Swedish and 4 German citizens onboard.

[Steffen Koschlig]

Seems like the aircraft was airborne for a bit before it crashed, or at least had enough energy to cause an impact/fire that pretty much destroyed the whole thing, will be interesting to see what caused this.

I heard, that the aircraft has been 2 meters in the air, before chrashing onto the runway and breaking in some parts.

[philip]

German and Austrian media report that the aircraft did not leave the ground according to eye-witnesses. Other reports claim that the plane reached about 500 feet and impacted on ground at a high bank angle to the right after fire/explosion.

The wreckage was discribed as 'completely destroyed and burned out' and appearantely broken into two main pieces.

Swedish media claim, Danish, Norwegian, Spanish and Swedish citizens onboard....

Unconfirmed reports of at least 4 German citizens on board can be found on German news websites as well.

[keltic]

Hello from a traumatized country. I could tell you what my cousin saw this afternoon. She works in the airport, and saw how the crippled plane crashed. From the very beginning she knew that it was going to be something real nasty.

The plane had taken off, there was an engine fire or explosion (she is not sure about it) and it swinged to the right side. The engine problem was on the left one. So it crashed with the tip of the wing first, and then went down.

I wonder why a plane can crash just for an engine fire. It seems to be something trainned on and on in the simulators. Media is starting to be alarmist, and points out that this is not proper of a civilized country.

I have my doubts too.

[philip]

I wonder why a plane can crash just for an engine fire. It seems to be something trainned on and on in the simulators. Media is starting to be alarmist, and points out that this is not proper of a civilized country.


With so many contradicting reports on this tragic incident I would wait for further information before speculating.

[Alessandro]

One of the survivors is a Swedish female.

[Cam]

SKYNEWS (Don't know how good they are) have a picture up they said came from a video of the engine on fire?

But then again, who knows....it could just all be rubbish and there is really no photo.

DailyMail (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1047380/Up-150-tourists-killed-plane-breaks-skidding-runway-Madrid-airport.html)
with pictures from the area...don't know how credible they are. Seems like a lot of info right off the bat.

[HalcyonDays]

SKYNEWS (Don't know how good they are) have a picture up they said came from a video of the engine on fire?

But then again, who knows....it could just all be rubbish and there is really no photo.

DailyMail (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1047380/Up-150-tourists-killed-plane-breaks-skidding-runway-Madrid-airport.html)
with pictures from the area...don't know how credible they are. Seems like a lot of info right off the bat.

Sky News + Daily Mail = useless media. Don't bother with either of them. Don't even bother with the BBC when it comes to aviation. They are all truly useless. Stick with the various aviation discussion forums and specialist magazines.

[Alessandro]

Furthermore, at least one Dutch citizen reported to be onboard.

[Chris Kilroy]

SKYNEWS (Don't know how good they are) have a picture up they said came from a video of the engine on fire?

But then again, who knows....it could just all be rubbish and there is really no photo.

DailyMail (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1047380/Up-150-tourists-killed-plane-breaks-skidding-runway-Madrid-airport.html)
with pictures from the area...don't know how credible they are. Seems like a lot of info right off the bat.

Totally bogus. Unless the aircraft was repainted into the regular Spanair colors in the past two days (the last picture in Star colors that I've seen is from two days ago), it's a different plane. In fact, it looks like a relatively normal MD-80 departure with a bit of black smoke present.

[Spad13]

The plane had taken off, there was an engine fire or explosion (she is not sure about it) and it swinged to the right side. The engine problem was on the left one.

If the problem was in fact with the left engine, I would have expected the airplane to swing to the left, not right.

[Steffen Koschlig]

Totally bogus. Unless the aircraft was repainted into the regular Spanair colors in the past two days (the last picture in Star colors that I've seen is from two days ago), it's a different plane. In fact, it looks like a relatively normal MD-80 departure with a bit of black smoke present.

I wouldn't believe, that an aircraft, which drops later on off the runway (!) takes such a strong rate of climb, when it would have climbed out so as shown, the crash would have been ended much better i think.

[Cargo Runner]

Just in case anyone needs a contact number, such as friends and relatives of passengers on flight JK5022 they can contact the Spanair helpline on: +34 800 400 200.

Another sad day in aviation - RIP pax & crew of JK5022 :(

[turbotraker]

SKYNEWS (Don't know how good they are)

Not very

[ShyGnome]

If the problem was in fact with the left engine, I would have expected the airplane to swing to the left, not right.

I had been thinking same thing, tho not sure how dramatic the pull is on the tail mounted engines. Overcompensation during rotation? If the crash site is accurate on the page 1 posts, it is difficult for me to come up with a scenario that doesn't involve a bizarre chain of events, mechanical and human.

[Vishal Jolapara]

Just been speaking to a Spanish friend via whom i got these links.

Prayers............

Thumbnail/links deleted as per request.

[O_K]

Norwegian newspaper "Dagbladet" reports that the airplane made an emergency landing on the 16th of august, because of engine failure. Dagbladets source is the Aviation Herald http://aviationherald.com/h?article=40b4d53e&opt=0


Edit: Not the same plane, 16th EC-HFS and today EC-HFP. Should have checked before I posted, newspapers are never reliable

[keltic]

I had been thinking same thing, tho not sure how dramatic the pull is on the tail mounted engines. Overcompensation during rotation? If the crash site is accurate on the page 1 posts, it is difficult for me to come up with a scenario that doesn't involve a bizarre chain of events, mechanical and human.

I am thinking on the AA which lost the engine over Chicago. Lost left engine, tried to turn round to the left too, and stalled. So in case of engine failure, to which direction planes must turn in order to go back to the airport?.

Tail mountain engines could damage easily the rudder or elevator in the case of an explosion. Any possible chance to lose hydraulics?

[gdg9]

awful

[alanh]

In the AA case, the engine tearaway damaged the hydraulics to the slats on the left side, which then retracted. That, combined with a minimum speed climbout, caused the left wing to stall. The crew didn't get a warning because the single stickshaker was also powered by the engine that fell off.

It's unlikely something similar happened here -- I believe the MD-80 series has manual reversion so they'd have some amount of control even with no hydraulics. That doesn't rule out damage to the controls, though.

Another scenario to throw out is a late rejected takeoff -- engine fails at rotation and the pilot puts it back down, but can't avoid running off the end so he turns to avoid the approach lights.

[Airbus_A320]

I am thinking on the AA which lost the engine over Chicago. Lost left engine, tried to turn round to the left too, and stalled. So in case of engine failure, to which direction planes must turn in order to go back to the airport?.

Tail mountain engines could damage easily the rudder or elevator in the case of an explosion. Any possible chance to lose hydraulics?
The plane will go towards the side with the failed engine. IIRC the AA flight also had the slats on the left side retract uncommanded which made the problem worse, along with knocking out a bunch of instruments. I guess with tail mounted engines it's possible that a catastrophic failure could damage the tail/rudder or horizontal stabalizer. Lets wait for the investigation to see what really happened. Will be interesting to see what caused this.

[philip]

Another scenario to throw out is a late rejected takeoff -- engine fails at rotation and the pilot puts it back down, but can't avoid running off the end so he turns to avoid the approach lights.

I can not imagine this was the case. The plane attempted to depart from Europe's longest civil runway (4350m, 14200ft). Plenty of space for an MD-80 to abort take-off and stop safely even when very heavy.

Also most sources now report the plane actually was airborne.

Pictures from crash site:
http://www.elmundo.es/albumes/2008/08/20/accidente_spanair_barajas/index_1.html

[laroche spotters]

Hello administrators of Jetphotos.net
The Adinistrator of AviationCorner.net have remove the photos from his web page under request by relatives of the accident.
So, as a friend of him, i'd like to also request (under his name) to remove the tumbnails of this photos that aren't on the net now. This thumnail are in Vishal's post.
I'll talk to Vishal to apologize for any incovenience.
Best regards
Sorry
La Roche Spotters

RIP to all.

[E-Diddy!]

Another scenario to throw out is a late rejected takeoff -- engine fails at rotation and the pilot puts it back down, but can't avoid running off the end so he turns to avoid the approach lights.

I can't think of many places where swerving off to the edge of the runway is a better option than keeping going straight. At any rate, if the pilot were to swerve, it could be because of terrain at the end of the runway where swerving would keep him from going over the cliff, however in every circumstance of a high speed RTO, I can guarantee you the approach lights are going to be the last thing on the pilot's mind.

[Airbus_A320]

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080820/ap_on_re_eu/spain_airport_accident

Looks like the death toll went up even more. Really, it's amazing that anyone at all survived that considering that there is nothing left of the plane at all, and the impact must have been pretty severe.

[Rocky123]

This newspaper website (http://www.news.com.au/couriermail/gallery/0,23816,5033950-17382,00.html) in Australia has a huge gallery of pix from the Spanair crash. Really gives you an idea of the scale of the disaster. There are dozens of images in their report (http://www.news.com.au/couriermail/story/0,23739,24216861-952,00.html) as well as video.

[Gulfstream]

It doesn't get much worse than this ...
"Only the tail was recognizable, there was wreckage scattered all over the place and dead bodies across a wide area. A lot of them were children," Ervigio Corral, who headed the emergency services' rescue effort, told reporters.

Survivors were flung from the plane by the force of the impact and landed in a stream, saving them from more severe burns, Corral said.

153 killed in Madrid airport plane crash (http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSLK27234920080820?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews)

[LX-A343]

On a personal note, which I don't want to have mixed with the official JPnet guidelines:

What I find absolutely unacceptable is the behaviour of some photographers. Check the top24 of yesterday and you will find two photos of the crashed aircraft, taken a few days back, i.e. in other words: which don't have ANYTHING to do with the crash and don't give us any additional informations or whatever. These photos would have been average photos, with an average number of hits. Apparently some photogs thought, that uploading them with the context to a crash, would raise the chance of a high hit number.

THAT'S ABSOLUTELY APPALING!! Looking for cheap hits on the back of some 150 dead people!!

These are the moments, where I would like to be able to reach through the internet to have a few serious words

OK, end rant, sorry for that and back to the topic.

[G-DALE]

Gerardo,

In one sense I think it is understandable that a number of photographers upload their pictures of any stricken aircraft shortly after having been invloved in an accident.

I wouldn't always feel it's about the hits, more so the fact of dis-belief and the mind boggling thought that the aircraft is pictured just a matter of days, maybe a week or two before the accident and in the Madrid crash there's now barely anything left that is recognisable looking at the news pictures.

Just my two pence.

[Cargo Runner]

How very interesting to see all those incredible pictures, they really tell a story and in a way put you there, what more could you wish for. After working in the industry for so long I can imagine myself taking such pictures either by camera or camera-phone, to capture the moment..... nothing cruel to be gained just freezing time for future..... but it was while I was looking at this pictures I had a ery sense come over me, here we are wishing the families and loved ones ... our best wishes but what about the people working on the ground???? :uhoh:

Planes don't crash all the time and no matter what training or videos you watch nothing prepares you for a scene like the one those fire fighters, medical crews and airport workers saw in front of them yesterday. It would be nice if we just remembered these people as well, it might be part of their job but really we would not like to be confronted with some of the grueling sights they were confronted with. I am not even going to say what they must have seen before them but they are in my thoughts. Nothing can prepare us for that and I guess nobody gives a damn either, they just think it is all part of our everyday job :shock:

[AA 1818]

I, for one, would like to extend my condolensces to the families of those that have had to burden the loss of their loved ones. I wish that we can say, one day, that we will not loose another life to an accident. My heart and my mind goes out to those suffering the loss of loved ones. I think that the most heartbreaking view of these events were the black hearses leaivng the airport. I could not restrain the tears. To those in morning, I am not alone in saying - this was not a Spanish tragedy, nor a European one, but one that will be remembered and mourned by the world.

[gbasco]

Spanish press is saying the plane had to return to be checked by a machanic because the "intake temp reading" was high, but it was solved. It was cleared then and on the 2nd attempt of taking off it crashed.

Sorry, I translated directly I dont know if it is 100%.

RIP Crew and PAX of JK 5022.

[Steffen Koschlig]

Yes, the first reason to return to the gate should have been an defect temperatur indicator. The last general check of the plane was in january this year.

[Egil]

Maybe they pulled the wrong fire extinguisher? OK, not very probable, since they wouldn't do that so soon after TO, I guess?

Very sad accident.

[Foxtrot]

A front air intake valve had in fact overheated, and it seems the plane was on its second takeoff attempt.

Source: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080821/ap_on_re_eu/spain_airport_accident

R.I.P

[philip]

Hi Gerardo,

I understand your concerns but this makes me wonder why they were priority screened in first place if (part of) the JP crew does not feel good about it!? Can't really blame the photographers as they likely would have uploaded the shots anyway. And, I must admit I also contributed to the high number of hits of the photos in question without the intention of being disrespectful.

Sorry for the OT, again.

[Uncle Jay]

This thread is far worse than the Daily Mail, the Daily News, The National Enquirer, or the worst of cable TV coverage. Total misinformation from post number one, wild speculation, hyporcitical hand-wringing over The Horror, The Horror, and look at the visitor count today ? Our normally sleepy forum has 15 visitors on an average day, but today hundreds of ghoul rubberneckers oogling the virtual wreckage like a paparazzi festival around Paris Hilton's latest car wreck of a life. It was a dark and stormy night, what did you expect ?

Actually I wrote the above paragraph just to exercise my talents for the upcoming Paul Clifford Worst Writing Ever Contest.

[Cargo Runner]

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board said it will send investigators to assist in the inquiry.

WHY :confused: :confused: :confused: No disrespect (to the yanks) but surely Europe has enough Aviation Authorities and expertise in crash investigation to deal with this without the NTSB sticking their nose... :mad:

If I was a relative I would expect the Spanish CAA to deal with this in the first instance followed by some of their European counterparts, this would be like Japan saying they were sending a team in to help with the inquiry...

[Brenden S]

Seriously dont speculate until full facts are known. I give full credit to the emergency crews facing not only a aircraft accident but also a grass fire which would have been going like the clappers.

[Airbus_A320]

WHY :confused: :confused: :confused: No disrespect (to the yanks) but surely Europe has enough Aviation Authorities and expertise in crash investigation to deal with this without the NTSB sticking their nose... :mad:

If I was a relative I would expect the Spanish CAA to deal with this in the first instance followed by some of their European counterparts, this would be like Japan saying they were sending a team in to help with the inquiry...
Well, the aircraft was made in the United States, and the NTSB has a lot of experience, including one other major MD-80 crash. Maybe their input was requested. Which ever agency is investigating is probably the last thing on the minds of the victims/relatives.

[T.O.G.A.]

WHY :confused: :confused: :confused: No disrespect (to the yanks) but surely Europe has enough Aviation Authorities and expertise in crash investigation to deal with this without the NTSB sticking their nose... :mad:

If I was a relative I would expect the Spanish CAA to deal with this in the first instance followed by some of their European counterparts, this would be like Japan saying they were sending a team in to help with the inquiry...

No offense taken. It is an excellant question. Sometimes the NTSB is invited because they have expertise that may be helpful in addition to what the EU has. Sometimes they go to learn if this a systemic problem to be addressed in the US.

My gut tells me they can't be involved unless they are invited though.

[JordanD]

Regarding the pictures being uploaded after the crash, I don't really see a problem with people uploading the pictures after the crash. It is a strange feeling to have a picture of an aircraft that has crashed, especially when it was taken only a few days before the crash. I don't think it's all that appalling that the photographer would want to share the photo. I do, however, agree that it is sort of in bad taste to have it has a hot photo.

[Crunk415balla]

Regarding the pictures being uploaded after the crash, I don't really see a problem with people uploading the pictures after the crash. It is a strange feeling to have a picture of an aircraft that has crashed, especially when it was taken only a few days before the crash. I don't think it's all that appalling that the photographer would want to share the photo. I do, however, agree that it is sort of in bad taste to have it has a hot photo.
Yeah, I agree except for one thing. I think they have every right to make it a hot photo. People OBVIOUSLY would like to see shots of the aircraft involved, a hot photo is just a way for people to easily find these without typing in the reg number. Its been done for every other crash I can think of, yet its creating a shitstorm for this one. Why?

[AVION1]

First, my condolence to the families and friends. Second, I wonder if someone in here has the M.E.L. for that aircraft and if that valve can be defered as a D.M.I. in the maintenance logbook?
And also, this accident is similar to that American Airlines DC-10 in Chicago, loss of an engine, loss of hydraulic fluids (I assume this), aircraft airborne and veering to the side of the runway and crashing.
Again, we are just assuming things..

[Crunk415balla]

Lets not assume.

[scottkin]

Just curious if anyone may have any info on the Captain or the F.O. on this flight? Or who may have possibly been flying at the time?

[JordanD]

Just curious if anyone may have any info on the Captain or the F.O. on this flight? Or who may have possibly been flying at the time?
Why would it matter if the captain or FO was at the controls?

[jkstark]

WHY :confused: :confused: :confused: No disrespect (to the yanks) but surely Europe has enough Aviation Authorities and expertise in crash investigation to deal with this without the NTSB sticking their nose... :mad:

If I was a relative I would expect the Spanish CAA to deal with this in the first instance followed by some of their European counterparts, this would be like Japan saying they were sending a team in to help with the inquiry...

Fairly standard procedure to have representatives from the authorities of the nation that manufactured the airframe and / or engines. In this case, both the airframe and the engines were of US manufacture (Boeing and Pratt&Whitney), so having the NTSB there is not all that unusual, in addition to representatives from both Boeing and P&W.

At least that is hwat I've observed on most situations...

Kris

[scottkin]

Why would it matter if the captain or FO was at the controls?
Jordan it may matter at some point during the investigation. The reason I asked was I have heard speculation that the left wing clipped the runway shortly after liftoff. I realize that at rotation losing an engine can put even a VERY experienced captain in a precarious situation. I also realize that these pilots have trained for this situation many many times in the sim but some situations present themselves at the worst times and this seems like it may have been one of those times. JMHO

[jkstark]

From what I can tell, this aircraft had a tiller on the Captain's side only - not that it necessarily makes any difference as to who was PIC for this TO.

With regard to the other comments made about pictures of the aircraft in question, I think a great point is made by Chris Kilroy earlier in a post about the video that was posted supposedly of the takeoff of this AC. Looking at the pictures, it is clear that this AC had been repainted in Star Alliance colors somewhere between July 07 and February 08, and that as late as June 25, 08, the aircraft was still in StarAlliance colors. The AC in the video is not painted in StarAlliance colors, putting the entire video to question. It is highly unlikely that the AC would have been repainted again back to the old CS between then and now. Without the knowledge that so many pictures of the particular AC were available, that factor may not have been made so clear. As Chris also states, that particular still from the video does not appear to be unusual for a MD takeoff...

I would love to be able to hear Nav's input on this incident, though...

Kris

[jkstark]

Jordan it may matter at some point during the investigation. The reason I asked was I have heard speculation that the left wing clipped the runway shortly after liftoff. I realize that at rotation losing an engine can put even a VERY experienced captain in a precarious situation. I also realize that these pilots have trained for this situation many many times in the sim but some situations present themselves at the worst times and this seems like it may have been one of those times. JMHO

Just an observation as to the AC type - am I correct in thinking that a single engine out on the DC-9/MD-80/717 series does not in fact cause a significant amount of asymmetrical thrust, due to the placement of the engines so close to the centerline of the AC? I can imagine a certain amount of yaw, but not an amount comparable to underwing mounted engines. I also suspect that the roll component is going to be significantly lower as a result of the lower yaw.

It does appear from photographs that the engines have a slightly inward thrust angle as well - can anybody verify that?

Kris

[TaCA]

Could this have been caused by a bird ingestion? Which lead to a uncontained engine failure. Has this ever happen with the Super-80's or on any other plane with tail-mounted engines?

[AJ]

This thread is far worse than the Daily Mail, the Daily News, The National Enquirer, or the worst of cable TV coverage. Total misinformation from post number one, wild speculation, hyporcitical hand-wringing over The Horror, The Horror, and look at the visitor count today ? Our normally sleepy forum has 15 visitors on an average day, but today hundreds of ghoul rubberneckers oogling the virtual wreckage like a paparazzi festival around Paris Hilton's latest car wreck of a life. It was a dark and stormy night, what did you expect ?

Actually I wrote the above paragraph just to exercise my talents for the upcoming Paul Clifford Worst Writing Ever Contest.
Hi Jay, I think it is just human nature. As we moderate these threads we delete many distasteful posts, however generally they just seem to be a quest for knowledge from many different points of view.
Please let us know (this goes for everyone) if there is a post that you believe should be removed and we will review it.

[Spad13]

From what I can tell, this aircraft had a tiller on the Captain's side only - not that it necessarily makes any difference as to who was PIC for this TO.



Especially since the tiller is not normally used for takeoff.

[Spad13]

This thread is far worse than the Daily Mail, the Daily News, The National Enquirer, or the worst of cable TV coverage. Total misinformation from post number one, wild speculation, hyporcitical hand-wringing over The Horror, The Horror, and look at the visitor count today ? Our normally sleepy forum has 15 visitors on an average day, but today hundreds of ghoul rubberneckers oogling the virtual wreckage like a paparazzi festival around Paris Hilton's latest car wreck of a life. It was a dark and stormy night, what did you expect ?



This is true not exclusively of this thread, nor even exclusively of this forum.

[JordanD]

Could this have been caused by a bird ingestion? Which lead to a uncontained engine failure. Has this ever happen with the Super-80's or on any other plane with tail-mounted engines?
If you mean uncontained engine failures (not necessarily due to birdstrikes), then yes, it did happen on an Delta MD-88 in Pensacola in the 90s.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delta_Air_Lines_Flight_1288

[Tbun]

ITS only natural that when a plane is down, people want to see the wreckage.

All this holier than thou tripe is rather more sickening than anything I have seen in the available pictures.

[Gabriel]

Just an observation as to the AC type - am I correct in thinking that a single engine out on the DC-9/MD-80/717 series does not in fact cause a significant amount of asymmetrical thrust, due to the placement of the engines so close to the centerline of the AC?
That's correct. Shorter arm leads to smaller moment.

For general information: The MD-80 series uses hydraulic for flaps/slats actuation, landing gear retraction/extension, steering and elevator boost.

All primary flight controls are mechanical, including the elevator (the elevator is free-fly type with servo-tabs (meaning that small tabs move up and down and the aerodynamic forces on them move the elevator which is free to rotate about its hinges) The hydraulic boost is to help to push down in a stall recovery because, at past-stall AOAs, turbulence from the wing can render the servo-tabs ineffective.

That means that the crew would have kept full authority over the primary flight controls (elevator, rudder and aileron) after whatever hydraulic failure. And I don't know the system in detail, but I doubt that the slats would have self-retracted after any type of hydraulic failure near the engines. In the AA DC-10 accident, the slats did retract fut the failure was in the hydraulic line that feed the slats, upstream of the check valve that prevents the hydraulic fluid to dedepressurize in the event of an hydraulic failure. Not the case here.

All that said, it looks that no kind of hydraulic damage could have lead to this accident.

Sow I'd like to share some hypothesis that are around in the forums and what I think about them:

Uncontained engine failure:

The left engine had a major seizure with rotating (until then) parts flying away from it at very high speed. This case has several versions:

- The sharpnel damages the hydraulic lines rendering the ariplane uncontrolable: Already discussed. I highly doubt it.

- The shrpnel damages the elevator and/or rudder machanism, rendering the airplane uncontrolable: Possible, but probable? If they lost the rudder authority the airplane, with only the right engine producing thrust, should have veered to the left and not to the right, unless the damage was such that left the rudder actuated to the left. A problem with the elevator would have caused the airplane to pitch severily up, climb quite a bit, stall and fall (not compatible with what we know by now), or pitch down and contact the ground stright ahead, not to the right of the runway.

- The sharpnel flies through the fuselage and knoks-out the other engine too: That's something that can happen and has happened a few times. However, authority over the flight controls would have remained unaffected and nothing would have prevented the crew from performing a landing stright ahead, maybe departing the runway at the end. Not what happened.

- The sharpnel compromises the structural inegrity of the tail, which deforms rendering the airplane out of control: Looks unlikely to me. Sturcutres are requiered to be fail-safe to survive an engine brust. Remember Sioux City.

Other:

- Shutting down the good engine: Possible, it has happened before too. However, not probable for the same reasons as the doble engine failure above.

- Some of the above combined with crew failing to perform flawless in a moment of high stress (due to a severe emergency in the most critical phase of the flight) and 100% human performance requiered (due to the same reasons). Cannot be discarded.

[Spad13]

That's correct. Shorter arm leads to smaller moment.

For general information: The MD-80 series uses hydraulic for flaps/slats actuation, landing gear retraction/extension, steering and elevator boost.

All primary flight controls are mechanical, including the elevator (the elevator is free-fly type with servo-tabs (meaning that small tabs move up and down and the aerodynamic forces on them move the elevator which is free to rotate about its hinges) The hydraulic boost is to help to push down in a stall recovery because, at past-stall AOAs, turbulence from the wing can render the servo-tabs ineffective.

That means that the crew would have kept full authority over the primary flight controls (elevator, rudder and aileron) after whatever hydraulic failure. And I don't know the system in detail, but I doubt that the slats would have self-retracted after any type of hydraulic failure near the engines. In the AA DC-10 accident, the slats did retract fut the failure was in the hydraulic line that feed the slats, upstream of the check valve that prevents the hydraulic fluid to dedepressurize in the event of an hydraulic failure. Not the case here.

All that said, it looks that no kind of hydraulic damage could have lead to this accident.

Sow I'd like to share some hypothesis that are around in the forums and what I think about them:

Uncontained engine failure:

The left engine had a major seizure with rotating (until then) parts flying away from it at very high speed. This case has several versions:

- The sharpnel damages the hydraulic lines rendering the ariplane uncontrolable: Already discussed. I highly doubt it.

- The shrpnel damages the elevator and/or rudder machanism, rendering the airplane uncontrolable: Possible, but probable? If they lost the rudder authority the airplane, with only the right engine producing thrust, should have veered to the left and not to the right, unless the damage was such that left the rudder actuated to the left. A problem with the elevator would have caused the airplane to pitch severily up, climb quite a bit, stall and fall (not compatible with what we know by now), or pitch down and contact the ground stright ahead, not to the right of the runway.

- The sharpnel flies through the fuselage and knoks-out the other engine too: That's something that can happen and has happened a few times. However, authority over the flight controls would have remained unaffected and nothing would have prevented the crew from performing a landing stright ahead, maybe departing the runway at the end. Not what happened.

- The sharpnel compromises the structural inegrity of the tail, which deforms rendering the airplane out of control: Looks unlikely to me. Sturcutres are requiered to be fail-safe to survive an engine brust. Remember Sioux City.

Other:

- Shutting down the good engine: Possible, it has happened before too. However, not probable for the same reasons as the doble engine failure above.

- Some of the above combined with crew failing to perform flawless in a moment of high stress (due to a severe emergency in the most critical phase of the flight) and 100% human performance requiered (due to the same reasons). Cannot be discarded.

Most of your theories require that there, in fact, was an uncontained failure, which we don't know if that was the case just yet.

As for shutting down the good engine, I doubt they had a chance to shut anything down, especially if Spanair's procedures (like most) require all checklists to be held until 1,000 AAE.

[scottkin]

[

- Some of the above combined with crew failing to perform flawless in a moment of high stress (due to a severe emergency in the most critical phase of the flight) and 100% human performance requiered (due to the same reasons). Cannot be discarded.[/QUOTE]

Great post Gabriel. I completely agree that one of the above mentioned factors very well may of played a roll in this accident. "most critical phase" . As I mentioned in a previous post, even the most experienced captains will have their hands full. Throw another scenario into play and you very well may have a disaster like yesterdays tragedy.

[screaming_emu]

Reading all this blatant, baseless, speculation makes my brain hurt.

RIP to all involved.

Fly safe

[AVION1]

I am trying to remember of any accident like this one, and the only one I have in mind is the DC-9 crash in Wisconsin several years ago, engine fire, loss of power and the airplane veered into a wooden area, all of this during take-off. I believe the airplane was an ex-Avensa airline plane purchased by one of those low-cost carriers.

[Spad13]

I am trying to remember of any accident like this one, and the only one I have in mind is the DC-9 crash in Wisconsin several years ago, engine fire, loss of power and the airplane veered into a wooden area, all of this during take-off. I believe the airplane was an ex-Avensa airline plane purchased by one of those low-cost carriers.

I believe you mean this one:

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001214X37757&key=1

[Vnav]

To correct a few things....

The rudder on the MD80 is normally hydraulically powered. With the Rudder Power Control Lever in manual, it can be flown mechanically with only minor limitations in landing procedure.

While the moment arm of tail mounted engines may be less than wing mounted engines, trust me that the yawing moment incurred during single engine ops is significant enough at high thrust settings like takeoff power.

[Gabriel]

To correct a few things....

The rudder on the MD80 is normally hydraulically powered. With the Rudder Power Control Lever in manual, it can be flown mechanically with only minor limitations in landing procedure.

While the moment arm of tail mounted engines may be less than wing mounted engines, trust me that the yawing moment incurred during single engine ops is significant enough at high thrust settings like takeoff power.

Thanks for the correction about the rudder control system. Does it mean that in case of loss of hydro a manual task (setting the Rudder Control Lever to Manual) has to be acomplished to change the rudder from hydro to mechanical and meanwhile you have no rudder authority, or it reverts automatically?

About the yawing moment, I didn't mean to say that the yawing moment was not significant. Only that it is smaller than on wing mounted engines (at the same thrust, of course). Of course that the higher the yawing moment the more authority the rudder has to have to comply with the "critical engine out" requierements for contrability. That means that, even if the moment is smaller than in wing mounted engines, it may be necesary an equally large rudder input from the pilot to arrest it.

[blueline]

If instead of beeing a river in the middle of the two runways it would be all the ground plain, the plain would have been going over the ground until stop or maybe explode but probably not caused many many deaths.

In the first images of the accident it is possible to see many of the casualties cover sheets put beside the river, and fuel might went to the river course as it flows like the water killing many people without possibility of saving them, maybe if the ground would have been plain the airplane would have run over and roll and many things but not dead many people.

I personally don't find too safe that between the runways of an airport having a river and the small valley which can become a tomb in case of an accident of that kind. Even the emergency services were unable to arrive to the places in first moment after the fire extinguished due to the morphology of the terrain! And that in the middle of a 6B+ euros airport made a couple years ago!

First images of the site:

http://www.antena3noticias.com/PortalA3N/noticia/espana/aficionado-graba-los-minutos-posteriores-accidente/2273972

If you have Google Earth put 40 31 37.13 N 3 34 04.29 w and you will see that there is a difference of about 15 meters between the level of the runway and the point about where the airplane fell just few meters beside the runway, do you think is it safe?

I've flight many times with spanair and I did that flight from madrid to Gran Canaria twice times + the return one four times in total with that company and one time when the plane (an MD82) was in the ground taxiing, there began to flow some kind of white smoke inside the cabin more on the back of the plane and many people began to scream! :P I noticed that in almost all the flights I've taken on md planes but not other planes, is it normal?

And another curiosity, last year I flight in the same Qantas airplane which had a hole while flying :P

Well, just questioning!
Bye bye!

[Quench]

from
http://www.airdisaster.com/news/article.php?id=31


Spanair spokesman Javier Mendoza said a valve was reported overheating in the front of the plane under the cockpit and technicians corrected the problem by turning it off. Mendoza said the device is not on a list of equipment that has to be functional for a plane to take off. He told a news conference that turning off such a device in these circumstances is an accepted procedure.


so clearly the valve had nothing to do with the engine.
I assume that by valve overheating it means the motor that operates the valve overheated. What kind of air intake valve is not needed?

Anyone know if the PAX were deboarded while the valve problem was investigated ?
I ask because it is quite hot in spain this time of year, maybe the engine was running all the time they were waiting so as to run the air conditioning. Which might be a factor.

[AVION1]

I believe you mean this one:

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001214X37757&key=1
YES, THAT IS THE ONE..!!!..I AM OLD AND SOMETIMES I CAN NOT REMEMBER THE NAME OF THE COMPANY OR PLACES. THANKS. HERE IS A COPY AND PASTE OF THE ACCIDENT REPORT:
====================
DRG TAKEOFF, THE ACFT (MIDWEST EXPRESS FLT 105) WAS CLIMBING THRU ABOUT 450' AGL WHEN THERE WAS A LOUD NOISE AS THE RGT ENG FAILED. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE ACFT ENTERED A STEEP DSCNT & CRASHED IN AN APRX 90 DEG, RGT WING LOW, ATTITUDE. AN INV REVEALED THAT THE 9TH TO 10TH STAGE, HI PRESSURE COMPRESSOR SPACER IN THE RGT ENG HAD FAILED. THERE WAS EVIDENCE THEFAILURE WAS PRECIPITATED BY A FATIGUE CRACK IN 1 OF THE 2 KNIFE EDGES ON THE SPACER. INITIALLY, CORRECT (LEFT) RUDDER RESPONSE WAS USED TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS OF POWER IN THE RGT ENG, BUT ABOUT 4 TO 5 SEC LATER, RGT RUDDER DEFLECTION OCCURRED. APRX 10 SEC AFTER THE RGT ENG FAILED, THE ACFT STALLED & WENT OUT OF CONTROL. ALSO, ABOUT 1.5 SEC AFTER THE INITIAL RGT ENG FAILURE, THERE WAS A REDUCTION IN THE LEFT ENG'S RPM, & SUBSEQUENTLY, THE ENG COMPRESSOR STALLED AFTER THE ACFT WENT OUT OF CONTROL & WAS DSCNDG IN AN UNUSUAL ATTITUDE. HOWEVER, THE REDUCTION OF POWER IN THE LEFT ENG WAS NOT CONSIDERED SIGNIFICANT TO THE LOSS OF CONTROL. NEITHER PLT VERBALLY IDENTIFIED THE EMERG CONDITION DRG THE SEQUENCE.

[Uncle Jay]

If the elevator in MD-80 series is controlled by a servo tab, I guess we can remove all those troublesome jack screws which arent needed any more, eh ?

[screaming_emu]

If the elevator in MD-80 series is controlled by a servo tab, I guess we can remove all those troublesome jack screws which arent needed any more, eh ?

Sarcasm?

[Dmmoore]

Could this have been caused by a bird ingestion? Which lead to a uncontained engine failure. Has this ever happen with the Super-80's or on any other plane with tail-mounted engines?

When someone ask "COULD" such & such happen, the answer almost always has to be "YES"!

The chance of the event being caused by bird ingestion is very small. It has happened but not often.

[Dmmoore]

ITS only natural that when a plane is down, people want to see the wreckage.

All this holier than thou tripe is rather more sickening than anything I have seen in the available pictures.

I have no problem with the posting of crash photo's unless they show seriously injured passengers or human remains. I have a problem when a poster attempts to post something humorous that turns out to be inappropriate.

I have no problem with any question posed by a poster for the purpose of gaining a better understanding of the incident / operation of the aircraft.

[Dmmoore]

Thanks for the correction about the rudder control system. Does it mean that in case of loss of hydro a manual task (setting the Rudder Control Lever to Manual) has to be acomplished to change the rudder from hydro to mechanical and meanwhile you have no rudder authority, or it reverts automatically?

About the yawing moment, I didn't mean to say that the yawing moment was not significant. Only that it is smaller than on wing mounted engines (at the same thrust, of course). Of course that the higher the yawing moment the more authority the rudder has to have to comply with the "critical engine out" requierements for contrability. That means that, even if the moment is smaller than in wing mounted engines, it may be necesary an equally large rudder input from the pilot to arrest it.

Gabriel,
When hydro power is lost, the rudder "REVERTS" to manual. The flight crew is alerted to the condition but no action is necessary.

Your statement on yaw is correct.

[jkstark]

I have no problem with the posting of crash photo's unless they show seriously injured passengers or human remains. I have a problem when a poster attempts to post something humorous that turns out to be inappropriate.

I've not seen anything here that is, in my mind, inappropriate. However, I do think that some of the media coverage has had pictures of victims that have truly bordered on the tasteless side...

[Dmmoore]

If the elevator in MD-80 series is controlled by a servo tab, I guess we can remove all those troublesome jack screws which arent needed any more, eh ?

To head off 7,256+ questions. :p
The screw jack moves the stabilizer which fine tunes pitch control. The elevator makes quicker pitch adjustments using aerodynamic forces.
The screw jack uses two different electric drives.

[scottkin]

http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-08-21-Spain-plane_N.htm

It also looks like there is a video out on the takeoff that's not bugus. From what I have read, there was no engine expolsion contrary to eyewitness reports.

[Dohc]

Could this have been caused by a bird ingestion? Which lead to a uncontained engine failure. Has this ever happen with the Super-80's or on any other plane with tail-mounted engines?

Normally, bird ingestion of a turbine does not cause jet engine explosions, but probably would produce losses of important mechanical parts of the turbine, that, with those high r.p.m., would to impact at high speed on critical hidraulic mechanisms on the aircraft tail, especially if the engines are placed closely together to the back, like occurs in case of a MD-82.

Look at these videos:

http://es.youtube.com/watch?v=mthiIOhCUSE
http://es.youtube.com/watch?v=y2OS2pwrZTI&NR

Moreover, I suppose only authorities' investigations may find what happened to the occurrence of the disaster, but engine's bird ingestion doesn't seem the cause in this case.

Sorry if my english isn't quite well.
Regards

[Gabriel]

Normally, bird ingestion of a turbine does not cause jet engine explosions, ...
No, but it can likely cause engine surges / compressor stalls that could be easily mistaken with explosions (they make Bang! and throw fire)
...but probably would produce losses of important mechanical parts of the turbine, ...
I don't remember bird ingestions that caused uncontained damage. On the other hand. All uncontained damages I remember where the result of a material failure like a crack which broke not a blade but a whole fan, compressor or turbine disk.
...that, with those high r.p.m., would to impact at high speed on critical hidraulic mechanisms on the aircraft tail
Like what?

[Cargo Runner]

http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-08-21-Spain-plane_N.htm

It also looks like there is a video out on the takeoff that's not bogus. From what I have read, there was no engine explosion contrary to eyewitness reports.

MSN news also says that the fire occurred once the plane hit the ground and that earlier reports of the plane traveling down the runway with the/an engine exploding/on fire now seem to be ruled out as well.

Looking at some of the photo's closer to or around the crash site shows what terrible conditions the emergency crews had to face and how awful for them to have to go into the area in those conditions. I know I have said it before but those guys (and maybe girls) deserve a big pat on the back for doing an extremely unpleasant job.

[delta092b]

The BBC reported some survivor comments:

SURVIVOR LIGIA PALOMINO


Ligia Palomino, a 41-year-old doctor, was one of the 19 survivors of Spanair flight JK 5022. "The plane was rocking from one side to another. Then I began to suspect we would crash. I don't know what happened next. I saw people, smoke, explosions - I think that is what woke me up because I had lost consciousness. "


AP also reported:

Canary Islands regional president Paulino Rivero said after meeting with Spain's prime minister, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, that the latter has seen [a] video and described it as showing the plane using up all the runway as it tried to take off, then never reaching adequate altitude.

[Leftseat86]

The BBC reported some survivor comments:

SURVIVOR LIGIA PALOMINO


Ligia Palomino, a 41-year-old doctor, was one of the 19 survivors of Spanair flight JK 5022. "The plane was rocking from one side to another. Then I began to suspect we would crash. I don't know what happened next. I saw people, smoke, explosions - I think that is what woke me up because I had lost consciousness. "


AP also reported:

Canary Islands regional president Paulino Rivero said after meeting with Spain's prime minister, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, that the latter has seen [a] video and described it as showing the plane using up all the runway as it tried to take off, then never reaching adequate altitude.


Incredibly eye opening stuff.

I don't see how the plane could use all the runway available when the crash site is about 1/3 way from the end.

[Cargo Runner]

What would cause the plane to 'rock from side to side'?

Could the undercarraige have suffered a collapse?

Does this model have pins put in the landing gear when on the deck?

[Leftseat86]

What would cause the plane to 'rock from side to side'?

Could the undercarraige have suffered a collapse?

Does this model have pins put in the landing gear when on the deck?


I think it would be best to stop speculating based on reports from people who have no idea what they're talking about.

Even if I was on that plane I don't think my view out of a 9 inch porthole would yield anything substantial.

The CVR and FDR are going to yield volumes...

[Gabriel]

The BBC reported some survivor comments:

SURVIVOR LIGIA PALOMINO


Ligia Palomino, a 41-year-old doctor, was one of the 19 survivors of Spanair flight JK 5022. "The plane was rocking from one side to another. Then I began to suspect we would crash. I don't know what happened next. I saw people, smoke, explosions - I think that is what woke me up because I had lost consciousness. "


AP also reported:

Canary Islands regional president Paulino Rivero said after meeting with Spain's prime minister, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, that the latter has seen [a] video and described it as showing the plane using up all the runway as it tried to take off, then never reaching adequate altitude.
Reminds me of an accident where an MD-80 crashed shortly after take-off when it hit a light pole in a nearby parking lot, and where all but a 4 years old girl were killed. In that case a number of mistakes and incredible bad luck coincided to set up the disaster. The crew forgot to set the flaps/slats for take-off, and then missed to check the flaps/slats in their before take-off checklist. The takeoff configuration warning should have advised them of that problem as soon as they advenced the throttles for take-off, fut that warning system failed too in a way that was never fully understood. Immediatly after rortation the stall warning trigged. The stall warning of the MD-80 has three stages: First the stick pusher advises of the proximity of the stall, if the condition deteriorates a horn, a light that reads "stall" and the sound of the word Stall! anounce tht the aircraft is actually at or beyond the very boundary of the stall with no further margin. If the situation doesnt improve quickly the stick pusher kicks in and commands full nose down despite the opinion of the pilot. However, this last step works only if the slats are extended, which was not the case. The crew thought that they had encountered a windshear, and commanded the elvator to be in the limit of the stall warning (the second stage) with the alarms going intermitently on and off. They had been trained that in that way the airplane was flying at its max lift condition, what is true only at the very boundary of the stall. Fellow pilots at the airline al agreed that they would have applied the same procedure to fly out of a windshear. However what you are doing is going alternativelly into and out of the stall, which adds a lot of drag and reduces the average lift. And it has other side effects: At very high angles of attack (in the limit of the stall) the roll authority is highly reduced while the adverse yaw is highly increased and, worst of all, the roll damp is nearly gone for good, which means that once the airplane starts rolloing it won't stop by simply centering the ailerons, but you have to apply a good bunch of opposite aileron to stop the roll. That make for some ugly handling characteristics where pilot induced oscilations are nearly unavoidable, unless you have trained flying in that condition. And things still get worse: Roll control is achieved by the ailerons and augmented by roll spoilers. The large and continous roll inputs that tha pilots applied to try to control the airplane as it rolled greatly from side to side made the roll spoilers be deflected most of the time, which only added more drag and substracted more lift from an already marginal condition. In the end they didn't manage to build any additional airspeed and barely climbed with the airplane rocking from side to side until they struck the light pole. As I understand it, today it's agreed that the best procedure when maximum lift performance is needed is to fly at an AOA in the limit of the stick pusher (so it kiks in and out alternatively). In this way you have about the same lift, less drag, more roll authority and more roll damp, which means less roll input, less roll spoiler deployments and again less drag. Trials in flight simulators and performance calculations showed that the airplane did exactly what it should have done given the inputs, and that flying in the boundary of the stick shaker would have made for a safe take-off and climb, clearing obstacles and gaining speed, despite the flaps and slats being retracted.

Now I think that the airplane rocking from side to side is a clear cue tht the airplane might have stalled or be flying in the limit of the stall. I think that the chances that the crew fails to set the slats/flaps for take-off and then fails to detect that in the before take-off checklist, and the take-off configuration warning fails to work, all in the same event, are too remote for two occurrences within one million years. But there could be other reasons that led the stall, like for some reason a thrust available that was less than required (an engine failure alone is not enough to explain this) with the pilots fixated to complete the take-off, or too much pitch up in a condition where th thrust was lower than normal, like an engine failure.

[Gabriel]

I think it would be best to stop speculating based on reports from people who have no idea what they're talking about.

Even if I was on that plane I don't think my view out of a 9 inch porthole would yield anything substantial.
No? I'm sure I'd be able to clearly detect a rocking from one side to the other, explosions and smoke, despite the 9 inch window.

And what's wrong with speculation in an internet discusion forum?
Or do you propose that one should keep from posting in this thread until the final report is made public, except to post factual information which at this stage is barely anything but "a Spanair MD-80 crashed during take-off at Barajas"?

[Cargo Runner]

I think it would be best to stop speculating ...

I was only asking a question, no speculating at all... not my job to surmise

[Spad13]

To head off 7,256+ questions. :p
The screw jack moves the stabilizer which fine tunes pitch control. The elevator makes quicker pitch adjustments using aerodynamic forces.
The screw jack uses two different electric drives.

For extensive reading on MD-80 series H-stab trim system, read the NTSB report for AS261.

[Spad13]

The stall warning of the MD-80 has three stages: First the stick pusher advises of the proximity of the stall, if the condition deteriorates a horn, a light that reads "stall" and the sound of the word Stall! anounce tht the aircraft is actually at or beyond the very boundary of the stall with no further margin. If the situation doesnt improve quickly the stick pusher kicks in and commands full nose down despite the opinion of the pilot.

I believe you meant to say that the stick shaker, not pusher, activates first.

[Vnav]

The stall warning of the MD-80 has three stages: First the stick pusher advises of the proximity of the stall, if the condition deteriorates a horn, a light that reads "stall" and the sound of the word Stall! anounce tht the aircraft is actually at or beyond the very boundary of the stall with no further margin. If the situation doesnt improve quickly the stick pusher kicks in and commands full nose down despite the opinion of the pilot. However, this last step works only if the slats are extended, which was not the case.

This description is fairly close, but the number of "stages" to the stallwarning system depends on the flap/slat configuration. Assuming a normal takeoff config of flaps 11, the first thing that happens is 'autoslat extension' where the slats move automatically from the midsealed position to fully extended. The next stage is the stick shaker followed by the aural/visual warnings and finally the stick pusher. The stick pusher will stop once it feels an unload of .6g, but it can be manually overridden by the pilots or it can be turned off completely simply by pushing the STICK PUSHER INHIBIT lights on the glareshield.

[scottkin]

Any thoughts on this one Nav?

[AVION1]

What would cause the plane to 'rock from side to side'?



Does this model have pins put in the landing gear when on the deck?
I still remember a mechanic that got fired because of it..!!! the 727-200 aborted take-off and the F/O was shaking and crying. Oh well..those old days..!!

[Gabriel]

I believe you meant to say that the stick shaker, not pusher, activates first.
Yes, I meant stick shaker first, visual/aural second, and stick pusher third (only with slats extended). I forgot about the autoslats as mentioned by Vnav. I thought that the stick pusher force was greater than the pilot's strength so he could not override it. And I knew there was some way to turn of the stick pusher.

I just want to clarify that my understanding (or lack of) of the MD-80 systems comes only from reading (not recently) NTSB reports and some other internet resources (ok, I confess, and also from using the Mad Dog add-on on MSFS). So it's sure that while I may be more or less on track, there will be mistakes.

I highly appreciate the corrections by the experts.

[Vnav]

Gabriel

Your understanding of the MD80 stall warning system was fine...and if you're interpreting it from the NW accident in DTW where the slats were supposedly not extended, then neither the autoslats nor the stick pusher would have been a factor

[Theoddkiwi]

The crew forgot to set the flaps/slats for take-off, and then missed to check the flaps/slats in their before take-off checklist.

Think you could be on to something there. After a return to gate, crews can feel pressured to get going again especially if they are behind schedule, so perhaps a failure to redo their check lists completely ment they missed something. Though not setting flaps would not help your cause, there are a few other things they may have forgot or skimmed over in haste.

Then combine that with an engine failure and then things start to get pretty messy

Have been on a few return to gates and always thought it was funny that the attendents would always re do the passenger safety brief even though they had just done it a few minutes before.

As the saying goes "Better to be safe than sorry" and the Flight Crew should be just as vigilant.

[Alessandro]

So how long had the crew worked for during the fatal day?

[TaCA]

http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2008/08/200882295356700354.html

[Dmmoore]

For extensive reading on MD-80 series H-stab trim system, read the NTSB report for AS261.

:shock: Really!
I have most of that one memorized.
I was a consultant in that one.

[scottkin]

:shock: Really!
I have most of that one memorized.
I was a consultant in that one.

Don, For some odd reason that accident seems to bother me more then most. I can't imagine the horror every person on board went through.

[Leftseat86]

No? I'm sure I'd be able to clearly detect a rocking from one side to the other, explosions and smoke, despite the 9 inch window.

And what's wrong with speculation in an internet discusion forum?
Or do you propose that one should keep from posting in this thread until the final report is made public, except to post factual information which at this stage is barely anything but "a Spanair MD-80 crashed during take-off at Barajas"?

Maybe you would, however we have absolutely no idea in the slightest whether that guy was talking about anything relative to the accident. Regular people flying on airplanes often have no idea what the difference between normal and abnormal is, and after a crash it is likely he would interpret anything as a sign of impending doom.

I'm just saying that the info from those two accounts yields nothing more to further any speculation at all.

We're still all basically going off "a Spanair MD-80 crashed during take-off at Barajas" and the location of the crash.

[Dmmoore]

Don, For some odd reason that accident seems to bother me more then most. I can't imagine the horror every person on board went through.

True but let's remain on topic. Spanair.

[blueline]

We're still all basically going off "a Spanair MD-80 crashed during take-off at Barajas" and the location of the crash.

I think we can also state that the plane ran all the runway before trying to take off as I heard on the news the pilot of another plane said that to the copilot.

[AVION1]

Anyone know where is the Outside Temperature probe located in the MD-80? is that near the windshield?, does it has an anti-ice heating element?, because as far as I know the mechanic "disconnected" it and placed it as a D.M.I. on the maintenance logbook and cleared the discrepancy as per the MEL. I wonder if this probe got lose and ingested by one of the engines?

[Theoddkiwi]

Anyone know where is the Outside Temperature probe located in the MD-80? is that near the windshield?, does it has an anti-ice heating element?, because as far as I know the mechanic "disconnected" it and placed it as a D.M.I. on the maintenance logbook and cleared the discrepancy as per the MEL. I wonder if this probe got lose and ingested by one of the engines?

When you "Disconnect" these things its usually pulling and collering a Circuit Breaker or disconnecting a plug, rather than disconnecting a probe. and they are pretty well stick onto the aircraft unless there is physical damage to the probe, in which case it would probably get replaced rather than disabled.

Is the MD-80 FADEC? Though a loss of temp data to the engines would not cause one to fail

[Tbun]

Surprised the video of takeoff hasn't been released yet.

[Gabriel]

When you "Disconnect" these things its usually pulling and collering a Circuit Breaker or disconnecting a plug, rather than disconnecting a probe. and they are pretty well stick onto the aircraft unless there is physical damage to the probe, in which case it would probably get replaced rather than disabled.

Is the MD-80 FADEC? Though a loss of temp data to the engines would not cause one to fail
Vnav please correct me, but I think the MD-80 is not FADEC equipped.
However it does have something called Thrust Rate Computer (TRC), or something like that, which, in function of the air data (and mainly the outside air temperature), calculates and displays the target EPR for the phase of flight selected on the TRC.
If the autothrottle is on, in certain modes (not in speed/match hold) it will move the thrust levers to make the actual EPR match the one calculated and diplayed bay the TRC.

For example for take off you select T/O (take-off) on the TRC and it displays the traget take off EPR in function of the outside air temperature, just before starting the take off roll you press the TOGA buttons and the flight director system configures for take-off (initial climb pitch and runway heading). It also configures the autothrottle (still dissarmed) for maintaining the take off EPR. Then you advance the throttle to a somehow high EPR, arm the autothrottle and it will make the fine tunning of setting and maintaining the thrust for take off EPR. What would happen at this stage if the outside air temperature is false I don't know.

[Spad13]

Vnav please correct me, but I think the MD-80 is not FADEC equipped.
However it does have something called Thrust Rate Computer (TRC), or something like that, which, in function of the air data (and mainly the outside air temperature), calculates and displays the target EPR for the phase of flight selected on the TRC.
If the autothrottle is on, in certain modes (not in speed/match hold) it will move the thrust levers to make the actual EPR match the one calculated and diplayed bay the TRC.

For example for take off you select T/O (take-off) on the TRC and it displays the traget take off EPR in function of the outside air temperature, just before starting the take off roll you press the TOGA buttons and the flight director system configures for take-off (initial climb pitch and runway heading). It also configures the autothrottle (still dissarmed) for maintaining the take off EPR. Then you advance the throttle to a somehow high EPR, arm the autothrottle and it will make the fine tunning of setting and maintaining the thrust for take off EPR. What would happen at this stage if the outside air temperature is false I don't know.

Not all MD-80s are A/T equipped (I don't know if the accident aircraft was). Regardless, as you said, A/T would only fine-tune the thrust setting within 1-2% N1, so even if there was an A/T malfunction and the N1 was off by 1-2%, I don't imagine that would have caused the crash.

[andrasz]

I think we can also state that the plane ran all the runway before trying to take off as I heard on the news the pilot of another plane said that to the copilot.

No we can't. The plane started to veer off the runway centerline at around 3/4 rwy length, and all reports indicate it was airborne by then. The wreck location is actually within the threshld distance.

So far fact, rest deduction:

To me it appears that the crew never realised what hit them. Even at the point of liftoff they had enough runway left (1000 metres) for an abort. However they went up, but never gained altitude and the plane settled down - this means either not enough thrust for the selected configuration, or not enough lift for the selected thrust. Time will tell...

[Dani]

Hi all,
first post just to add a few things that have been under discussion in Spanish forums but I cannot find here.

1. Reports from a pilot suggest the a/c wheels are marked just beside the right side of the runway meaning that the plane took off but went back to the ground before leaving the runway. Over 10oo metres of excursion off runway that ended due to a small canyon driving a small river. Most probably the heigth of the canyon caused the fatal destroy and final explosion.

2. Reports from people at the scene postcrash: aroud 100 metres in the 100 metres trip outside of the runway, it was found the tail cone (almost intact) and rear part of #1 with its reverse in the closed position.
At the end of the runway trip, they discovered the #2 with the reverse in the deployed position, which I do believe is an extremely important fact.

With the facts in hand we know:
- The a/c was able to do it up to V1 without trouble, because if not, pilot would have aborted.
- Some event made the a/c leave the runway by the right side (airport video discards an explosion in engine).

My guess, everything OK up to V1, from that point thrust does not respond to pilot request, who has to enlarge the take-off space, but then, around Vr, probably with NLG up, an event takes place that takes the a/c out of the runway (tyre burst or uncommanded deploy of reverse #2 or commanded reverse but #1 fails to deploy in a late decision to brake, or....)

As posted in some posts before a/c still had between 500 and 1000 meters of runway, but stayed in runway 1000 to 1500 meters longer than usually required by MD82.

Some expert in MD reverse functioning could "destroy" my theory?. Maybe the crash deployed it?.

If you are interested I will try to translate the reports to english which may be key elements for discussion awaiting official reports.

[Quench]

Hi all,
2. Reports from people at the scene postcrash: aroud 100 metres in the 100 metres trip outside of the runway, it was found the tail cone (almost intact) and rear part of #1 with its reverse in the closed position.
At the end of the runway trip, they discovered the #2 with the reverse in the deployed position, which I do believe is an extremely important fact.


Oh boy an uncommanded thrust reverser would certianly do it ! :-(
Or you try to abort using the thrust reversers and only one deploys


With the facts in hand we know:
- The a/c was able to do it up to V1 without trouble, because if not, pilot would have aborted.
- Some event made the a/c leave the runway by the right side (airport video discards an explosion in engine).


But if the runway is long enough (as I believe is the case here) v1 > Vr

[Gabriel]

But if the runway is long enough (as I believe is the case here) v1 > Vr
By definition, Vr is not smaller than V1.

[andrasz]

By definition, Vr is not smaller than V1.

True, but that is only terminology. Technically once you are airborne, and then land again on the remaining runway, it is no longer an abort but a forced landing. However if the runway is long enough, it can be done. Pretty much the same as a touch-and-go in reverse. Of course there are very few runways long enough for a large airliner to be able to do it in practice, but the accident runway was one of the few (in theory).

Again terminology, but having had a good look at the runway, it is clear that the legal threshold is displaced by about 1000 metres from the actual end, the rest is the overrun area and also may be used for takeoff roll in the rare cases when the runway is used for a takeoff to the south (this is the runway usually used by the heavies).

The assymetrical thrust reverser positions could turn out to be relevant. Let's wait for the CVR transcript...

[andrasz]

Having checked MAD runway 36L, it is true that the legal marked threshold is somewhere close to where the aircraft veered to the right. This could be the source of all the "used up all available runway" comments. However there is another 1000 metres of paved runway surface, legally the 'extension' which can be used to increase available takeoff roll towards the south. Anyone more knowledgeable than me can tell us what is the case when the legal threshold in the takeoff direction is less than the available paved area ? My hunch is that V1/V2 needs to be calculated based on the legal runway length, not the actual available, correct ?

If so, this could be another contributing factor, with V1 less than what it would have been based on the real runway length. (though on a 3000 metre runway I'm reasonably sure it would have been very close to Vr...) In a critical situation trained reflexes take over, and the "up after V1" principle is so well etched in most (sadly as several wrecked aeroplanes beyond the end of the threshold showed, not all...) pilots minds that it would have been very difficult to break out of it and realise that there is still plenty of runway ahead.

[keltic]

I am not very awared of how thrust reversers work. One incidental deployment...for instance doesn´t make they know what´s going on?. Unless jammed, can´t it the problem be fixed and deployed again?.

In modern B737-800NG or A320, is there a kind of indication that they have deployed?. Too many accidents for these (not assuming it has happened this in the MAD one), for something to be done in the future.

I am not technical and my answer could sound a bit naive, but I wonder if these events can be foreseen and trainned in the simulator.

[andrasz]

I am not very awared of how thrust reversers work.

On the MD-80 the thrust reversers are of the old 'clam-shell' type, where two forward curving air scoops are inserted behind the engine exhaust (both fan and core exhaust) that deflects the airflow and thrust forwards. I have heard of virtually no uncommanded actuation of this type, as the actuator is mechanically linked to the thrust reverser levers, and needs to be 'pushed' into the exhaust airflow. Without the hydraulic boost, the doors would be forced open by the exhaust airflow.

Good video here: http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-2890877821959377875&ei=UW-ySLudCJC02wLX7fTXDA&q=md-80+thrust+reversers&vt=lf&hl=en

On newer technology engines the thrust reversers block the fan airflow around the core, with doors opening to allow the deflected air out and forwards on the side of the engine. To my knowledge all known cases of uncommanded incidents happened with this type, where the airflow will actually help an inproperly stowed thrust reverser to deploy. However this layout is much more effective than the older clamshell type, which deflects most of the air up and down instead of forwards.

Video: http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=2886516252868653586&ei=yXCySNWnLIzQ2ALJ_pnyDA&q=airbus+thrust+reverser&vt=lf&hl=en

Do not confuse uncommanded deployment with inadvertant deployment. In the first case the reversers deploy without any command due to some fault, while in the latter the pilots (sometimes without noticing) activate the reverser without the intention to do so. The several Airbus landing accidents where the reverser was a contributing cause all happened with one reverser deactivated according to MEL, and the pilots did not realise that while one engine was in reverse, the other started producing significant forward thrust.

[Spad13]

My hunch is that V1/V2 needs to be calculated based on the legal runway length, not the actual available, correct ?



Incorrect. V1, VR and V2 are calculated based on weight and density altitude. Runway length is NOT a factor. Runway condition may be an issue, e. g. wet, snowy, icy etc, but not length. Runway length does, however, affect max allowable weight.

[screaming_emu]

Incorrect. V1, VR and V2 are calculated based on weight and density altitude. Runway length is NOT a factor. Runway condition may be an issue, e. g. wet, snowy, icy etc, but not length. Runway length does, however, affect max allowable weight.

Bah...what do you know about this crap? :grin:

[Spad13]

Bah...what do you know about this crap? :grin:

Not a lot, only enough to calculate this crap a few times a day.

[blueline]

Now on TV news they said that the technicians found that one engine (I don't remember which) had the reverse position and that they were inspecting if it happened after crashing or what happened there.

They also said that there are investigating the similarities between this accident and one happened on 1987 in Michigan where they had some flap or slap was enabled in a wing that made the plane slowdown and crashed.

Yesterday another Spanair MD80 series airplane flight from Barcelona to Lanzarote or Fuerteventura (Canary Islands also) landed in Malaga because a fail in the emergency generator or something like that, about 20 minutes ago they got aboard again and will arrive in about 2 hours (according to what the news said).

[bob12312357]

Incorrect. V1, VR and V2 are calculated based on weight and density altitude. Runway length is NOT a factor. Runway condition may be an issue, e. g. wet, snowy, icy etc, but not length. Runway length does, however, affect max allowable weight. All runway length tells you is if oyu can take off in the available distance or not. As you said, nothing to do with V-ref numbers.

[Quench]

All runway length tells you is if oyu can take off in the available distance or not. As you said, nothing to do with V-ref numbers.

V1 can be the speed at which it is no longer safe to abort, or it can be the speed at which it is safe to continue the takeoff in the event of a single engine failure - Right?

For the former runway length is a factor.

[Spad13]

V1 can be the speed at which it is no longer safe to abort, or it can be the speed at which it is safe to continue the takeoff in the event of a single engine failure - Right?

For the former runway length is a factor.

It is in theory, but not in practice. In practice, one ought to avoid a high-energy abort if at all possible, even if the runway is sufficient. This is why there is no mention of runway length on the speed card.

That being said, there are places where there would be plenty of room for a post-V1 abort, for instance when taking off from 31L at JFK we are usually at V1 by the time we reach the displaced threshold. This is where crew judgment comes into play. If the emergency is severe enough an abort may take place, but otherwise we'll peel off, run our procedures and go from there.

[andrasz]

Incorrect. V1, VR and V2 are calculated based on weight and density altitude. Runway length is NOT a factor. Runway condition may be an issue, e. g. wet, snowy, icy etc, but not length. Runway length does, however, affect max allowable weight.

Thanks, one always learns :)

[scottkin]

What do you fly Spad??

[Spad13]

What do you fly Spad??

Made in Montreal, T-tail, two engines.

[Dani]

Sorry for my spell mistakes yesterday, did not recheck the post.

Here you have 4 of the many reports being discussed within aviation forums in Spain.

My personal view regarding the reverse issue. Only 3 alternatives.
- Pilot commanded it out to stop the a/c (why Engine 1 reverse is closed?).
- Uncommanded deployment, dramatically reducing thrust and throwing it to the right side of runway.
- Maybe it´s just the crash that deployed it (however it´s a quite symmetrical deployment of both shells). I´ll try to upload the picture.
<IMG SRC=http://www.jetphotos.net/user-uploads/1219302341669.jpg>
Picture was provided by the man in Report 4.

************************************
REPORT

NOTE: Reported by a worker in Barajas T4, later specified he saw the a/c lifting around 50 metres in the air and when turning to the right a/c movement was like that of a kite.

“I was next to the Satellite of T4, 14:25. I observed an Spanair MD accelerating. I was surprised that he was using such long space in the runway, similar to that used by an A340.

Lifted almost at the end of the runway, moving to the left side, then turned to the right and the wing touched the ground, with the a/c running along 500 metres, entering a wooded area and exploding in a huge fireball.”

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

REPORT 2

NOTE: Reported by an Anonym. Quite detailed, seems has been cleaning the area post crash.

“The a/c hardly went into the air, first marks of impact are more or less at the equivalent distance of the PAPI of 18R, only 20 metres right side off the runway. Traces show RH MLG impact first with RH wing tip (10 metres trace of the tip). Then NLG markings, bumping 2 metres in advance. Tail cone (the part differentiating MD from DC9) is visible in this area as well as some engine cowlings.<

Then clear signs that a/c was running with all U/C down. MLG have a more or less straight line but NLG continuously moving right and left. This running lasted around 500 metres.

After those 500 metres, hits a fence of a perimetral and lifts off due to a down slope for 400 metres when it hits a wooded area, resting in an upside down position.

On the site it’s impressive the amount of energy of a/c to run aprox 1000 metres after first impact.

A/c only started to disintegrate after hit with the fence. Engines have remained with the main body until the end.”

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

REPORT 3

NOTE: Reported by a pilot taking off post crash from the same runway. However some of his observations are impossible if he is flying.

“I’ll tell what I saw which left me quite perplex.

I took off through 36L, get to V1, rotation, I indicate “Positive climb” and copilot gives me the “Gear Up”. As I pick up the U/C I can see on the right side the burnt surface. It’s not at the end of the runway but between both runways.

However, you can perfectly see the wheel marks on the grass. The a/c left the runway with over 1000 metres of runway still available.

My thoughts on this: If a/c was airborne, it was not for more than 20 or 30 feet, falling on the runway again but not crashing as the U/C was intact.

The first signs of wheels on the grass are just past the antenna for ILS approach of 18R, so, still 1000 metres of runway available in front of him.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

REPORT 4

NOTE: I have shortened this one as most of the details are the same as Report 2 regarding location of pieces and a/c excursion what gives both them great value.

“<?xml:namespace prefix = st1 ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" /><st1:metricconverter w:st="on" ProductID="120 metres">120 metres</st1:metricconverter> right of 36L. The entire tail cone was found together with the reverse, undeployed, of Engine 1.

… at the end of the excursion off runway the engine 2 with deployed reverse …

… I´ve seen staff from the NTSB and Boeing searching the area ….”

[ultraflight]

I guess the laughies are unintentional...uncommanded?

[Gabriel]

Incorrect. V1, VR and V2 are calculated based on weight and density altitude. Runway length is NOT a factor. Runway condition may be an issue, e. g. wet, snowy, icy etc, but not length. Runway length does, however, affect max allowable weight.
Incorrect. BALLANCED FIELD V1 (that which makes ASDR=TODR) is not affected by ASDA and TORA. But if ASDA and TORA are, for example, longer than ASDR and TODR then there is a range of possible V1s, and the operator must select one within the range. If your company's policy is to use always the ballanced field V1, then your V1s wont be affected by runway lengths, but that doesn't need to be the case always.

Even further, flexible V1s based on ASDA and TODA may, in certain circumstances, allow you to operate in situations where the ballanced field V1 wouldn't work. For example, say that there is a clearway but no stopway, then the ASDA is less than the TODA. Further say that the ASDA is slightly below the ballenced field ASDA=TODA. You can select a lower V1 which will increase the TODR above the ballanced field TODR, but hopefully within the TODA, and will lower the ASDR below the ballenced field ASDR hopefully within the ASDA.

Notes:
For these examples I assumed the same toke-off weights.
ASD = accelerate - stop distance.
TOD = take off distance.
The A and the R at the end mean "available" and "required" respectively.
"Clearway" is a zone following the runway that is clear of obsrtacles and that the airplane can legally use to reach 45ft above the ground in the event of an engine failure at V1 (Vef really, but it's close to V1).

[andrasz]

http://www.jetphotos.net/user-uploads/1219302341669.jpg


Thanks for the photo, very revealing and precludes a lot of speculation. This is the thrust reverser mechanism, detached from the engine. With the actuators having lost hydraulic pressure, the mechanism would move freely around the hinges. The design is such that when installed, the airflow around the engines help the clam shells to deploy (otherwise a much larger and heavier actuator would be needed to force the doors into the exhaust). It is quite likely that the doors were snapped shut as they broke free of the engine - either by the airflow or by bouncing on the ground - especially if the other set of thust reversers that are stowed are still attached to the engine.

It is still possible that the thrust reversers were deployed, but much less likely than based on the verbal description we've heared so far.

[Spad13]

Incorrect. BALLANCED FIELD V1 (that which makes ASDR=TODR) is not affected by ASDA and TORA. But if ASDA and TORA are, for example, longer than ASDR and TODR then there is a range of possible V1s, and the operator must select one within the range. If your company's policy is to use always the ballanced field V1, then your V1s wont be affected by runway lengths, but that doesn't need to be the case always.



I'm not aware of any 121 operators that don't use balanced field numbers. There may be corporate jet operators that use something else, but I doubt that. Now, keep in mind that we operate only from runways that our dispatch department has evaluated and established performance numbers for, that is to say, there are runways at airports that we service that we cannot use (Rwy 32 at BOS, 17/35 at PHL and others). For every airport we operate out of we have numbers in what's called runway analysis manual that establishes all the maximum weights for various density altitudes for all approved runways. So, all we need to worry about with respect to the runway is that we remain under the runway limit weight (which in the instance of our aircraft is actually above the certificated MTOW in many cases). Once that's established we flip the speed card to the relevant weight and adjust for density altitude.

I would imagine that having the V-speeds runway-dependent in addition to the above factors would introduce yet another chance for the crew to screw up, which is undesireable, we're not that smart as it is.

[Gabriel]

I'm not aware of any 121 operators that don't use balanced field numbers. There may be corporate jet operators that use something else, but I doubt that. Now, keep in mind that we operate only from runways that our dispatch department has evaluated and established performance numbers for, that is to say, there are runways at airports that we service that we cannot use (Rwy 32 at BOS, 17/35 at PHL and others). For every airport we operate out of we have numbers in what's called runway analysis manual that establishes all the maximum weights for various density altitudes for all approved runways. So, all we need to worry about with respect to the runway is that we remain under the runway limit weight (which in the instance of our aircraft is actually above the certificated MTOW in many cases). Once that's established we flip the speed card to the relevant weight and adjust for density altitude.

I would imagine that having the V-speeds runway-dependent in addition to the above factors would introduce yet another chance for the crew to screw up, which is undesireable, we're not that smart as it is.
I'm Ok with that. In fact I have no idea of what the operators use, be it 121, commuter or whatever.

I just know what's required. And yes, when you put everithing in the calculation it's quite complicated, to the point that you don't get a V1 but a range of acceptable V1s and then some criteria must be used to decide where within that range you set your speedbug.

But the manual prepared by the airplane manufacturer must include all the numbers. The operator then can choose a subset within those numbers.

One question [off topic]

How often is your revenue generating weight limmited by requiered performance, be it take-off or climb? (instead of structural limitations like MTOW or MLW, or market limitations like "we have nothing else to take")

Maybe operators who typically load the plane up to where it's admisible for the flight (I'm thinking of FedEx maybe) do use all what the regs allow to take every pound they can? Maybe with the help of some computer like a laptop with a suitable software?

And another one: What do you do when a runway is NOTAMmed for change in runway, clearway or stopway length (for example due to works arround the threshold)

[Spad13]

One question [off topic]

How often is your revenue generating weight limmited by requiered performance, be it take-off or climb? (instead of structural limitations like MTOW or MLW, or market limitations like "we have nothing else to take")



Fairly rarely. In fact, it's been a few months since the last time we were runway-limited and I don't recall a single time when we were climb-limited. Most common factor is the MLW, folllowed by ZFW, followed by structural MTOW.


Maybe operators who typically load the plane up to where it's admisible for the flight (I'm thinking of FedEx maybe) do use all what the regs allow to take every pound they can? Maybe with the help of some computer like a laptop with a suitable software?


FedEx is also a 121 carrier, so they too use balanced-field numbers.


And another one: What do you do when a runway is NOTAMmed for change in runway, clearway or stopway length (for example due to works arround the threshold)

One of two things will happen then. Most often we will get TMGL (Temporary Max Gross Load) data on our dispatch release for the affected runway. If that's not available, we will be prohibited from using that runway until such time as it is.

[Dmmoore]

Thrust reverser deployment on non FADEC aircraft (such as the DC-9 / MD-80) is only possible by moving the cockpit throttle lever to idle and raising the reverser lever. It requires an action from the flight crew.

The only exception would be if an action were to occur which damaged the engine controls at the time the reverser actuated. "IF" the control rod from the throttle quadrant to the to the reverser control valve were damaged / disconnected, the reverser could operate with the engine set to forward thrust. An event causing the rod to disconnect would have to precede the reverser deploying.

I don't know of any uncommanded T/R deployments on a non FADEC aircraft.

[Leftseat86]

Pretty scary if the right reverser deployed...

[Crunk415balla]

Pretty scary if the right reverser deployed...
Yes, if they do conclude that the reverser did deploy in flight, that would be very frightening.

[JordanD]

I guess the laughies are unintentional...uncommanded?
Yeah, for some reason it happens sometimes.

[dougb]

The witness descriptions of this crash sound a lot like a couple of flaps-up takeoff crashes i've read about. Have any of the news stories suggested that? How likely is it that the takeoff configuration warning system could fail?

[T.O.G.A.]

Do T/Rs require weight on main wheels gear to allow a commanded deployment?

Do the throttles need to be in idle before T/R's levers can be pulled back?

[Spad13]

Do T/Rs require weight on main wheels gear to allow a commanded deployment?

Do the throttles need to be in idle before T/R's levers can be pulled back?

No to the former, yes to the latter, according to Vnav, presently an MD-80 Captain.

[Theoddkiwi]

Do T/Rs require weight on main wheels gear to allow a commanded deployment?

Do the throttles need to be in idle before T/R's levers can be pulled back?
Dont know about Md's but i would think yes and yes, though on the NG strictly speaking the T/R can be deployed at less than 5 ft which is basically just off the ground.

But as stated previously the Trust levers must be at idle as the T/r would be mechanically locked otherwise.


I would suspect the reversers in this case are in this position as a result of the crash rather than a cause. Or perhaps a last ditch effort to stop if the report of its path along the ground is correct.

[T.O.G.A.]

I would suspect the reversers in this case are in this position as a result of the crash rather than a cause. Or perhaps a last ditch effort to stop if the report of its path along the ground is correct.

I would agree with that. It will be interesting to see what the FDR yields.

I would also agree with another poster that it sounds like an attempted flaps up TO but I believe you'd get a configuration warning once the throttles went above part power with flaps up. Could it be possible they were not lowered enough for a full load?

If an engine failed or stalled, I wonder if the ARTs system kicked in like it was supposed to.

[dougb]

I would also agree with another poster that it sounds like an attempted flaps up TO but I believe you'd get a configuration warning once the throttles went above part power with flaps up. Could it be possible they were not lowered enough for a full load?



Does anyone know if it is possible that the configuration warning system is on the same circuit as the temperature sensor that was disabled? Perhaps pulling the breaker for the sensor also disabled the audible warning? The flight I was thinking of is Northwest flight 255, back in 1987. Same plane, and the description by witnesses is practically identical. That plane had a configuration warning system, but for undetermined reasons it had no electrical power at the time of the accident. I remember that because it occurred about a month before I took my first flight ever, and its something that's in the back of my mind on every flight I take. That and the word jackscrew every time i board an MD-80 variant.

[Dmmoore]

First; "IF" the T/R's were deployed, the flight crew commanded them to deploy. That is the flight crew retarded the power levers to idle and raised the T/R levers. Or they deployed as a result of damage to the control system after the fact.

Second; The Takeoff Warning system has it's own dedicated circuit.

Third; All speculation about engine, T/R and / or configurations should be answered when the data from the DFDR is read and published.

[Gabriel]

I would also agree with another poster that it sounds like an attempted flaps up TO but I believe you'd get a configuration warning once the throttles went above part power with flaps up.
Based on the NTSB's investigation of the NW case, yes the configuration warning SHOULD have sounded, but in the NW case it failed to do so because it was unpowered for reasons never discovered. There where other similar accidents (taking off with the flaps & slats retracted) where the crew took off with the wrong configuration not noticing or disregarding the configuration warning that sounded during the whole take-off roll. However, in the cases that I'm aware of, this happened in types (Boeings) where the configuration warning is an intermitent "toot - toot -toot", not like in the MD-80 where it's an intermitent ring with the word "Flaps!" explicitly yelled between rings.

As another MD-80 pilot said in one of these forums, the pilots must input the CG and the requiered take-off flaps in a "computer" that uses that info to compare the actual trim and configuration setting with the requiered values. If they don't match the configuration warning is trigged as soon as the throttles are advanced for take-off. The warning is the intermitent ring plus the words of all those things that don't match the required take-off configuration (slats and/or flaps and/or trim and/or spoilers and/or parking brakes).

If one atempts to take off with the flaps in the wrong setting, the alarm will say Flaps! unless the crew was sloppy enough not only to fail to set the flaps correctly and to fail to detect that in the checklist but also to dial the wrong setting in the take-off computer. Flaps 0, wiht slats extended to the sealed / semi-extended position, is the first detent of the flaps/slats lever and it's an unusual but legal take-off configuration. But then, slats is always required for take off and not an item the crew must enter in the take-off computer, so if you attempt to take off with flaps AND slats retracted, you would get both the "Flaps!" and "Slats!" bitching (and possibly the "Trim!" too) or, if you dialed "Flaps 0" in the take-off computer, you would still get the "Slats!" warning (and possibly the "Trim!" too).

What brings us to:
Could it be possible they were not lowered enough for a full load?
The NTSB investigation of the NW crash, which was almost at MTOW, also showed that the take-off and climb performance for a flaps 11 / slats semi-extended (second detent of the flaps/slats lever) and for flaps 0 / slats semi-extended (first detent) were almost identical (the difference between the 2 conditions is 6 kts in the stall speed). However the performance of a flaps 0 / slats 0 (flaps/slats lever in the fully retracted position) take-off was greatly degraded (40kts of difference in the stll speed with the flaps/slats in the first detent). So based on that, slats/flaps extended but not enough doesn't seem to be enough to explain this accident. No flaps / no slats COULD be.
If an engine failed or stalled, I wonder if the ARTs system kicked in like it was supposed to.
As I understand it, it depends. The ART (automatic reserve thrust, don't mistake reserve with reverse) kicks in when the airplane is in the take off mode and the system detecs an asymetry between the two engines, advancing the throttles to a higher "emergency" trhust setting.

I highlighted "in the take off mode" because the MD-80 also has a "flexible take off mode" where, when tot full take-off performance is required, a lower take-off thrust setting is aplied to save life of the engines, and I think that in that mode the ART doesn't kick in.

I know little at best about actual MD-80 operations, but I wouldn't be surprised if, with a 140000ft runway, the take-off flex is used. On the other hand, what the take-off flex mode does is fake the air temperature to the thrust rate computer, so the system thinks that the air is hotter than it is and displays a lower target take-off EPR. That day in Madrid was pretty hot. I don't know if using TO FLEX would make a difference or be possible at all.

[Spad13]

As I understand it, it depends. The ART (automatic reserve thrust, don't mistake reserve with reverse) kicks in when the airplane is in the take off mode and the system detecs an asymetry between the two engines, advancing the throttles to a higher "emergency" trhust setting.

I highlighted "in the take off mode" because the MD-80 also has a "flexible take off mode" where, when tot full take-off performance is required, a lower take-off thrust setting is aplied to save life of the engines, and I think that in that mode the ART doesn't kick in.

I know little at best about actual MD-80 operations, but I wouldn't be surprised if, with a 140000ft runway, the take-off flex is used. On the other hand, what the take-off flex mode does is fake the air temperature to the thrust rate computer, so the system thinks that the air is hot than it is and displays a lower target take-off EPR. That day in Madrid was pretty hot. I don't know if using TO FLEX would make a difference or be possible at all.

If the ART on the MD-80 is anything like what we call APR (Automated Power Reserve) on our airplane, you're close, but APR works in Flex T/O as well. In normal T/O the APR will advance from normal T/O N1 to max N1 for that temperature (the difference is usually 1.5-2.0% N1). In Flex T/O it will do the same thing, but will add those 1.5-2.0% to the Flex T/O setting. So, if flex N1 is 86%, the APR will kick it up to 87.5% or so and then the PNF will have to manually advance the thrust lever to the max allowable N1, like APR would have done under normal T/O regime.

As for whether or not flex would have been used on a 14,000' strip, that would depend on what MDD's/Spanair's limitations are for flex use. In our case, we are unable to use flex above certain weights as well as above certain temperatures. This varies with field elevation.

[delta092b]

JORGE SAINZ
<!-- CREDIT 1-->The Associated Press
<!-- ARTICLE CONTENT -->MADRID, Spain – The Spanish jetliner that crashed during takeoff last week, killing 154 people, hit the ground tail first and bounced for almost a mile, the head of the commission probing the disaster said today.

The Spanair MD-82 hit a grassy area next to the runaway at Madrid's Barajas airport and, judging by marks left on the ground, the body of the plane lifted and fell three times as it skidded over nearly a mile of uneven terrain, the commission's director Francisco Soto told reporters.

Soto said there were no marks of a crash landing on the runway itself.

"The marks on the ground tell us that the plane hit the ground tail first and as a result the tail cone, the end part of the plane, broke off," said Soto, Secretary of the Civil Aviation Commission for Investigating Civil Aviation Accidents and Incidents.

Soto said information gathered so far was insufficient to allow him to comment on survivor accounts that suggest the plane lost power before take off or exceeded the normal distance on the runway before lifting.

Survivor Beatriz Reyes Ojeda told a news conference that the aircraft seemed to lack power during takeoff, then veered sharply to the right.

"I guess I did realize that when the plane was going to take off, perhaps it was not going so fast," said Reyes Ojeda shortly after being released from the hospital today.

Only 18 people survived the accident. The first survivor to leave the hospital was 6-year-old Roberto Alvarez Carretero who had injuries to his head, face and arms. He was released Monday. His 16-year-old sister, Maria, died.

Reyes Ojeda, 41, was the only survivor to emerge without any serious injury. She had a gash in her right leg.

During takeoff, Reyes Ojeda said, the plane's right wing dipped abruptly. "And I said to myself, something is going on here.''

"I grabbed the seat. I noticed a bump. My stomach was rising and falling," she said.

Her account of the plane's takeoff is similar to that of other survivors.

One of them, Ligia Palomino Riveros, a 42-year-old Colombian-born Spaniard, told The Associated Press over the weekend that the plane moved very slowly on the runway, struggled to get airborne and started "wobbling" as it veered to the right and crashed to the ground.

Reyes Ojeda has been widely praised for pulling several children out of the flaming wreckage, although it is not known if they are among three youngsters who survived the crash.

"There were children who had seats on top of them. What I did was pull them out and set them aside so they were not trapped,'' she said. "I know a lot is being made of this, but I think any human being, at any time when people ask for help, will give it.''

Reyes Ojeda is a native of the Canary Islands, the destination of the Spanair MD-82 involved in Spain's worst air disaster in 25 years.

She was lively and smiling for much of the news conference, but her voice broke and she held back tears as she spoke of how she is alive while so many other people from the islands died. About half of the 172 people on the plane lived in the islands, in the Atlantic Ocean off West Africa.

"It is a contradictory feeling because I know that bodies are arriving back there and I will arrive intact," she said.

Two damaged black boxes recovered soon after the crash last Wednesday are being examined, said Soto.

Soto also said the engines were found to be in good enough condition to be investigated and would likely to provide much information. He said they had no details of the contents yet.

He said the commission would produce its preliminary report within a month.

He said there were about 20 experts investigating the crash, including some from U.S. companies Boeing – which acquired airplane manufacturer McDonnell Douglas in 1997 – and engine manufacturer Pratt & Whitney.

[Theoddkiwi]

If it is true that the aircraft was sluggish or slow, then you would expect the crew to identify this before trying to rotate and commence RTO.

How are the V speeds on the MD 80 determined? Does the FMC do all the calculations or is this all calulated by the crew who then enter the data.

Would the MEL'ed temp sensor mean they needed to recalulate their takeoff performance data?

What i am getting at (not knowing a thing about how the V and engine thrust settings are determined) is that perhaps they had incorrect takeoff data in terms of a low enigne power setting with low V speed calculations.

So the scenario being engines are set to and reach the calculated thrust level (which is too low) they are slow to accelerate but in their minds feel they have successfully reached V1 then Vr rotate then stall with a right wing drop which ultimately ends up with contact with the ground and the rest is history.

As they have apparently bounced across the grass a last ditch attempt to stop is to grab a handful of reverse but through the desperation only get hold of one lever.

Which returns me to my earlier comment on a a crew delayed by a fault trying to make up for lost time and choose not to or forget to recheck their settings and configurations

[Gabriel]

If it is true that the aircraft was sluggish or slow, then you would expect the crew to identify this before trying to rotate and commence RTO.
I guess it's not that easy to detect such a thing, since only speed is monitored, not time or distance needed to achieve these speed, and not acceleration (what looks to me would be an easy implementation since the airplanes already measure longitudinal acceleration for the INS and the FDR).

[Darren Howie]

After the potomac crash of air florida i think anyone in there right mind flying an aircraft which uses EPR for thrust control who does not check N1 on take off needs a major talking to.
If this is the case that incorrect thust was set and a similar accident to Air Florida has occured the entire training dept at Spanair should be hung out to dry.
Rate of accel even at max flex is still evident as is your excessive use of runway to get to both 100/80Kts and you lack of accel.
Cannot believe this could be the cause of an accident given the huge awareness in crews of the dramas of the use of EPR for thust control.
On a side note would love to strangle the engineer who thought up EPR as a means of pilots trying to drive aeroplanes. Be one of those guys who has never been out of his office in his entire life...idiots.
Oh and for slightly earlier many operators use unbalanced yes unbalance field length for jet operations to enable larger payload uplift and use of stopways/clearways in there take off calcs.
Dazz

[Spad13]

Oh and for slightly earlier many operators use unbalanced yes unbalance field length for jet operations to enable larger payload uplift and use of stopways/clearways in there take off calcs.
Dazz

Perhaps in Canada that may be the case, I've never seen a US operator that did that and I've jumpseated on many.

[Gabriel]

Oh and for slightly earlier many operators use unbalanced yes unbalance field length for jet operations to enable larger payload uplift and use of stopways/clearways in there take off calcs.
Dazz
Spliting hairs, but you can still use balanced field numbers if you take the stopway and the clearway to be of the same length (you must take the lengh of the shortest of the two) and if the TORR still remains within the TORA. (TOR = take of run)

[blueline]

Today in news they said that the pilot didn't try to abort the take off, it didn't take off but went over the grass until it crashed in the river.

And I would like to ask again something, as there is plenty of space around that airport, wouldn't it be better in terms of safety to make the terrain all plain around airports (when available as this is the case) instead of leaving a river flowing in front (and still worse under my point of view) or between the runways that is where the airplane went to crash.

In this case the airplane was like a pretty heavy car running at high speed full of fuel, if a car loss control in a highway or in a plain terrain it may roll around until it stops but if it has irregular terrain in front and loss control, it will have more likely a sudden stop making everyone inside die as it happened in this accident.

Don't you think that when available airports should have enough or as much as possible plain terrain in front of them to stop the heaviest plane that works at each airport at near take off speed in front of the runways?

Just questioning...

[Vinco]

Today in news they said that the pilot didn't try to abort the take off, it didn't take off but went over the grass until it crashed in the river.

And I would like to ask again something, as there is plenty of space around that airport, wouldn't it be better in terms of safety to make the terrain all plain around airports (when available as this is the case) instead of leaving a river flowing in front (and still worse under my point of view) or between the runways that is where the airplane went to crash.

In this case the airplane was like a pretty heavy car running at high speed full of fuel, if a car loss control in a highway or in a plain terrain it may roll around until it stops but if it has irregular terrain in front and loss control, it will have more likely a sudden stop making everyone inside die as it happened in this accident.

Don't you think that when available airports should have enough or as much as possible plain terrain in front of them to stop the heaviest plane that works at each airport at near take off speed in front of the runways?

Just questioning...

Airplanes aren't made to go off road. Structuraly they're not designed to support 150,000lbs near V1/Vr speed on anything short of smooth tarmac. Structure will fail and fuel will spill out causing a fire most of the time. It then becomes a question of economics. Should the airport spend millions of dollars moving dirt around for an unlikely event a/c will not catch on fire?

[dr_cfii]

Today in news they said that the pilot didn't try to abort the take off, it didn't take off but went over the grass until it crashed in the river.



I believe plenty of reports and suvirvors did state that the plane was airborne at one moment?

[blueline]

It then becomes a question of economics. Should the airport spend millions of dollars moving dirt around for an unlikely event a/c will not catch on fire?
Madrid spent 6.2€ billion just to make the T4 and runways, one of them is where the airplane tried to take off and crashed, they moved lots of dirt to make the runways, I'm sure that to move all the necesary dirt there would not need another 300 million euros, even they could have moved there tons of other materials like sand which is not as hard as ground.

Another poster said they took off, yes, I war confused, yes they took off, but they were on the ground again before the end of the runway, because of that I though that, anyway look at the recreation of what is said at the moment:

http://www.antena3noticias.com/PortalA3N/play?mostrar=videos&idGaleriaFotos=2331332&idGaleriaVideos=2331854&id_contpag=102

Just press the play button :)

The same airplane aborted a take off one month ago due to vibrations on the front gear.

Regards

[Dmmoore]

Madrid spent 6.2€ billion just to make the T4 and runways, one of them is where the airplane tried to take off and crashed, they moved lots of dirt to make the runways, I'm sure that to move all the necesary dirt there would not need another 300 million euros, even they could have moved there tons of other materials like sand which is not as hard as ground.

Another poster said they took off, yes, I war confused, yes they took off, but they were on the ground again before the end of the runway, because of that I though that, anyway look at the recreation of what is said at the moment:

http://www.antena3noticias.com/PortalA3N/play?mostrar=videos&idGaleriaFotos=2331332&idGaleriaVideos=2331854&id_contpag=102

Just press the play button :)

The same airplane aborted a take off one month ago due to vibrations on the front gear.

Regards

The previous aborted take off is noted to prove what? We all ready know aborted take offs are accomplished from time to time. 99.9% of the time, safely, without running off the runway.

The short answer to your question is yes, it's much better to have level terrain around all airports.

Now all you have to do is "DO IT"!:p Oh and pay for it. And realize that unless all the bare ground around the airport is dug out, compacted and covered with a suitable surface to prevent water from softening the under laying material it will not long support the weight of a heavy aircraft.

Water must be allowed to drain and run off properly.

The cost to do as you suggest would be very close to the same cost per square meter as a finished runway.

If you are happy with a level surface that won't support the aircraft's weight, it will reduce the cost by 50-75% per square meter.

[Leftseat86]

Today in news they said that the pilot didn't try to abort the take off, it didn't take off but went over the grass until it crashed in the river.

And I would like to ask again something, as there is plenty of space around that airport, wouldn't it be better in terms of safety to make the terrain all plain around airports (when available as this is the case) instead of leaving a river flowing in front (and still worse under my point of view) or between the runways that is where the airplane went to crash.

In this case the airplane was like a pretty heavy car running at high speed full of fuel, if a car loss control in a highway or in a plain terrain it may roll around until it stops but if it has irregular terrain in front and loss control, it will have more likely a sudden stop making everyone inside die as it happened in this accident.

Don't you think that when available airports should have enough or as much as possible plain terrain in front of them to stop the heaviest plane that works at each airport at near take off speed in front of the runways?

Just questioning...

We could also make everyone in the airplane wear fire retardant suits and helmets.

[blueline]

We could also make everyone in the airplane wear fire retardant suits and helmets.

It would be quite funny! And maybe some people would be less afraid of flying then as they would feel a little more safe!

I love to fly and I don't care about that kind of accidents as it doesn't happen so often but you won't deny that when one happens the media talks about it up to a paranoid level (have you heard about the southamerican TV -I think it was from Argentina- which made a video with an invented talk between the pilot and co-pilot? It is available on youtube...).

About the accident, is the accident in Barajas similar to that?
http://www.avherald.com/h?article=408f9862/0002&opt=0

Regards!

[keltic]

I would recommend not taking into account the 90% of the information of the Spanish media. Antena3 is being particularly cheap

[ultraflight]

El Pais website (http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/MD-82/despego/sistema/freno/Spanair/anulo/dias/elpepunac/20080828elpepinac_1/Tes) reports that the MD-82 was operating with the thrust reverser of the right-hand engine disabled a few days before.

"El MD-82 siniestrado despegó sin uno de los sistemas de freno. La aerolínea Spanair "canceló" la reversa del motor derecho unos días antes de que se estrellase. Los mecánicos habían "hallado un defecto" en esa reversa, según fuentes de la compañía."

[Cargo Runner]

The airline involved in the Madrid plane crash had considered switching aircraft at the last minute, a Spanish government minister said.

Spanair flight JK 5022 was delayed for about an hour because of a problem with an air temperature gauge.

The aircraft crashed on 20 August, just after take-off, killing 154 people.

Magdalena Alvarez told a parliamentary panel that Spanair had "indicated to the airport the possibility of replacing the plane with another". <!-- E SF -->

Ms Alvarez, the Spanish development minister, said Spanair "told the airport control centre that it had decided to continue with the plane... which is the one that crashed".

She was summoned before the Spanish Congress to testify on Spain's air safety procedures in the wake of the accident.

Spanair has not spoken publicly about having considered changing planes. A spokesman said the company could not discuss what had happened to the aircraft, because the accident was under judicial investigation.

However, it has previously insisted that the gauge problem had nothing to do with the crash.

BBC news http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7589113.stm

[andrasz]

The airline involved in the Madrid plane crash had considered switching aircraft at the last minute, a Spanish government minister said.

Sounds like a dramatic statement, but that would be normal Operations Control procedure at any decent airline. You have a technical fault and maintenance initially says they have no idea how long it will take to fix (they always do...). You start looking at the options: cancel, find another a/c, or delay the flight and hope maintenance finishes quicker than they say they will (they usually do...). If there is a spare aircraft available, or you can switch with a later flight giving engineering more time, it will be done to minimise the disruption.

The deactivated T/R is a more relevant piece of news, it may turn out to be significant.

[Cargo Runner]

Sounds like a dramatic statement, but that would be normal Operations Control procedure at any decent airline.

The deactivated T/R is a more relevant piece of news, it may turn out to be significant.

Sounds more like they HAD to move that aircraft quick and did NOT have the time available to change over... Pressures indeed...

[Darren Howie]

Perhaps in Canada that may be the case, I've never seen a US operator that did that and I've jumpseated on many.

Well im not in Canada..lol
Anyway think a jumpseat ride is a fair way from performance course and how take off data is calculated and published.
I would be highly surprised that the majority of US operators are not taking the advantage the unblanced field length offers in terms of extra payload.
The bonus weight you can lift from fields with large clearways in quite large indeed.
Think about large airports and how much clearway is available off runways with over water departures for example.
A few operators using it i know of off the top of my head from running our Jetstar A-330 Perf course.
Qantas group,Singapore,BA,Thai,JAL,ANA,UAL.
Dazz

[Verbal]

Error With Flaps May Have Led To Spanair Crash Last Month
The Wall Street Journal Online 09/03/2008
Author: Andy Pasztor

The pilots of a Spanair SA jetliner that crashed in Madrid last month failed to extend the aircraft's flaps before trying to take off, according to people familiar with the investigation, and a suspected electrical malfunction kept them from getting a cockpit warning about the danger.

Preliminary data obtained from a pair of so-called black boxes recovered from the wreckage of the McDonnell Douglas MD-82, which killed 154 people, indicate that both engines were working properly and there was no fire before impact, these people said.

But the flight-data recorder shows that the plane's flaps, movable devices at the rear of the wings that provide extra lift needed at takeoff, weren't extended, according to these people.

Usually, that would have triggered a loud horn in the cockpit alerting the pilots that the plane wasn't properly configured for takeoff.

In the last few days, investigators have focused on the theory that some sort of electrical defect or problems with circuit breakers prevented the horn from sounding, these people say.

According to one person familiar with the details, investigators also are looking into why the normal pre-takeoff checklist failed to pinpoint that the flaps hadn't been extended. One person familiar with the details said investigators, among other things, are looking into whether the cockpit crew was distracted or hurried through the check.

Crash investigators haven't released this accident scenario and it still could change as the probe continues. One reason the automatic cockpit warning horn didn't sound might have been because some of the airplane's logic circuits mistakenly sent signals indicating the MD-82 was already in the air. The horn is designed to give a loud warning -- but it operates only when the plane's systems show the aircraft is on the ground.

Loaded with tourists headed for the Canary Islands at the height of the summer travel season, the twin-engine jet barely lifted off the runway, veered off it and smashed its tail on the ground three times while traveling about 4,000 feet (1,200 meters) before breaking up in a fireball.

Investigators are looking into the role of a malfunctioning outside-temperature sensor, which mechanics apparently disabled before the tragic takeoff. The operation of the sensor itself is unlikely to have any direct impact on the plane's ability to fly, according to aviation safety experts. But the problem with the sensor may have been a signal of related problems affecting other electrical circuits.

One retired pilot familiar with the electrical circuits of the MD-80 family of aircraft said problems with the probe could have been a sign of related electrical problems affecting other circuits.

The plane's unusually nose-high attitude and the rolling motion of the wings described by eyewitnesses, according to this retired pilot, is consistent with handling characteristics of a takeoff without flaps.

Spokesmen for the airline and Spanish investigators have declined to comment on the details of the investigation..

[Dmmoore]

Now we can look at how the flight crew missconfigured the flaps / slats and how / why the misconfiguration wasn't picked up by takeoff warning system.

[JordanD]

Damn, I really hope that wasn't the direct cause but it wouldn't surprise me if it was. It's amazing how one little oversight like that, combined with another very minute systems failure can cause such a horrendous crash. :sad:

[ultraflight]

Now we can look at how the flight crew missconfigured the flaps / slats and how / why the misconfiguration wasn't picked up by takeoff warning system.

Don, could you explain the mechanics of what might have happened? Surely the plane can take off without flaps, at a higher speed, with 3000 feet of runway left in front of it? Were they trying to rotate at V2 and lost control when it wouldn't fly?

[Airbus_A320]

Don, could you explain the mechanics of what might have happened? Surely the plane can take off without flaps, at a higher speed, with 3000 feet of runway left in front of it? Were they trying to rotate at V2 and lost control when it wouldn't fly?
Well, if they thought the flaps were set they would have rotated at whatever the calculated Vr was and the plane might have gotten off the ground and probably flew in the ground effect for a bit (everyone says it got a little off the ground) then once it got above the ground effect that's when the shit hit the fan and it would be too late at that point to do anything because it would be stalled very close to the ground.

http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19870816-2

[Leftseat86]

Those MDs also have a pretty steep climb out angle and rotation.

[andrasz]

Don, could you explain the mechanics of what might have happened? Surely the plane can take off without flaps, at a higher speed, with 3000 feet of runway left in front of it? Were they trying to rotate at V2 and lost control when it wouldn't fly?

I'm not so sure in this case. Aircraft was near MTOW and at 2pm in mid-august in MAD it must have been close to 40 deg. C. Anybody with access to MD82 performance charts?

[Dmmoore]

I'll leave the takeoff warning system out of this discussion.
A lot of speculation will be present in this post but here goes.

Assuming the aircraft could takeoff with zero flaps from the runway won't change the fact that in order to do so, the aircraft must accelerate to a higher speed before becoming airborne. The closer to MTOGW the more critical the speed requirement.
Rotating at the speed required for a normal takeoff with flaps / slate extended removes a minimum 15 to 20 knots from the flaps / slate retracted required speed.
Ground effect:
Ground effect is a cushion of air which increases the total lift the wing produces by an estimated 5 to 10%. The effect is negligible after reaching an altitude equal to 1/2 the wing span of the aircraft but with the aircraft on the ground the lift produced by ground effect can be as high as 20% of the total lift. This in large part is due to engine thrust pushing up as the pitch angle increases.
Takeoff at a lower than specified airspeed:
Flaps / slats or not, rotate 20 knots slow and the air craft may become airborne however the drag generated by the extra AOA needed to generate the required lift prevents the aircraft from accelerating. If the pitch angle is reduced enough to allow the aircraft to accelerate, the aircraft will lose altitude quickly and slam into the ground. The only thing you can do is increase thrust. If you do not ave enough thrust you will impact the ground hard.

Check out the F-100 Sabre Dance in the link below.

http://www.alexisparkinn.com/test_flying_videos.htm

[ultraflight]

According to Weather Underground historic data there was a tail wind blowing too (anybody know where to get the metar for MAD at the time of the crash?): <table class="dataTable obsTable" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0"><tbody><tr><td>2:30 PM</td> <td> 82.4 °F / 28.0 °C </td> <td> 35.6 °F / 2.0 °C </td> <td>19%</td> <td> 30.06 in / 1018 hPa </td> <td> - </td> <td>South</td> <td> 8.1 mph / 13.0 km/h / 3.6 m/s</td></tr></tbody></table>

[dr_cfii]

Also, I question why did the AC use more than usual RWY length as reported by the eyewitnesses? You'd think it would accelerate quicker with no flaps, down the rwy? Did the pilots realize they made wrong to config?

[P3_Super_Bee]

Also, I question why did the AC use more than usual RWY length as reported by the eyewitnesses? You'd think it would accelerate quicker with no flaps, down the rwy?

Without flaps, you have less lift, to get the lift required to take off you will need to be going faster therefore using more runway to get to a faster takeoff.

You will accelerate down the runway faster without flaps, but not so much faster that you can take off in the same runway length needed with flaps.

[ultraflight]

I see what dr_cfii means: if the pilots were unaware that the flaps were not set, they would rotate at the normal expected speed; why should that have been further down the runway than normal? Something else must be the matter...

[Dmmoore]

Fact #1. The aircraft did get airborne.
Fact #2. When airborne, the aircraft was at a very high AOA and unstable.
Fact #3. The aircraft did not remain airborne.
Fact #4. The aircraft was found (post crash) with the flaps / slats retracted.

There is no doubt the flight crew thought the flaps were set.
On the long runway available they were very likely using a reduced thrust takeoff.
There is no indication the takeoff warning system alerted the crew to the miss configuration, this system must work, no go.

From my point of view, the aircraft did what I would expect for an aircraft miss configured as it was.

[Quench]

Today in news they said that the pilot didn't try to abort the take off, it didn't take off but went over the grass until it crashed in the river.

And I would like to ask again something, as there is plenty of space around that airport, wouldn't it be better in terms of safety to make the terrain all plain around airports (when available as this is the case) instead of leaving a river flowing in front (and still worse under my point of view) or between the runways that is where the airplane went to crash.

In this case the airplane was like a pretty heavy car running at high speed full of fuel, if a car loss control in a highway or in a plain terrain it may roll around until it stops but if it has irregular terrain in front and loss control, it will have more likely a sudden stop making everyone inside die as it happened in this accident.

Don't you think that when available airports should have enough or as much as possible plain terrain in front of them to stop the heaviest plane that works at each airport at near take off speed in front of the runways?

Just questioning...

there is a system called EMAS I think Engineered materials arresting system? Which is a crumbly cement like material which breaks up as the aircraft goes over it thus stopping it.
This should be put at the end of every commercial runway so as to stop any aircraft that over runs before it hits the ditch or the motorway at the end of the runway.

But unfortunately economics dictate that it isn't :-((

[Deadstick]

there is a system called EMAS I think Engineered materials arresting system? Which is a crumbly cement like material which breaks up as the aircraft goes over it thus stopping it.
This should be put at the end of every commercial runway so as to stop any aircraft that over runs before it hits the ditch or the motorway at the end of the runway.

But unfortunately economics dictate that it isn't :-((
Can't be done at some airports. I can't name them all but certainly SAN when landing 09. The runway end is about 100 yards (if that much) from Pacific Highway.

[Quench]

Can't be done at some airports. I can't name them all but certainly SAN when landing 09. The runway end is about 100 yards (if that much) from Pacific Highway.

100 yards of EMAS while less than the recommended 200 yards is better than nothing.

c.f.
http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=6279

[Deadstick]

100 yards of EMAS while less than the recommended 200 yards is better than nothing.

c.f.
http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=6279
Except you would be going through the ILS antennas, parking areas, and a gas station on the corner across the street. Better than nothing is something, except in the case of SAN it would be not much to solve the problem in question.

There has been heated debate for years about SAN being downtown and constrained from improvement. It also has an obstacle to the 27 approach in the form of a parking garage extending up almost to the ILS approach path. I believe it's a 9 degree approach over the freeway, surrounding buildings and said garage. I've long believed it should be closed and moved to Miramar. Seriously long runways with cleared areas at both ends of the airport. The problem is the new noise caused for the ritchies in La Jolla.

[Spad13]

There has been heated debate for years about SAN being downtown and constrained from improvement. It also has an obstacle to the 27 approach in the form of a parking garage extending up almost to the ILS approach path. I believe it's a 9 degree approach over the freeway, surrounding buildings and said garage. I've long believed it should be closed and moved to Miramar. Seriously long runways with cleared areas at both ends of the airport. The problem is the new noise caused for the ritchies in La Jolla.

A small, but important correction: there is no ILS to Rwy 27 at SAN, only a LOC approach. The only ILS is from the other side to Rwy 9. The vertical profile for LOC 27 calls for a 3.55 deg slope, more than the normal 3.0, but a lot less than 9 deg.

http://www.myairplane.com/databases/approach/pdfs/00373L27.PDF

[Leftseat86]

The displaced threshold means that the slope needn't be much steeper than usual to clear that parking garage. The view from up there is spectacular, unforunately they kick you out for loitering...

[Leftseat86]

And yeah Miramar would be a fantastic choice for a new San Diego airport, probably not going to happen though :/

[Dmmoore]

there is a system called EMAS I think Engineered materials arresting system? Which is a crumbly cement like material which breaks up as the aircraft goes over it thus stopping it.
This should be put at the end of every commercial runway so as to stop any aircraft that over runs before it hits the ditch or the motorway at the end of the runway.

But unfortunately economics dictate that it isn't :-((

EMAS was not a factor in this event.

If you wish to continue the EMAS discussion, please open another thread.

[Deadstick]

A small, but important correction: there is no ILS to Rwy 27 at SAN, only a LOC approach. The only ILS is from the other side to Rwy 9. The vertical profile for LOC 27 calls for a 3.55 deg slope, more than the normal 3.0, but a lot less than 9 deg.

http://www.myairplane.com/databases/approach/pdfs/00373L27.PDF
Thank you for the correction. The 9 degree number I quoted was given to me by an Alaska Air pilot several years ago, as was the ILS info. I was also told it takes an endorsement to land at SAN, but I don't know any of this from personal experience, so my apologies for being incorrect.

[andrasz]

Getting back to the topic, I have some questions, I hope someone can answer:

What is the MD-82 take-off warning logic for flap setting? I assume the flap extension indicator gets the feed from sensors that report the physical position of the flaps, independent of the flaps lever. I would assume there should be a warning in case of a discrepancy. What is the case when flaps are intentionally set to zero, which is a legal takeoff-configuration for some weight/runway combinations?

It was reported that on the CVR "Flaps, OK. Slats, OK" is audible. With our company the required response to the Flaps item is "X degrees, set", not a simple OK to indicate set as should be. What regulations are there for checklist procedure, and if the reported CVR is accurate, is OK an acceptabe response?

[Spad13]

I was also told it takes an endorsement to land at SAN, but I don't know any of this from personal experience, so my apologies for being incorrect.

That may be an operator-specific policy, rather than a legal requirement.

[Carl E. Hackert]

"It was reported that on the CVR 'Flaps, OK. Slats, OK' is audible"...Where did you find the CVR info concerning the flap settings?

We'll be able to discuss this more intelligently with the release of the security video, ATC & CVR transcripts and FDR info. At this point, all we seem to know is that after a longer than normal takeoff run, the liftoff proceeded to 100-150' in altitude and stalled - a survivor reported the aircraft shaking and the wings rocking then dipping.

Earlier reports of an engine fire have been said to be incorrect after authorities viewed the security video and the overheat condition was in the air conditioning system.

So, that leaves the possibility of misconfiguration of the aircraft for takeoff leading to the stall after liftoff - crew error. It has happened before, unfortunately.

As you say, such as errors can easily be linked to the use of non-standard terminology, interuptions during checklists and informal/unprofessional cockpit atmosphere.

The LaGuardia takeoff crash ranks among the saddest examples of non-qualified first officer and an unprofessional captain - all captured on the CVR.

[andrasz]

"It was reported that on the CVR 'Flaps, OK. Slats, OK' is audible"...Where did you find the CVR info concerning the flap settings?


It was reported by el Pais (leading Spanish daily) this morning as quoted, then picked up by various media, quoting as usual "sources close to the investigation..." Same source informs that there was no aural take-off warning, but stickshaker & GPWS activated before impact. One of the more factual english sources:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/2690448/Madrid-air-crash-investigators-explore-pilot-error--possiblity.html

Obviously a key question in the investigation will be whether flaps were not set and missed during the checklist (has happened before), or the flap lever was actually set properly, but the flaps/slats did not extend and this was missed, in part because of a fault (or pulled fuse) inhibited the T/O warning.

[Gabriel]

Getting back to the topic, I have some questions, I hope someone can answer:

What is the MD-82 take-off warning logic for flap setting? I assume the flap extension indicator gets the feed from sensors that report the physical position of the flaps, independent of the flaps lever. I would assume there should be a warning in case of a discrepancy. What is the case when flaps are intentionally set to zero, which is a legal takeoff-configuration for some weight/runway combinations?
There are some MD-80 piltos arround here that can correct me if (where) I'm wrong.

Therer is a flaps / slats lever and a slats and flaps position indicator wich is fed by tha actual flaps/slats position and not directly from the position of the lever. If there is a disagree between the lever and the indicator then a flaps/slats disagree indication would activate. That is NOT the take-off configuration warning.

The plaps/slats lever has several detents:
UP (0/0)
0 (flaps 0 / slats partially extended to its sealed position)
11 (flaps 11 / slats partially extended to its sealed position)
15 (flaps 15 / slats fully extended to its unsealed position)
28 (flaps 28 / slats fully extended to its unsealed position)
40 (flaps 40 / slats fully extended to its unsealed position)

The minimum flaps/slats setting for T/O is slats only, so yes flaps zero is legal under certain conditions, but slats must be always extended.

There is a take-off compuiter where the pilots enter the required take-off flaps (0, 11 or 15) and the position of the CG. The take-off comuter then computes the required trim setting for that configuration and CG.

There is a take-off configuration warning system that arms when the throttle levers are moved forward beyond certain point (even if the airplane is on the ramp with the engines off). When the throttles are advanced past that point the system compares several airplane actual settings with the requiered take-off configuration. These settings are:

- Flaps matching what was entered in the take-off computer
- Slats matching corresponding value for what was entered as flaps setting in the take-off computer. Note that if you enter flaps zero the system will require the slats to be in the partially extended / sealed position.
- Trim within a range about the value computed by the take-off computer.
- Spoilers retracted.
- Parking brakes off.

If one or more of these settings do not match the required configuration, the system will sound a horn and yell in clear English all of the items that do not match. If you are at the ramp with the engines off, the parking brake set and the flaps/slats retracted, and advance the throttle you will hear the horn plus "Slats! Flaps! Brakes!"

If the required flaps setting in this case was say flaps 11 and they left the flaps and slats retracted, then they should have heard Slats! Flaps!.

If they made another mistake by enetering "flaps 0" in the take-off computer but left the flaps and slats retracted (not in the flpas zero / slats extended position) they should have still heard Slats! and the horn.

Unless the take-off warning failed too. It would not be the first case.

[Carl E. Hackert]

Thanks for the info and the news story source. The similarities of the results of a possible Spainair crew error with the ill-fated 1987 Northwest DC-9 crash is striking and sad... That NW flight's CVR audio file is posted on airdisaster.com - one can hear the audible warning, too late and too low (50') to recover.

[Quench]

If one or more of these settings do not match the required configuration, the system will sound a horn and yell in clear English all of the items that do not match. If you are at the ramp with the engines off, the parking brake set and the flaps/slats retracted, and advance the throttle you will hear the horn plus "Slats! Flaps! Brakes!"


So it is something that could easily be tested as part of the preflight checks.
Is it ?

Anyone know if there are any statistics regarding how often a takeoff configuration alarm has saved an otherwise doomed takeoff ?

[Gabriel]

Thanks for the info and the news story source. The similarities of the results of a possible Spainair crew error with the ill-fated 1987 Northwest DC-9 crash is striking and sad... That NW flight's CVR audio file is posted on airdisaster.com - one can hear the audible warning, too late and too low (50') to recover.
The similarities are striking indeed. To the point that the NW "DC-9" was not a DC-9 as we know it today. It was one of the DC-9 Super 80 series, and specifiaclly a DC-9-82. Unlike the original DC-9, the Super 80 series was developed when Douglas and Mc Donnell had already merged, and the name of the family DC-9 Super 80 become the MD-80. Within this family, the DC-9-82 (like the NW one) became the MD-82. Exactly the same type as the Spanair one.

The warning you hear in the CVR is the stall warning (thre horns and the word Stall!). In the background you can also hear the stickshaker. Whn the stall warning started to sound, immediatly after lift off, the situation was still recoverable. The take-off configuration warning that I mentioned in my previous post never sounded.

[Gabriel]

So it is something that could easily be tested as part of the preflight checks.
Is it ?
Yes, it can and is systematlically tested as part of the preflight checks. At least that's what some operators mandate to do.

I don't know if Spanair procedures don't mandate to check this or it does and the pilots didn't, or if they did first but not when they returned to chek the other problem they had.

[SeanC]

Well, plenty of knowledgeable voices on here from reading through this thread, so thought I might throw a question out there in relation to the recent, tragic accident at Barajas.

One Spanish TV news report a few days back made a point of mentioning that the use by passengers of their mobiles phones in the cabin may have potentially (and I do emphasise that word) caused the failure of the audio alarm to sound re the apparently incorrect setting of flaps/slats on flight JK5022. It went on to say that the use of electronic equipment below 3000 metres/feet (can't recall which precisely) can interfere with aircraft instruments, and that in a study (not sure if this was a national or international finding) it was discovered that 84% of passengers obeyed the boundaries set re the use of electronic equipment on board. This however leaves 16% not doing so.

This leaves me wondering;

(a) could use of said electronic personal devices theoretically cause a malfunction of an audio alarm in the cockpit?

(b) (if this question is better off in a separate thread mods, please advise) having personally observed with growing unease a growing laxity among passengers in abiding by the laws on when & when not to use electronic devices when flying, are we reaching a point when the civil aviation authorities should require passengers to either store these devices in check-in lugguge or hand them to cabin crew at the point of boarding the aircraft? Perhaps I'm overstating the issue, but if such carelessness has the potential to impact on aviation safety standards, then surely it's something that requires serious attention?

[Spad13]

There is a take-off configuration warning system that arms when the throttle levers are moved forward beyond certain point (even if the airplane is on the ramp with the engines off). When the throttles are advanced past that point the system compares several airplane actual settings with the requiered take-off configuration.

I find it surprising that the system would be thrust lever position-dependent, rather than engine speed dependent, especially if the aircraft is A/T equipped. On our aircraft the similar system will give us a green T/O Config OK advisory message on EICAS if flaps are at 8 or 20deg, both engines are operating, brake is off and trims are withing green range. We will get a config warning message if either the flaps, the trim or the brakes are not where they should be AND either engine is above 70% N1. An airplane with engines off is obviously not in T/O config and I imagine the MDD system would require at the very least for AC power to be on the airplane. I attempted to track down an MD-80 systems manual, but was unsuccessful.

[Gabriel]

I find it surprising that the system would be thrust lever position-dependent, rather than engine speed dependent, especially if the aircraft is A/T equipped. On our aircraft the similar system will give us a green T/O Config OK advisory message on EICAS if flaps are at 8 or 20deg, both engines are operating, brake is off and trims are withing green range. We will get a config warning message if either the flaps, the trim or the brakes are not where they should be AND either engine is above 70% N1. An airplane with engines off is obviously not in T/O config and I imagine the MDD system would require at the very least for AC power to be on the airplane. I attempted to track down an MD-80 systems manual, but was unsuccessful.
Yes, of course you need the aircraft to be powered (APU or external cart), as for many things done before the engines are started. But the take-off configuration warning is activated by a switch which in turn is mechanically activated directly by the throttle levers.

From the NW accident report, page 13:

http://amelia.db.erau.edu/reports/ntsb/aar/AAR88-05.pdf

At the time of the accident, the APH required the flightcrew to check the takeoff
warning system during the RECEIVING AIRPLANE checklist. The check is made during the spoiler
check when the throttles are advanced to about 4 inches of throttle travel to check the performance
of the spoiler lever. The APH states, in part:
The takeoff warning horn will sound after the throttles have been
advanced to the takeoff position. Allow the CAWS to cycle
through at least one cycle: ” STABILIZER, AUTO BRAKES, BRAKES,
FLAPS AND SLATS.”
The warning is activated by throttle lever position and not by engine power settings.

[dr_cfii]

(a) could use of said electronic personal devices theoretically cause a malfunction of an audio alarm in the cockpit?

(b) (if this question is better off in a separate thread mods, please advise) having personally observed with growing unease a growing laxity among passengers in abiding by the laws on when & when not to use electronic devices when flying, are we reaching a point when the civil aviation authorities should require passengers to either store these devices in check-in lugguge or hand them to cabin crew at the point of boarding the aircraft? Perhaps I'm overstating the issue, but if such carelessness has the potential to impact on aviation safety standards, then surely it's something that requires serious attention?

Being a wireless engineer, I'd say no way that any of personal electronics could even remotely interfere with either AC electronics or the navigation equipment.

In the cell phones case, it is more the FCC rule ("confusing" numerous cell towers from up there) than the FAA concern...

[3WE]

The similarities are striking indeed.

One striking difference is that NWA maintained an incredibly straight track, while this aircraft veered "strongly" off to the side of the runway.

To be clear, my point isn't to discredit the associations which appear valid; but to revisit some things about Madrid: particularly, the engine nozzle in the reverse position, and wasn't the other reverser inoperative?

So, while the NWA crew (with it's shorter runway) was stuck doing everything it could to fly, there's some hints here that the Madrid crew may have tried a desperate attempt to return to the runway (which makes a little sense since the runway was longer, but which at the same time also makes bad sense since after V1 and V2, there's very few "allowable" reasons to abort).

Anyway, any news yet on FDR and CVR data indicating a power reduction, selection of reverse thrust, talk of trying to set it back down? If so, the inoperative reverser adds a big twist with speculation that staying straght might have made for a better and more survivable "on-runway" crash, instead of going off-roading in an MD-80.

[Gabriel]

One striking difference is that NWA maintained an incredibly straight track, while this aircraft veered "strongly" off to the side of the runway.

To be clear, my point isn't to discredit the associations which appear valid; but to revisit some things about Madrid: particularly, the engine nozzle in the reverse position, and wasn't the other reverser inoperative?

So, while the NWA crew (with it's shorter runway) was stuck doing everything it could to fly, there's some hints here that the Madrid crew may have tried a desperate attempt to return to the runway (which makes a little sense since the runway was longer, but which at the same time also makes bad sense since after V1 and V2, there's very few "allowable" reasons to abort).

Anyway, any news yet on FDR and CVR data indicating a power reduction, selection of reverse thrust, talk of trying to set it back down? If so, the inoperative reverser adds a big twist with speculation that staying straght might have made for a better and more survivable "on-runway" crash, instead of going off-roading in an MD-80.
The NTSB said that the NW plane rolled to one side and the other several times with banks angles axceeding 30deg. The Spanair one was reported by a survivor and whintesses to be rocking the wings from one side to another. The airplane stalled is very unstable in roll and the roll handling characteristics are very poor too. In such conditions, whether the airplane ends more or less along the same line or veers off it is a matter of whether the banks to both sides are more or less of the same magnitude and duration or not. More chance than anything else.

I'll write a possible sequence of events which mixes some facts, many rumors, loads of speculation, too many wild guesses and even a good bungh of imagination. Discretion is cautioned. I have little to support this and it's just an expresion of my feelings about what could have happened.

- The air-ground sensor was faulty. The air-ground sensor is a switch linked to the nose gear strut. When the strut is compressed it returns ground mode, and when it's extended it returns the air mode. The fault in the sensor was such that the system worked Ok smetimes and wrongly other times.
- The crew made all the tasks for the preparation of the flight. Among them, they advanced the throttles to check the take-off configuration warning, computed the CG, obtained the required flaps setting (11) and entered those two values in the TCC (take-off configuration computer), set the flaps to 11, adjusted the trim to the computed value, and made all the checks including flaps.
- The plane taxied for take off. During the taxi some movement of the nose strut made the faulty air-ground sensor change from "ground" to "air".
- The RAT probe go too hot and the crew got and overheat warning. The RAT probe is designed to be heated whenever the airplane is on the air, but not when it's on the ground. The heating system is automatic and activated by the air-ground sensor.
- The crew returned to the ramp to have the RAT probe overheat issue checked out. At some point they brought the flaps/slats back to the retracted position.
- The tech guis didn't identiy the faulty ground/air sensor as the source (perhaps it was back in "ground" by then), and dissabled the heating at once.
- The crew taxied again fo the take-off. The take-off config warning wasn't checked again because it's only checked when receiving the plane. They where under pressure to hurry up and went througth the check lists quickly. During one of those check lists one pilot chalenged "flaps and slats" and the other answered "check", not the actual indication of flaps and slats position as it should have been done. Probably the "check" answer was an automated response to the challenge and the position was in fact not checked. The flaps and slats were mistakenly left retracted.
- Take-off power was set. The take-off config warning did not yell "slats! flaps!" as it should. This system is inhibited when the airplane is in "air" mode. The faulty air-ground sensor was signaling "air".
- The PNF called "Vr" at the right speed for the flaps 11 configuration. The PF responded rotating nose up.
- At any given speed, the flaps and slats increase both the lift at any given AOA as the maximum achievable lift. Had the flaps/slats been set to 11, the airpane should have lifted off at about 6 to 8deg ANU. But with a speed that was to low for the configuration, the airplane barely lifted off when the pitch was about 12deg ANU, with the tail nearly (or barely) scraping the runway. Simultaneously, the stick shacker (that warns of the proximity of a stall) started and continued until the impact. The aircraft continued to increase its pitch. Two seconds after the lift off the secondary stall warning (an intermitent horn and a voice saying "stall!", that indicates that the stall AOA has been already achived or exceeded) also activated.
- During the few seconds that lasted the flight the pilot modulated the yoke several times, relieving pressure to silence the secondary stall warning and pulling again, action that activated the warning again.
- At the stall, the airplane was unstable in roll and the control responsiveness in roll is poor at best. That made the pilot make large roll inputs which induced a roll oscilation with significant bank angles to both sides. Those large roll inputs also made the roll spoilers to deflect, which increased the drag even more and reduced the lift even more.
- The airplane never climbed more than 40ft.
- Eventually, the airplane rolled right and settled down back on the ground. The first impat occurred on the right runway shoulder, with the airlane heading about 10deg right of the runway heading, in a right wing down, nose high ettitude. The tail impacted first which caused the tail cone to separate. Then the right wing tip, right main gear, and left main gear.
-In a desperate attempt to stop, the pilot pressed full brakes, brought both throttles to idle and pulled the reverse levers (this actions could have started shortly before the first impact, when the pilot noticed that he was loosing it and that the imact was unavoidable).
- The right reverser deployed. The left reverser was melled/pinned out, and so it didn't deploy.
- Almost simultaneously with the deployment of the right reverser, the right engine separated from the airplane.
- The airplane continued skidding on the grass until it reached the ravine and river, where it was violently stopped and resulted destroyed by impact force and, mainly, by post-crash fire.
- While the causes of the accident were the wrong flaps/slats setting, the failure of the crew to detect that wrong failure during the checklists, and the failure of the take-off config warning due to the failure of the air-ground sensor, the severity of the accident could have been prevented or at least mitigated had the pilot commanded pitch to fly at or slightly below the onset of the stick shaker (and perhaps firewalled the throttles). Performance studies will show that the airplane was able to climb and clear any obstacles had the pilot avoided flying at/beyond the stall. Also, even when V2 had been already achieved, had a rejected take-off been initiated when the stick shaker started, the runway was long enough to stop the airplane within the stopway or at least to depart the runway with a much slower forward speed what would have greatly reduced the consequences.

[Bozo]

Some facts about MD80. Relevant to this accident.
Temperature sensor: The only one is the RAT probe (RamAirTemperature).
This one is heated, for deicing purpose, only in Air over ground/flight logic. Relay R2-5. In L/H Ground Control and CB B11.
Config warning: Take Off Warning on MD80. Is only active on Ground. Deleted in air over relay R2-5.
If Relay R2-5 is faulty (not energized ) some system are in Air mode.
There is heating on RAT probe and T/O warning is deleted.
Same happens if L/H Ground Control CB is pulled. Some more system will be in Air mode. Pulling this CB, to check if heating of RAT probe is working is relevant.
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Liftoff with MD80 without slats, is possible only by help of “ground effect” or extremely high speed.
If speed is normal, A/C will stall after a short time and there is no margin to handle the stall.
In this situation, A/C will be very unstable and will roll over to one or another side.
Bozo

[Kuark]

(I am just a flight sim fan so I apologize for any stupid statement)

I am intrigued about the comment of a survivor saying that the aircraft was taking too long to get to the speed. Of course this is a quite subjective opinion for a passenger.

However as everybody is focusing on flaps/slats problem (not confirmed officially if I am not wrong) might we forget other possibilities like any thrust problem?

I was reading some documentation about the aircraft. The Thrust Rating Panel includes a T.O. FLX mode which calculates a reduced EPR limit based on estimated RAT. This is the only link that I could find between take-off configurations and external temperature. I tried in the flight simulator with a very hot (abnormal) external temperature and the EPR limit was significantly reduced. Could an abnormal low EPR limit be missed?

You are the experts so let me know if this makes any sense.

Thanks.

[Theoddkiwi]

I am concerned that Air Ground sensing is only through one relay and or sensor on the MD-80.

Certainly the 737NG has a dual channel Air/Ground sensing system, and discrepancy between the two systems would give a Master Caution light.

Given thats its pretty important for the A/c to know if its on the ground or not, is there no redundancy built in here?

Either way, it would seem they atleast missed physically checking their flapr settings via both the handle and instrumentation.

Other flapless take offs have possibly occured by crew disabling the alarm.

[Bozo]

I am concerned that Air Ground sensing is only through one relay and or sensor on the MD-80.

Certainly the 737NG has a dual channel Air/Ground sensing system, and discrepancy between the two systems would give a Master Caution light.

Given thats its pretty important for the A/c to know if its on the ground or not, is there no redundancy built in here?

Either way, it would seem they atleast missed physically checking their flapr settings via both the handle and instrumentation.

Other flapless take offs have possibly occured by crew disabling the alarm.

Air/Ground sensing system on MD80 is also by several sensors and L/H, R/H relay grops. R2-5 is one of five rely on L/H Ground/Fight sensing.
Bozo

[Dmmoore]

The takeoff warning system is tested during preflight inspection before each flight. If a problem is present, it should have been detected.

[Bozo]

The takeoff warning system is tested during preflight inspection before each flight. If a problem is present, it should have been detected.
Yes.......
And Flap/Slat lever to pos. 11.
Dirty Dozens.

[Theoddkiwi]

The takeoff warning system is tested during preflight inspection before each flight. If a problem is present, it should have been detected.

But i would seem apparent that after the return to gate, they did not go through their checks fully before their second attempt.

Gottagetthereitis its a deadly disease

[Unal Basusta]

According to what I know about the airplane and what I gathered from different sources here is my guess work about the accident.


The heavily loaded MD82 aircraft, bound for the Canary Islands, smashed to the ground tail-first near Barajas airport on August 20 after struggling to climb after an unusually long take-off run. Only 18 people survived.ffice:office" /><O:p></O:p>
Spanair flight JK5022 taxied out to the runway and then turned back to the terminal after the pilot reported a fault in the instrument that measures outside temperatures. <O:p></O:p>
When the technicians gave the green light an hour later, the 15-year-old aircraft returned to the runway, accelerated to more than 150mph and began to lift a few feet into the air and the MD82 aircraft crashed into the ground near the end of the runway. <O:pA combination of pilot error and an electrical failure has emerged as the possible cause of the crash of a Spanair airliner at Madrid airport last month that killed 154 people. The crew of the MD82 jet failed to extend the wing flaps that are vital for take-off and an automatic system did not alert them, according to media leaks from the Madrid investigation. <O:p></O:p>
Data from the “black box” recorders of the Spanair jet showed that the two engines worked normally up to the crash but that the flaps were not set. The flaps on the wing’s trailing edge and slats on the leading edge are essential for lift on take-off. They are one of the three “killer items” that pilots triple-check before take-off. TRIM, FLAPS, SPOILERS<O:p></O:p>
The cockpit voice recorder, recovered from the crash, showed that the crew had confirmed “Flaps OK, Slats OK” during their reading of the check list, according to Spanish reports. <O:p></O:p>
A loud audio alert "BEEP BEEP FLAPS, BEEP BEEP SLATS “should have warned the crew of the wrong flap setting the moment they applied take-off power, but it did not work. The devices were installed on airliners decades ago because the failure of pilots to set flaps caused so many accidents. Two other alarms — warning of nearby ground and imminent stall — did work in the Spanair aircraft as the pilots struggled to control it. According to evidence gathered so far this accident look like a copy of previous MD 82 The US National Transportation Safety Board determined that the loss of a Northwest Airlines MD-82 at almost exactly 21 years before the Spanair crash, was due to the crew's failure to use the taxi checklist to ensure that the flaps and slats were extended prior to the take-off roll.<O:p></O:p>
<FORM>
As was the habit of all accident investigators here again accident news started with engine fire/explosion then with reversers and finally wrong take-off configuration. İn lace>Spain</ST1:place> is quoting them adding their own little "twists" to the story to make it fit better a "mechanical" (electrical) malfunction and downplay the pilots (potentially) forgetting to set wing configuration correctly for take-off.

"An electrical malfunction caused the accident".???<O:p></O:p>
<O:p></O:p>
İt is unbelievebale they still can’t find any clue if the flaps and slats extended or not. There are 5 sources to gather this information from the wreck.<O:p></O:p>
1-Wing pieces on the crash site. <O:p></O:p>
2-Cockpit ındicators<O:p></O:p>
3- Flap slat quadrant<O:p></O:p>
4- position of slat actuators<O:p></O:p>
5-Recorders.


<O:p></O:p>
When a pilot moved the flap handle to extend he watches for a blue light and the proper indication on the flap gauge., The checklist called for checking the slats/flaps and then the takeoff warning configuration. To do that thrust was applied when start taxiing, if the the slats up, we would hear the warning horn... If the slats were set, No warning...if a warning was heard, the slats were not set.
When reach the runway, check the slats/flaps once more...not a checklist item but a KILLER ITEM . FLAPS, TRIM, SPOILERS will all kill you on takeoff if not properly set.

İMPORTANT CLUES FOR ACCİDENT: <O:p></O:p>
İn order to Take Off without flaps and slats pilots must<O:p></O:p>
1-Failed to do proper preflight. (Checking all circuit brakers)<O:p></O:p>
2- Failed to do proper checklist check.<O:p></O:p>
a) Did not check the flap position gage, slat light, position of flap handle on the pedestal.<O:p></O:p>
3- When powered up both engine did not received take off warning (Setup procedures was to advance the thrust levers prior to engine start and test the CAWS (Central Aural Warning System). If it worked properly, we would hear a "BEEP BEEP FLAPS, BEEP BEEP SLATS, )<O:p></O:p>
a) Due to failure to check circuit brakers during preflight failed to see GND CONT. RELAYS circuit braker was out.<O:p></O:p>
b) because of this CB was out ( Or a fault in the system)hence the failure of TAT probe heat problem, strob light being on and take off configuration warning failure occurred.<O:p></O:p>
c)During second refueling the fueler seen the strobe lights were on. (They only work in air or if the aircraft think it is in the air) <O:p></O:p>
The probe heating on the ground and fueller seeing the strobe lights on is an indication of aircraft was in air mode.,<O:p></O:p>
takeoff configuration warning/groundshift mechanism were not working the symptom being the heating of the RAT on the ground and the strobe lights during fueling..

This becomes second piece of evidence of an air/ground system malfunction which put the aircraft on flight mode and the failure of take off configuration warning and the RAT probe heating.

On rotation when the A/C failed to climb properly, the crew realised what had happened and instinctively tried to stop and grabbed the reversers, (reports says one reverser locked out for being inop.) .After accident one reverser found on locked Full reverse thrust position. <O:p></O:p>
THE THRUST REVERSERS didn't cause or contribute to the crash.

The ENGINES were producing proper and normal thrust for takeoff.

İn an incident with another MD83. crew failed to comply with the checklist and did not extend flaps and slats. After rotation experienced stall and 50 deg bank left and then recovering and then right 50 deg. This whent on for a few times back and fwd and somehow manage to get the aircraft stable with selecting gear up and just continue towards the slow hill at about 100 ft of altitude. Crew then found out flap handle in up position. How was that possibe ?? This is an officilal NTSB report and they found c/b -L/H GND CTRL RLY OUT when landed safely. <O:p></O:p>
<O:p></O:p>
PİLOT’S<O:p></O:p>
İt doesn´t matter how long one is flying an aircraft type and how experienced one is always do.<O:p></O:p>
<O:p> </O:p>
1- Proper walkaround.<O:p></O:p>
2-Proper check of all CB’s <O:p></O:p>
3- Check all aural warnings<O:p></O:p>
4- Do a proper check list check.<O:p></O:p>
5- Double check the killers. TRIM, FLAPS, SPOILERS...

<O:p></O:p>
AİRPORTS:<O:p></O:p>
1- Must install cameras specifically to monitor take-offs and landings for safety or flight operations performance.<O:p></O:p>
2- Şhould level the ground around all active runways and remove or shorten the obstacles. (Prevents eccesive damage to airplanes and unnecessary loss of life. Permits rescue vehicles faster response time and more efficient operations)<O:p></O:p>
<O:p> </O:p>
<O:p> </O:p>
PASSANGERS<O:p></O:p>
<O:p> </O:p>
I had a passenger telling us AFTER the flight that one of our speedbrake panels was fluttering. Of course we shrugged it off, but called for an engineer anyway just to be sure, who subsequently found a major rupture in the panel's hydraulic actuator, grounding the plane for the rest of the day. NOW I wish that pax had spoken up in flight<O:p></O:p>
<O:p> </O:p>
I know of one case in which the spoilers deployed on landing of a 737 and when the handle was moved to retract them, the cable broke...so the handle moved to the correct spot, the light that said the spoilers were extended went out BUT THE SPOILERS WERE STILL EXTENDED. It was missed onthe walk around...but some guys in back on the next flight, deadheading noticed and stopped the takeoff in time...THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO WARNING.

WHILE it takes bravery to speak up to avoid a disaster you must be brave and speak up if you :

1. know something about planes

2. see something wrong.

A passenger noted something wrong with our flaps on landing...we extended them at the gate and wow, was there something wrong!!! grounded!

My guess about the accident is with over load ,bad trim ,low EPR, hot temperature and a slight tail wind take off without flap/ slat extended.
Due to inop TO conf.warning. And the tocw is inop due to pulled grd prox cb.<O:p></O:p>
<O:p> </O:p>
The DC9/MD80/MD90 series is one of the finest, strongest planes built. It is a joy to fly if you are a good stick and rudder pilot. It has few computers and the pilot is directly in charge of just about everything.<O:p></O:p>
<O:p> </O:p>
</FORM>

[AJ]

Please post on this thread!:
http://forums.jetphotos.net/showthread.php?p=487884#post487884

[Dmmoore]

Merged threads

[Gabriel]

Perhaps in Canada that may be the case, I've never seen a US operator that did that and I've jumpseated on many.
[Off topic]
Spad, you might find this inteesting:
http://www.smartcockpit.com/pdf/flightops/aerodynamics/28
(RE: V1 range)
Se specially page 37 for a mini-summary

[Gabriel]

İn an incident with another MD83. crew failed to comply with the checklist and did not extend flaps and slats. After rotation experienced stall and 50 deg bank left and then recovering and then right 50 deg. This whent on for a few times back and fwd and somehow manage to get the aircraft stable with selecting gear up and just continue towards the slow hill at about 100 ft of altitude. Crew then found out flap handle in up position. How was that possibe ?? This is an officilal NTSB report and they found c/b -L/H GND CTRL RLY OUT when landed safely. <O:razz:></O:razz:>
<O:razz:
I'm much interested in this incidet. Any link to the report or ifnormation please?

[Crunk415balla]

So this thread has been moved out of the Aviation Safety thread?

[Dmmoore]

So this thread has been moved out of the Aviation Safety thread?

No.
Another related thread was merged into this one.
If you look carefully you will find you posted in the Aviation Safety thread.

[Gabriel]

No.
If you look carefully you will find you posted in the Aviation Safety thread.
:skeptic: :uhoh: :roll:

[Crunk415balla]

No.
Another related thread was merged into this one.
If you look carefully you will find you posted in the Aviation Safety thread.
When I posted it was right there with the XL Airways thread and stuff, but ok.

[AJ]

Yes it was moved out, I presuming by moderator finger trouble! I moved it back last night.

[Dmmoore]

Yes it was moved out, I presuming by moderator finger trouble! I moved it back last night.

OO:oP's
The forum instruction confused me:confused:!

Thanks AJ.

[Cargo Runner]

The wing flaps on a plane that crashed in Madrid last month did not open properly during take-off, Spanish media have reported.

Investigators found that the pilots were unaware of the problem because a cockpit warning alarm did not go off, several Spanish newspapers said.
The Spanair plane plunged to the ground shortly after take-off, killing 154 people on board.
It was the deadliest air crash in Spain in 25 years.
<!-- E SF -->
Cockpit recordings

Reports in the Spanish media suggest that the Spanair jet may have stalled during take-off because the wing flaps were not properly deployed.
The flaps make it easier for aircraft to get off the ground at take-off speeds.
Investigators have not released any official statement on the disaster, but Spanish media say the issue of the wing flaps came from analysis of the cockpit voice and data recordings.
The Spanish Interior Minister, Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba, told Spanish television the government would not comment until the investigation into the crash had been completed.
"In my experience an accident doesn't happen for a single reason," he said.
"We are going to wait for the report to be finished to find out what happened because there are many theories," Mr Rubalcaba added.
The Spanair jet had aborted a previous take-off attempt.
It was preparing to fly to Las Palmas in the Canary Islands, when the pilots reported a problem. Technicians discovered a fault in a temperature gauge on the aircraft. <!-- E BO -->


according to the BBC

[Chris Kilroy]

This wouldn't be the first MD-80 accident occurring because of an improper flaps/slats setting during takeoff from a fairly long runway:

Previous Accident (http://www.airdisaster.com/cgi-bin/view_details.cgi?date=08161987&reg=N312RC&airline=Northwest+Airlines)

[Cam]

Does anyone have a visual of what they are talking about? Did they just not set the flaps for take-off?

[Smilin_Ed]

Does anyone have a visual of what they are talking about? Did they just not set the flaps for take-off?

Until someone tells us in what position the flap control(s) were found, we don't know if the crew failed to set the control(s) to the correct position or whether they set the control(s) properly but the flaps/slats didn't move to the selected position.