Military & FAA at odds over unresponsive jet in Hawaii

[FireLight]

HONOLULU - With an unresponsive commercial jet missing its landing and no one knowing what was happening in the cockpit, federal aviation officials say they alerted the military about the wayward flight that failed to respond to nearly a dozen calls.

The military denies any alarm was raised. While investigation has focused on whether the pilots were sleeping, the Feb. 13 incident prompted congressional concern Wednesday and reveals a possible breakdown in communications despite all the measures installed after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

The Federal Aviation Administration said it properly and promptly alerted the military through various channels about the unresponsive go! jet from Honolulu to Hilo at 21,000 feet carrying 40 passengers and three crew members. Rest of story here: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23938005/

It didn't really occur to me when the story first came out about the pilots that flew past their destination in Hawaii, but the other potential issue was whether the aircraft was in trouble and may have been used for terrorist purposes.

It leads to a question. When should the Air Force scramble aircraft to intercept commercial aircraft that aren't responding?

[Dmmoore]

It brings up several questions but I would say if the Jet is headed away from land, I would alert search and rescue. If it were headed toward something valuable, scramble fighters.

[FireLight]

It brings up several questions but I would say if the Jet is headed away from land, I would alert search and rescue. If it were headed toward something valuable, scramble fighters.

Seems sensible.

I was reminded a bit of the Helios 737 in Greece. (IIRC, I saw it on a National Geographic Channel show recently.) Loss of cabin pressure at altitude resulted in the crew (and pax) becoming unconscious. F-16's were scrambled, but there wasn't much they could do with the crew incapacitated. (One flight attendant remained conscious, but apparently was also not in a position to take over aircraft operation - would he have had much of a chance if he did?) The only thing they could have done was shoot the aircraft down if it veered towards a major city like Athens. That would have been a pretty tough situation for the fighter pilots to be in.

[bob12312357]

Seems sensible.

I was reminded a bit of the Helios 737 in Greece. (IIRC, I saw it on a National Geographic Channel show recently.) Loss of cabin pressure at altitude resulted in the crew (and pax) becoming unconscious. F-16's were scrambled, but there wasn't much they could do with the crew incapacitated. (One flight attendant remained conscious, but apparently was also not in a position to take over aircraft operation - would he have had much of a chance if he did?) The only thing they could have done was shoot the aircraft down if it veered towards a major city like Athens. That would have been a pretty tough situation for the fighter pilots to be in.
The Helios jet never lost cabin pressure,because it was never pressurized. The pressurization on 737's can be manually or automatically controled,it was left on manual and unpressurized. The captain was a Type A personality who when they couldn't figure out what the warning horn for lack of pressurization was and a crew member suggested the proper anwser,the captain ignored him and kept saying what he thought it was,all the while climbing higher. Due to it not being a rapid decompression and rather a gradual climb in an unpressurized cabin the crew never noticed the gradual onset of hypoxia until it was upon them. The flight attendant was a low hour pilot,and clueless on how 2 operate a several hundred thousand pound airliner. As in about 80% of all crash's I believe this was ruled pilot error.

[FireLight]

Bob - thanks for the clarification. The distinction between depressurization and failing to pressurize is an important one in terms of recognizing the situation. It is clear that that CRM wasn't effective or they may have solved the problem in time - even if only to get their oxygen masks on which would have given them the ability to recover from the incident. The show identified that they found a fragment of the instrument panel with the control for pressurization set to Manual, which had been set during a mechanical check the previous day, as there was some crew report of an abnormal noise coming from the rear door. The control was never set back to Auto prior to the flight. (There was also a third position on the dial, Standby I think)

For the purpose of this thread, I found this at AD, which showed that scrambling fighters was standard Greek practise when contact was lost with an airliner. Doesn't seem to be standard American practise, even at this time.

Two F-16 fighter jets were sent out shortly after the plane entered Greek air space over the Aegean Sea and did not respond to radio calls — a standard Greek practice. As they intercepted the airliner shortly before it crashed, the jet pilots saw one of the pilots slumped unconscious over the controls, Alpha TV reported. They also reported that there was no movement in the cabin.

The Helios jet never lost cabin pressure,because it was never pressurized. The pressurization on 737's can be manually or automatically controled,it was left on manual and unpressurized. The captain was a Type A personality who when they couldn't figure out what the warning horn for lack of pressurization was and a crew member suggested the proper anwser,the captain ignored him and kept saying what he thought it was,all the while climbing higher. Due to it not being a rapid decompression and rather a gradual climb in an unpressurized cabin the crew never noticed the gradual onset of hypoxia until it was upon them. The flight attendant was a low hour pilot,and clueless on how 2 operate a several hundred thousand pound airliner. As in about 80% of all crash's I believe this was ruled pilot error.

Note: I am thinking now that the show might have been Mayday on the Discovery Channel (Canada)

[Quench]

The Helios jet never lost cabin pressure,because it was never pressurized. The pressurization on 737's can be manually or automatically controled,it was left on manual and unpressurized. The captain was a Type A personality who when they couldn't figure out what the warning horn for lack of pressurization was and a crew member suggested the proper anwser,the captain ignored him and kept saying what he thought it was,all the while climbing higher. Due to it not being a rapid decompression and rather a gradual climb in an unpressurized cabin the crew never noticed the gradual onset of hypoxia until it was upon them. The flight attendant was a low hour pilot,and clueless on how 2 operate a several hundred thousand pound airliner. As in about 80% of all crash's I believe this was ruled pilot error.

This one went down about 5 miles from my house so I took great interest in the investigation.

It was not a crew member, he called maintence and asked where the CB for the warning horn was. They replied do you have a pressurisation issue?
At which point the crew passed out due to hypoxia.

The Cabin oxygen masks deployed at 12,000 feet or so, which would have given a master caution to compliment the presurisation warning. I find it unlikely that the flight crew would have succomed to hypoxia at this stage.

So any way the cabin crew were well aware that the flight was in trouble. When they could not communicate with the flight deck. they attempted to gain entry. At this stage the flight was salvageable, because the cabin crew could have given oxygen to the flight crew.

However the chief flight attendant could not remember the access code to the post 9/11 flight deck security door. The door opened automatically when the first engine flamed out. By which time the flight crew were comatose and with one engine out and the second failing there was no way the PPL was going to be able to do anything to help.

He tried to radio, apparently he did transmit but no one thought to be listening on the Cyprus departure frequency in Athens.

If he had gained access earlier for sure reviving the crew was a posibility. Also, I imagine Athens' shiny new airport has CAT 3 ILS so an auto-land "Airplane style" would not be completely out of the question, or at least a wings level crash with greater than zero survivors.

I was sure that the new cockpit doors would be sited as a contributing factor in the final investigation. But I guess so soon after 9/11 no one dared suggest such a thing and it was glossed over in the final report.

IMO there should be an emergency cockpit access button which a concious flight crew have the option of rejecting with in 60 sec say, if they dont the door should open.

One final sad point, clearly the primary cause of the accident was the captains acions. But that did not stop the lawers from trying to sue Boeing for having the same alarm for cabin depresurisation as takeoff configuration. I never heard if they got anywhere with that claim.

[Gabriel]

I'd like to clarify some points:
The Cabin oxygen masks deployed at 12,000 feet or so [...] I find it unlikely that the flight crew would have succomed to hypoxia at this stage.That's right, the crew was usefully conscious well beyond that point. That is known by comparing the radar tapes and FDR with the communications with the ground technical crew on a same timeline.
So any way the cabin crew were well aware that the flight was in trouble. When they could not communicate with the flight deck...... which was too late after the masks had deployed and instead of the expected emergency descent the airplane kept climbing......they attempted to gain entry. At this stage the flight was salvageable, because the cabin crew could have given oxygen to the flight crew.That's pure speculation. There is no evidence of when or if they attempted to gain entry, so it is not known if the pilots were recoverable at this stage if that stage existed to begin with.However the chief flight attendant could not remember the access code to the post 9/11 flight deck security door.Pure speculation again. It's impossible to know. The DFDR doesn't record the mind of the chief flight attendant.The door opened automatically when the first engine flamed out. By which time the flight crew were comatose and with one engine out and the second failing there was no way the PPL was going to be able to do anything to help.Perhaps I'm wrong, but I'm quite sure that's wrong again and that the flight attendant / PPL was already in the cockpit when the first engine flamed out. The F-16 reported seeing the flight attendant in the cockpit, and that was before the airplane started to spiral down in one engine. So the flight attendant / PPL gained access to the flight deck in some other way that the door opening because of one engine shutting down.He tried to radio, apparently he did transmit but no one thought to be listening on the Cyprus departure frequency in Athens.No. "Mayday" was recorded in the CVR, but at the same time the DFDR show that the press-to-talk button was not keyed, so he never transmitted anything.Also, I imagine Athens' shiny new airport has CAT 3 ILS so an auto-land "Airplane style" would not be completely out of the question, or at least a wings level crash with greater than zero survivors.Gliding a 737 and pulling up a bit before touchdown to prevent crashing nose first is easy even for a low time PPL, and I know what I'm talking about.
The investigators cited hypoxia (but before full unconsciousness) as a probable explanation for the flight attendant / PPL poor performance, even for a PPL. For example saying "mayday" in a very weak voice and failing to press the mic key.IMO there should be an emergency cockpit access button which a conscious flight crew have the option of rejecting with in 60 sec say, if they dont the door should open.Are you sure there isn't something like that? The investigators withheld the information about the door and its operation for security reasons.

[Quench]

I re-read parts of the report
which is here http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/PIO/PIO.nsf/all/F15FBD7320037284C2257204002B6243/$file/FINAL%20REPORT%205B-DBY.pdf

You are right, I have forgotten some details

I'd like to clarify some points:
That's right, the crew was usefully conscious well beyond that point. That is known by comparing the radar tapes and FDR with the communications with the ground technical crew on a same timeline.
... which was too late after the masks had deployed and instead of the expected emergency descent the airplane kept climbing...

It would not be too late to revive the flight crew. At a cabin altitude of 25,000 ft they would be unconcious but reviveable for what 10 - 20 minutes at least.


That's pure speculation. There is no evidence of when or if they attempted to gain entry, so it is not known if the pilots were recoverable at this stage if that stage existed to begin with.Pure speculation again. It's impossible to know. The DFDR doesn't record the mind of the chief flight attendant.


The CVR was of the type that only has the last 30 minutes so unfortunately I have to speculate. This is a luxury I have which the official investigators do not (officialy at least)

So the PAX oxygen was supposed to deploy at cabin altitude of 12,000 but actualy deployed at 18,000ft. Since the PPL flight attendant was concious just before the crash at FL340 we must assume he was concious for most of the flight and on O2 otherwise how did he regain conciousness after 2 hours at cabin altitude of 25,000ft. Three portable oxygen packs were found in the crash with the valves open.

Now he is concious, he sees the oxygen masks drop, probably tries to help passengers to put masks on. The PAX oxygen lasts 12 minutes. So 12 minutes later all the PAX start dying.
No word from the flight deck, no emergency descent.
What would he do? He woud try to phone the flight deck of course. But there is no answer.
Now what do you do? passengers are dying. For sure you would attempt to gain access to the flight deck.

This would be at most 15 minutes after oxygen masks deployed.
That is assuming he and the rest of the crew do not try to call the flight deck immediately. They are supposed to call every 20 minutes during normal operation!

The report states

The Board found the fact that this cabin attendant might not have attempted to enter the
flight deck until hours after the first indication that the aircraft was experiencing a nonnormal
situation quite puzzling. Of course, in the absence of a longer-duration CVR, it
was not possible to know whether this or any other cabin crew member had attempted to
or succeeded in entering the flight deck. From the sounds recorded on the CVR,
however, the Board could ascertain that this cabin attendant entered the cockpit using the
emergency access code to open a locked cockpit door.


But also from the report


At 08:48:31 h, two chimes were heard on the CVR and, at 08:48:51 h, another two
chimes were heard followed after 20 seconds by a continuous chime which lasted 20
seconds. Some seconds later, a click sound similar to the cockpit door opening was
recorded. Also, sounds similar to movement in the cockpit, seat adjustment, and oxygen
7
mask removal from its stowage box and oxygen flow during donning of the mask were
recorded.
Approximately 08:49 h, during the tenth holding pattern, the F-16 pilot observed a person
wearing a light blue shirt and dark vest, but not wearing an oxygen mask, enter the
cockpit and sit down in the Captain’s seat. He put on a set of headphones and appeared
to place his hands on the panel directly in front of him.
According to the FDR, at 08:49:50 h, the left engine flamed out



Look at the times Access 08:48:31, flame out 08:49:50
79 seconds later.


Yes it is impossible to determine what the Flight attendants were doing for 2.5 hours. However ISTM if they were unconcious they would stay that way. If they were concious they would be trying to gain access to the flight deck.

Maybe they gained access and could not revive the crew. But now knowing there is no flight crew then this PPL did nothing that would have registered on the FDR. Donen't seem possible to me.

the PPL would have been able to figure out how to work the radio and transponder in 2 hours.

So the only conclusion I can make that fits the facts is that at least one member of the cabin crew was concious for the whole 3 hours and unable to access the flight deck. Until 79 secconds before flameout.




Perhaps I'm wrong, but I'm quite sure that's wrong again and that the flight attendant / PPL was already in the cockpit when the first engine flamed out. The F-16 reported seeing the flight attendant in the cockpit, and that was before the airplane started to spiral down in one engine. So the flight attendant / PPL gained access to the flight deck in some other way that the door opening because of one engine shutting down.No. "Mayday" was recorded in the CVR, but at the same time the DFDR show that the press-to-talk button was not keyed, so he never transmitted

Yes you are quite right. I remember frustrated at the time that they tried 121.5 and Athens radar but not Larnacia departure. It would seem good practice try the last allocated frequency.


anything.Gliding a 737 and pulling up a bit before touchdown to prevent crashing nose first is easy even for a low time PPL, and I know what I'm talking about.
The investigators cited hypoxia (but before full unconsciousness) as a probable explanation for the flight attendant / PPL poor performance, even for a PPL. For example saying "mayday" in a very weak voice and failing to press the mic key.


Yes could be an explanation, but three used portable O2 packs and 3 hours to act seems unlikely. Either he had hypoxia for 3 hours so he would be in a coma like the rest or he had a good hour or two of usefull conciousness.


Are you sure there isn't something like that? The investigators withheld the information about the door and its operation for security reasons.
[/QUOTE]

I believe this is the way they work now, but 5B-DBY did not have this system clearly the report talks about coded access keypad. Which clearly had an expected 40 second access delay. And probably (I assume) there would be a similar 40 second delay if some other event triggered the door to open.

I was thinking that the door should open in the event of loss of cabin pressure. Then I thought no good because a hijacker can induce a loss of cabin pressure. But then I thought the thing to do would be to initiate the 40 second sequence if the cabin looses pressure. If the flight crew are concious in a hijack situation they can reject. Otherwise the door would open.


In any event these are the kinds of recommendations I was expecting to see in the report and I did not.
However it is possible that such recommendations were made and are classified.

I hope this is the case.